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The Naqshbandi-Haqqani order, with roots
in Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria, has
emerged since the mid-1970s as one of the
most visible and fastest-growing Sufi orders
in Western Europe and North America. The
success of this conservative, s h a ri ca h- m i n d-
ed spiritual movement in attracting Euro-
peans and Americans to both Islam and Su-
fism stems from a number of sources. The
order’s teachings promote time-honoured
and appealing mystical themes that include
spiritual growth, love, respect for the natur-
al environment and religious toleration, all
of which, the order insists, are epitomized in
the s u n n a h of the Prophet Muhammad. The
message is effectively distributed to a wide
following on the internet, in books and
pamphlets, and through a well-organized
network of national Sufi centres and local
circles that gather for weekly z i k r (a commu-
nal ritual that ‘remembers’ Allah). The two
main leaders of the order, Shaykh Nazim
Haqqani and his deputy Shaykh Hisham
Kabbani, reinforce these teachings and ce-
ment powerful personal ties with their fol-
lowers through almost constant touring and
t r a v e l .
Also included within the order’s teachings
– but by no means its major focus – are spo-
radic references to an eclectic and complex
apocalyptic scenario that is grounded firmly
in Sunni eschatology but driven by mystical-
ly inspired visionary insight into current
events, politics, and the future. The result is
a vision of troubled times ahead that res-
onates powerfully with certain modern West-
e r n audiences, whether Christian, Muslim or
avowedly non-religious. 
Rise of the Order
The Naqshbandi-Haqqani order is a mod-
ern branch of the larger well-known Naqsh-
bandi order, a Sufi brotherhood that took its
name and inspiration from the 14th c e n t u r y
Central Asian mystic Khwaja Baha’ al-din
Naqshband. Historically, the Naqshbandis
have enjoyed enduring popularity and are
active today especially in Turkey, Afghan-
istan, the Balkans, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, India,
northwestern China, Bangladesh, Malaysia
and Indonesia. Linking the Naqshbandis
across these diverse ethnic, social and his-
toric settings are a set of defining features:
an uncompromising Sunni orientation, em-
phasis on s h a rıi ca h and s u n n a h, and a tradi-
tion of full social and political participation
in the world.
Shaykh Nazim Haqqani (b. 1922) is the
‘grand-shaykh’ and namesake of the Naqsh-
bandi-Haqqani lineage. The son of a junior
Egyptian colonial administrator in British
Cyprus, Shaykh Nazim’s spiritual education
began in Istanbul; later, in Damascus, he
joined the order under Shaykh cAbd Allah
Daghestani (d. 1973). Deputed to Cyprus,
Shaykh Nazim ‘spread spiritual guidance
and Islamic teachings’ for seven years be-
fore eventually returning to Syria.
Naqshbandi-Haqqani hagiographies por-
tray the period from the early 1950s until
1974 as one of intense spiritual activity for
Shaykh Nazim, marked by lengthy retreats
and extensive preaching tours in Syria and
Cyprus. He encouraged people ‘to leave
atheism, secularism and materialism and to
come back to God,’ but his criticisms of the
Cypriot coalition government led to his ex-
pulsion in 1965 and his eventual return to
D a m a s c u s .
The Haqqani branch, based around Shaykh
Nazim’s distinctive practice, emerged in
1973. Empowered by the spirit of the
Prophet Muhammad, Shaykh Nazim began
his mission ‘to spread the light of Islam into
the European countries.’ He travelled first to
London and, encouraged by the followers of
Gurdjieff protégé John G. Bennett (d. 1974),
established a centre. Each year since then,
Shaykh Nazim has made it his custom to
spend Ramadan in London before returning
overland across Europe to the Middle East,
halting en route to teach about Islam and
the Naqshbandi order. His efforts expanded
to include South and Southeast Asia, and by
the late 1980s the Haqqani branch claimed
to have followers all over Asia, including
thousands in Pakistan and over 20,000 disci-
ples in Sri Lanka.
Shaykh Nazim’s first trips to the United
States and Canada were in 1991, with the re-
sult (according to Haqqani literature) of
over 10,000 people becoming Muslims and
Naqshbandis. That same year, Shaykh
Hisham Kabbani (Shaykh Nazim’s son in-law
and spiritual deputy) was named shaykh of
the order in the Western Hemisphere and
ordered to reside in the United States.
Today Shaykh Hisham oversees a network of
twenty-three mosques, centres and retreats,
anchored by a ‘convention and retreat cen-
tre’ on farmland in Michigan and by his own
residence in northern California.
The ‘signs of the Hour’
a n d the Mahdi
The Naqshbandi-Haqqani order is virtually
alone among contemporary Sunni groups in
its accent on the Mahdi, the ‘signs of the
Hour’ and the end of this world. By virtue of
their mystical visions, status and insights,
the Haqqani shaykhs claim deep insight into
the unfolding events of the imminent ‘last
days’. Traditional Sunni eschatology is built
around the Qur’an’s urgent, vivid images of
cosmic anarchy (the ‘signs of the Hour’) and
from a wealth of related Prophetic tradi-
tions. The decline of society and cataclysmic
events in the natural world announce the
‘Last Day’, which climaxes in the physical
resurrection and ultimate judgement of all
human beings. For Sunnis, belief in this final
day is part of i m a n (‘faith’), just as knowl-
edge of precisely when these events will
occur is Allah’s alone. But if the certainty of
these eschatological events is agreed upon,
the complex details of the apocalyptic script
are not. The events, their order and the pre-
cise roles of such figures as cIsa (Jesus) and
the Mahdi (‘the rightly-guided one’) and Da-
jjal (the ‘Deceiver’) are shadowy and con-
tested in a rich and unwieldy literature of
Muslim chiliastic traditions.
For the Naqshbandi-Haqqani shaykhs,
however, mystical illumination allows no
confusion about the proper understanding
of the traditional Sunni sources – the Dajjal
and the Mahdi are presently alive, Armaged-
don is imminent, and vast, profound
changes loom in the world. In 1992, Shaykh
Hisham assured his listeners: 
‘We are the only group expecting Mahdi and
Jesus’ coming very soon. We are on the right
track. We have met them.’
Moreover, the shaykhs maintain a vision-
ary spiritual connection with the two fig-
ures. 
‘What I am telling you is according to true
vision, not vague or imagined. Mahdi (s) and
Jesus (s) are among you.’1
The Naqshbandi-Haqqani shaykhs present
an idiosyncratic and complicated agenda
for the last days, all anchored with refer-
ences to historic Muslim thinkers as diverse
as Ibn Kathir and Ibn Al-cArabi. At one point
England will peaceably convert to Islam,
and hidden saints will operate in Germany
and China. Global Pax Americana will ensue
before World War III erupts around Turkey.
Billions will die before Mahdi and cIsa ap-
pear to slay Dajjal and inaugurate their
miraculous reign of love, justice, peace and
happiness. Afterwards, the world and time
will conclude with the final judgement.
Shaykh Nazim has been tapped for a special
role in these last days. The Mahdi, presently
occulted in a cave in the ‘Empty Quarter’ in
the Arabian Peninsula, has charged Shaykh
Nazim with the spiritual preparation of his
‘helpers’ – the Muslims and non-Muslims who
will rally behind the ‘rightly-guided one’
when he declares his redemptive mission.2 Ig-
noring occasional Muslim criticism of their
prophecies and ‘fortune-telling’, both Shaykh
Nazim and Shaykh Hisham selectively share
their mystical foreknowledge of coming
events. On some ‘secrets’, however, they are
silent, maintaining they have not yet received
the Mahdi’s permission to speak.
Ecumenical Apocalypticism
The Haqqani shaykhs mix traditional es-
chatological motifs with their own mystical
interpretations of current times: the result is
a shifting, event-driven script of the ‘last
days’ that is at once timely and timeless.
Shaykh Nazim’s specific (and elastic) end-
time predictions have ranged to explain
new figures (such as the Russian ultra-na-
tionalist Vladamir Zhirinovsky) as well as
dramatic developments including the Gulf
War and the fall of Communism. This ability
to relate even the most unexpected events
to a larger explanatory framework – that is,
to draw eternal meaning from the ‘chaos’ of
the ephemeral world – may be the most
powerful lure of almost all contemporary
apocalyptic movements world-wide.
There is much room within the evolving
Naqshbandi-Haqqani mystical exegesis of
world events for sharing apocalyptic themes
and imagery. Striking examples of this bor-
rowing abound. Shaykhs Nazim and Hisham
speak easily of ‘Armageddon’ and ‘World
War III’, the ‘Anti-Christ’ and the ‘Saviour’, in
their discussions with Muslims and non-
Muslims in Europe and North America. Both
shaykhs also offer (and revise) their predict-
ed beginnings for the last days (which have
included 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993 and 2000)
in the Gregorian and not the Hijri calendar.
Though all the symbols noted above can
have an Islamic provenance, they are also
instantly and unmistakably familiar to many
Western audiences in an entirely different
context. The Haqqanis employ this shared
apocalyptic vocabulary to poignantly em-
phasize how Islam and Islamic spirituality
are vital to the lives of even their non-Mus-
lim listeners.
Despite the frequent and spectacular fail-
ures of Naqshbandi-Haqqani apocalyptic
prophecy, the order’s popularity continues
to rise. This is a salient clue to a deeper func-
tion of ‘Mahdism’ in Naqshbandi-Haqqani
rhetoric. For, while it may be curiosity or
concern over the ‘last days’ that might draw
some initiates to the order, these initiates
are able to find satisfying reasons to stay
At first glance, the arrival of the year 2000 AD seems
unlikely to provoke any great reaction – much less
spiritual anxiety – among most Muslims. Any West-
ern ‘centurial mysticism’ surrounding the date 1 Jan-
uary 2000 AD vanishes, after all, in the Hijri calendar
equivalent of Ramadan 24, 1420. But despite the out-
ward irrelevance of the Gregorian 2000 to most of
the u m m a h, one Islamic mystical brotherhood – the
Naqshbandi-Haqqani order – finds the advent of the
year 2000 one of several powerful symbolic events in
which traditional Sunni ideas of the ‘Last Day’ inter-
sect with the millennial expectations of a new gener-
ation of European and American converts to Islam.
A Sufi Apocalypse
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The Millennium is not an Islamic event, but it developed into a global event
making it difficult to ignore or avoid. Eschatological sentiments feed on glob-
al occurrences such as the increase in armed conflicts, population crises, and
the digital phantom of the Millennium Bug, but also on the desire for the ful-
filment of prophecies of justice and social equality. The growing sense of
global interdependency – in particular in frames of (potential) conflict of inter-
ests or, conversely, of consensus – grants reliability and authority to advo-
cates of universalist schemes, including those elaborating upon the notion of
equality through the New Media and those building upon seemingly more tra-
ditional religious concepts. The champions of the information revolution may
well be critiqued for their social optimism (Lawrence, p. 9), but their appeal is
strong and the experiments impact on society (Lotfalian, p. 8). The millenari-
ans may not be representative of the larger communities
of faith, but they are too indicative of the fluidity of devo-
tional practice and narrative. The remarkable mix of ima-
ges and ideas taken from diverse religious and spiritual
traditions and discourses by the Naqshibandi-Haqqani
leadership (see cover), combined with the extensive geo-
graphical spread of this Sufi order, illustrates the complex-
ities of the current movements of people and ideas. The order embraces what
are thought to be Christian concepts of the End of Time, synchronizes with the
Gregorian calendar, and addresses concerns of a broader public in the West in
order to further its spread, in particular in North America. This trend of fusion
is not restricted to clearly transnational organizations such as the Naqshiban-
di-Haqqani organization, also in the Middle East one finds a vivid Arabic es-
chatological discourse in which elements adopted from Western millenarian-
ism play a prominent role. The shared historical sources of this particular reli-
gious genre may partly explain this phenomenon, but, evidently, apocalyptic
imageries are open to a great variety of signs and omens, thus globalizing the
Millennium 2000 and making it relevant to – at the least some – Muslim audi-
ences. The inclusion of recent and current events, for instance the Gulf War
and the wars in the Balkans and in the Caucasus, also puts the West on the
apocalyptic stage, even allowing for the endorsement of Western Clash of Cul-
tures and End of Histories theories (Furnish, p. 22). Merchandizing the Millen-
nium occurs in the Muslim World, too, albeit not on a scale comparable to the
West. It is mostly a highly fused phenomenon in which elements from ancient
traditions are freely combined with high-tech imageries of global consumer-
ism. In Gizeh, for example, a golden top is airlifted on the largest pyramid
when the hour of the Millennium strikes, a costly event which arouses opposi-
tion from various circles, including Muslim ones.
But it is not only the final hours of a century that set the stage for transcultur-
al experiments: the constant migration of people and ideas can also be a cata-
lyst to experimentation elsewhere. The romantic encounters between Paki-
stani men and Philippine women in Hong Kong and the subsequent conversion
of the latter to Islam are a case in point (Hawwa, p. 10). Several contributions to
this issue show that the line between defending and inventing tradition is
blurred in societal debates on what is considered fashionable and socially de-
sirable in the context of migrant communities. Transnational in character, mi-
grant communities are not only confronted with views and customs of local
majorities, but also become part of local communities through schooling, ca-
reer and intermarriage, a process that put their social, religious and/or nation-
al identities to the test (Van den Bremen, p. 7; Amiraux, p. 30; Buitelaar p. 29;
Lewis p. 28). The situation of old Muslim minorities differs from that of migrant
communities in that they put greater stress on preservation (of local majority
status; see Attané, p. 11) or on the idea(l) of re-establishing their communities
(Armijo-Hussein, p. 12; Szajkowski p. 27). A remarkable situation exists in an
area where the Muslim World converges with that of Ethiopian Christianity: re-
peated collective migration from the one religion to the other (Abbink, p. 24).
In other cases not people but spirits seem to have migrated, as in the case of
Muslim Shamanism of Central Asia (Garrone, p. 15). 
Naturally, debates on fashion and social codes are also
very common in predominantly Muslim societies (Popenoe
p. 5; El Guindi p. 6;; Ahmad, p. 16; Ensel p. 23). What makes
the debates in these societies more pertinent is, perhaps,
the different political significance of Islam – being the reli-
gion of the majority of citizens or the religion of state, or
both. In Europe, the US or China, Islam is on the political
agenda, but those speaking in its name do not, or hardly ever, set the agenda,
albeit that in the Balkans Muslim votes count (Chukov, p. 26). In many Muslim
countries Islam is integrated into the political system in the sense that govern-
ments and oppositional groups make use of its institutions and vocabulary, and
like their constituencies ascribe to its general values. Political uses of Islam are
not new phenomena, and the political relevance of Islam to modern state build-
ing has been recognized by many, starting with the Ottomans (Rogan, p. 19). At
present its political potential often favours linkage between political and reli-
gious elites (Noor, p. 13; Van Hoven, p. 25). In internal or external conflicts mod-
ern Muslim conceptions of political rights and wrongs challenge alternative ex -
pressions; and often, as in the cases of Kashmir and Jordan/Palestine, the politi-
cal appeal of Muslim groups transgresses state boundaries (Rao, p. 17; Al-Kha-
zendar, p. 20-1).
Research on societies and their systems of beliefs can only be pursued in a
successful manner when criticism is expressed. Subsequently, reviews of re-
cent research, even state of the arts reports, are vital. In this issue the study of
Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa (Brenner, p. 31) and in Post-Soviet Russia (Bobrov-
nikov, p. 32) are critically reviewed. News on institutes, projects and conferen-
ces relevant to the study of Muslim societies and communities constitutes an-
other pillar of this N e w s l e t t e r. Given the multitude and wide variety of initia-
tives, both old and new, ISIM would like to invite as many contributions to this
category as possible, also in view of the development of an electronic guide.
Linking of research – also to the study of non-Muslim societies – and access to
results of research remains problematic. Apart from conducting original re-
search, ISIM aspires to connect the various traditions, trends and aspirations
in the broad field of the study of Muslim society and to help in making them
a c c e s s i b l e . ♦
DICK DOUWES
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The ISIM solicits your response to the ISIM News-
letter. If you wish to contribute to the Newsletter,
style sheets may be obtained upon request from
the ISIM Secretariat or on the ISIM website. In order
to offer update information on activities concern-
ing the study of Islam and Muslim societies, along
with news on vacancies, grants, and fellowships,
the ISIM relies on its readers. The information will
be made available on the ISIM Website.
The ISIM Newsletter is a tri-annual publication of
the International Institute for the Study of Islam in
the Modern World (ISIM). Responsibility for the
facts and opinions expressed in this publication
rests solely with the authors. Their views do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute or its sup-
porters. The ISIM Newsletter is free of charge.
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E d i t o r i a l
N E W S V A C A N C Y
ISIM Chair:  University
of Amsterdam
The ISIM and the University of Amsterdam invite applications for the ISIM Chair for the
Study of Contemporary Islam at the University of Amsterdam, at the Faculty of Social
and Behavioural Sciences. This faculty organizes 11 degree programmes, an extensive
international study programme and conducts a series of research programmes at 8 in-
stitutes. The faculty employs over 400 permanent staff members and counts more than
7,000 students. A multidisciplinary approach and international cooperation are actively
e n c o u r a g e d .
Candidates should:
– possess an established international reputation in the study of contemporary Muslim
societies from the social science perspective;
– have extensive knowledge of one or more regions and be well versed in comparative
social science research;
– have a strong record of field experience;
– have wide-ranging academic contacts, particularly in the Muslim world;
– have an excellent command of languages relevant to their field of research as well as
fluency in English; and
– have experience in teaching and supervising postgraduate programmes.
The holder of the ISIM Chair will be expected to carry out the following tasks at both
the ISIM and the University of Amsterdam:
– develop research programmes and conduct research within the framework of the two
i n s t i t u t i o n s ;
– teach classes and provide supervision to undergraduate and graduate students; and
– contribute to various other academic activities such as conferences and special
l e c t u r e s .
This ISIM Professorship is a full-time position for a maximum of five years with the p o s-
sibility of extension. Female candidates are especially encouraged to apply.
Review of applications will begin on 1 March 2000.
Applicants should send a full CV, including list of publications, to: Prof. Muhammad Khalid Masud
ISIM, P.O. Box 11089, 2301 EB Leiden, The Netherlands
The University
o f N i j m e g e n
Joins the ISIM
It is with great pleasure that the ISIM welcomes the University of
Nijmegen as a full partner in the Institute. The University of Ni-
jmegen – located in the east of the Netherlands – is one of the
largest Dutch national universities. Founded in 1923 as a result
of the emancipation of the Catholic community in the Nether-
lands, the university developed into one of the main centres of
learning in the country. Today, it offers 73 training courses, at-
tracting well over 12,000 students, and employs nearly 4,000
staff members distributed over 9 faculties.
Over the last decades, the University of Nijmegen has con-
tributed strongly to the development of the study of Islam and
Muslim societies in the Netherlands and beyond. The regional
emphasis at the various relevant departments and institutes
(Middle Eastern Studies, Anthropology, Centre for Women’s
Studies, Religious Studies, Third World Centre) is on the Middle
East and North Africa. However, Sub-Saharan Africa and South-
east Asia, as well as migrant communities in Europe, constitute
part of the research interests.
The University of Nijmegen was involved in the early stages of
discussions leading to the foundation of the ISIM. With its par-
ticipation, the ISIM strengthens its national basis. Profiting from
the expertise in Nijmegen, the new input enables the ISIM to fur-
ther expand its activities. As is the case for the other participat-
ing universities, a special ISIM Chair will be established at the
University of Nijmegen. The appointment will be announced in
the next ISIM Newsletter, but may well be published on the ISIM
Website and elsewhere earlier.
The ISIM is organizing sounding board meetings in the
intellectual capitals of the Muslim world. The first of
this series was held in Beirut last May. In October 1999,
an ISIM delegation visited Cairo for a joint meeting
with the Center for the Study of Developing Countries
at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science (FEPS)
of Cairo University. The ISIM delegation also visited a
number of other institutes in order to explore the pos-
sibilities of cooperation, in particular in view of the col-
lection of local printed materials. The choice for Cairo
was an obvious one: the city has been a centre of Islam-
ic learning since the early days of Islam and has been a
cradle of reformist, modernist and revivalist move-
ments in the last two centuries. This city of teeming mil-
lions has a large number of publishing houses that pro-
duce an abundance of Islamic literature, demonstrat-
ing the scholarly vitality of the city that also hosts ma-
jor trends in Islam today. 
ISIM Cairo Meeting 
and cooperation between the western and
non-western scholarship for the study of
contemporary Islam. The first day a number
of scholars of Cairo University as well as
from various other institutes such as the
American University of Cairo, the Centre d’É-
tudes et de Documentation Economique,
Juridique et Social (CEDEJ) and the Al-Ah-
ram Centre, presented their current re-
search. The second day consisted in a pre-
sentation of the ISIM research pogrammes
and plans and a panel discussion. 
The second objective was to explore the
possibility of cooperation for the recruit-
ment of students for the ISIM. For this pur-
pose the Netherlands-Flemish Institute in
Cairo (NVIC) organized a seminar. In cooper-
ation with the CEDEJ, a number of potential
PhD students from the region, including the
Sudan, were invited. The students present-
ed their research work and discussed the
possibilities for further research. A number
of Dutch and Flemish PhD students who
conduct research in Egypt also participated.
The ISIM delegation paid visits to several
institutes and publishing houses in order to
introduce the Institute and to explore possi-
ble cooperation with them. Muhammad
Khalid Masud gave a talk on ‘Shatibi’s Phi-
losophy of Islamic Law and its impact on
Modern Muslim Thought’ at al-Azhar. Other
visits included the Al-Ahram Center for Stra-
The main objective of the sounding board
meeting was to discuss the problematics in
the study of Islam in the modern world. For
this purpose, a two-day workshop (October
26-27) was organized at the Center for the
Study of Developing Countries at Cairo Uni-
versity. Dr Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyed, the
Director of the Center, provided informa-
tion on the dynamics of the organization.
Hasan Hanafi, a leading intellectual, pre-
sented the keynote address. He surveyed
the major trends in Islamic Studies and
stressed the need for mutual understanding
tegic Studies, the International Institute of
Islamic Thought and the American Universi-
ty. A short courtesy visit was made to the
Mashikhat al-Azhar.
Local printed materials
The ISIM was especially interested in the
possibilities for the acquisition of local print-
ed materials, in particular gray literature and
ephemera, and local periodicals. This type of
literature is vital for the study of contempora-
ry movements and trends but is not general-
ly acquired by university libraries. The ISIM
has initiated the production of an index of re-
cent scholarly publications on contemporary
Islam and Muslim society in local languages.
Existing reference tools like Index Islamicus
provide information only about materials
published in Western languages. Equally sig-
nificant research material in non-Western
languages often goes unnoticed. ISIM plans
to publish this index as an annex to its News-
letter and on its Website. This project enables
the production of analytical bibliographical
surveys and of state of the arts surveys in the
region.  ♦
Muhammad Khalid Masud is the ISIM Academic
D i r e c t o r .
Participants in the Cairo Meeting:
– Mona Abaza (American University of Cairo)
– Saif El-Din Abdel-Fattah ( F E P S / I I T )
– Ola Abou Zeid ( F E P S )
– Wadouda Badran ( F E P S )
– Martin van Bruinessen ( I S I M )
– Dick Douwes ( I S I M )
– Han den Heier ( N V I C )
– Raufa Hasan (Centre of Women Studies, 
Sana’a University)
– Iman Farag ( C E D E J )
– Hasan Hanafi (Faculty of Philosophy, CU)
– Dina Khawaga ( C E D E J - F E P S )
– Muhammad Khalid Masud ( I S I M )
– Hoda Mitkis ( F E P S )
– Nivine Mos’ad ( F E P S )
– Hala Mustafa (Al-Ahram Center)
– Nadia Mustapha ( F E P S )
– Mustapha Kamil Al-Sayyed ( F E P S )
– Mohammed El-Sayyid Selim ( F E P S )
– Iffat Al-Sharqawi (Ain Shams University)
– Gino Schallenberg ( N V I C )
– Sami Zubaida (Berkbeck College,
University of London)
Inst itut i o na l a c t iv i t ie s
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Inst itut i o na l ne w s
A P P O I N T M E N T
Martin van Bruinessen initially studied theoretical
physics and mathematics, only later turning to an-
thropology and Islamic studies. When still a student
in physics, he took a number of long trips to the Mid-
dle East that aroused his lasting interest in the re-
gion. He then followed courses in anthropology and
started learning Turkish and Persian. After a few
years as a mathematics teacher, he received a re-
search grant for fieldwork among the Kurds, which
allowed him to spend two years in the Kurdish-inhab-
ited parts of Iran, Iraq, Iran and Syria. He received his
PhD from Utrecht University in 1978, with a thesis on
the social and political organization of Kurdistan.
One of the major themes in this thesis concerns the
social and political roles of Sufi orders (especially
Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya) among the Kurds.
This work was established as one of the key texts on
Kurdish society, and it was translated into various
languages, including Turkish, Kurdish and Persian.*




Van Bruinessen has frequently revisited Kur-
distan, and has published numerous articles
on Kurdish society and history, with a strong
emphasis on the place of religion. In order to
give his work more historical depth, he took
up Ottoman studies and worked on a number
of Ottoman sources about Kurdish society.
Some of this work was published as an edition
and analysis of one of the major 17th-century
sources on Kurdish society, Evliya Çelebi’s fa-
mous travelogue (Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir,
Brill, Leiden, 1988). 
Meanwhile, Van Bruinessen had moved on
to another part of the Muslim world, Indone-
sia. A stroke of good luck landed him a tem-
porary research position at the Royal Institute
of Linguistics and Anthropology (KITLV) in
Leiden, which allowed him to spend consid-
erable time in Indonesia (1983-84). His first re-
search project was concerned with whether
the Islamic resurgence and Islamic radicalism
were triggered by rural-to-urban migration
and relative deprivation, as has often been as-
serted to be the case in the Middle East. In-
stead of starting with Muslim radicals, howe-
ver, he decided to look at the situation of ru-
ral-to-urban migrants who clearly experi-
enced relative deprivation and register their
responses. He lived in an urban slum in Band-
ung (West Java) for almost a year. Not surpris-
ingly, perhaps, he found little radicalism but a
lot of magic and mysticism and discovered
that ‘traditionalist’ Islam remains very vital in
a modern urban setting. 
Van Bruinessen’s next Indonesian experi-
ence was to be when Indonesia’s Institute of
Sciences (LIPI) invited him as a consultant for
field research methods (1986-90). He took
part, inter alia , in a large research project on
the worldview of Indonesia’s ulama, carried
out by Indonesian researchers. This position
enabled him to travel throughout the Muslim
parts of Indonesia and get to know numerous
ulama and Muslim intellectuals. Having en-
countered many ulama affiliated with the
Naqshbandiyya, he began collecting material
for a systematic survey of that Sufi order (pub-
lished as a book in Indonesian in 1992: Tare-
kat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia, Mizan,
Bandung). 
In 1991, after a brief period in the Nether-
lands and in Kurdistan, he returned to Indo-
nesia to teach sociology of religion and relat-
ed subjects at the State Institute of Islamic
Studies (IAIN) of Yogyakarta, within the
framework of the Indonesian-Netherlands
Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS). He re-
mained there until early 1994, and wrote,
among other things, a book on the ‘tradition-
alist’ Nahdlatul Ulama, which is probably the
largest organization in the entire Muslim
world. Van Bruinessen spent altogether al-
most nine years in Indonesia and has pub-
lished numerous articles in English and four
books in Indonesian on various aspects of Is-
lam in Indonesia.
Since 1994, Van Bruinessen has taught
Turkish and Kurdish studies in the Depart-
ment Oriental Languages and Cultures at
Utrecht University, with a one-year interrup-
tion as a guest professor of Kurdish Studies at
the Institute for Ethnology of Berlin’s Free
University. He was involved in drawing up
ISIM’s research profile and was initially a
member of the academic committee but
withdrew from it to apply for the ISIM chair at
Utrecht University.
His present research interests include shift-
ing religious and ethnic identities in Turkey,
the transformation of Sufi orders in modern
urban settings, contemporary developments
in Muslim socio-political thought and civil so-
ciety, and transnational Muslim networks. ♦
* A revised English version was published in 1992
a s Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political
Structures of Kurdistan, Zed Books, London.
Summer  Aca demy  – W or ki ng Gr o up
Mod er ni ty a nd Is l am 
G E O R G E S  K H A L I L
The 4t h International Summer Academy of the Berlin-
based Working Group Modernity and Islam (see I S I M
N e w s l e t t e r 2) took place from 13-25 September 1999
at the Fondation du Roi Abdul-Aziz Al Saoud pour les
Etudes Islamiques et les Sciences Humaines in Casa-
blanca, Morocco. About 30 junior and senior scholars
from various disciplines and geographical back-
grounds discussed questions relating to ‘Notions of
Law and Order in Muslim Societies’ at one of the ma-
jor research institutions in the Muslim world. The
Summer Academy was directed by Professor Gudrun
Krämer from the Institute of Islamic Studies of the
Free University of Berlin. 
Notions of Law and Order
Since 1996 the Working Group Modernity
and Islam has been organizing annual two-
week summer academies as an attempt to
internationalize its scholarly programme.
So far more than 100 junior and senior
scholars from about 20 different countries,
with their disciplinary backgrounds ran-
ging from anthropology to psychology,
covering regions from the Maghreb to Chi-
na, have participated in Summer Acade-
mies that were held under the themes of
‘Modernity and Islam’, ‘Processes and
Counter-Processes of Modernisation’, ‘Cri-
sis and Memory’ and ‘Notions of Law and
Order in Muslim Societies’. They have taken
place in Berlin, Beirut and Casablanca and
have been funded by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research.
The scholarly programme of the Working
Group Modernity and Islam tries to link re-
search undertaken i n the Muslim world to
research o n the Muslim world carried out in
Germany and other parts of the non-Muslim
world. The programme is not confined to
contemporary Middle Eastern studies but
rather emphasizes systematic questions re-
lated to the complex phenomenon of mod-
ernity, including its historical dimension.
The Summer Academy is primarily ad-
dressed to doctoral and post-doctoral re-
searchers, offering them a forum to present
and discuss their research. The programme
differs from the normal lecture-hall or con-
ference set-up, since the main contributors
are the young researchers themselves.
Leading international scholars participate in
the Academy as tutors, adding their own
methodological concerns and questions.
The idea is to draw up a sort of interim sta-
tus report that can be integrated into the
work of the young as well as the more estab-
lished scholars. 
Under the quite provocative title of ‘No-
tions of Law and Order in Muslim Societies’
discussions focused on issues such as the
rule of law, legal interpretations of the law,
the role of the practitioners of the law, law
and gender, law as a political symbol, good
governance, legal reform, change and plu-
ralism, techniques and methods of legal de-
velopment, the use of legal sources for so-
cial history as well as moral discourse, social
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Jo int  se mina r  r epo r t
E D V AN  H OV E N
Transformation Processes and Islam in Africa was the
theme of a conference held on 15 October 1999 at
the African Studies Centre (ASC) in Leiden, the Neth-
erlands. The conference was co-sponsored ISIM. 
Transformation Processes
The conference addressed the various ways in
which Islam is making its presence felt, not
only in the regions of the continent which for
centuries have belonged to Islam’s sphere of
influence, but also those that until recently
have remained virtually untouched by Islam.
Dutch research on Islam, having traditionally
focused on Indonesia and the Middle East,
testifies to the renewed interest in sub-Sahar-
an Africa, a field which is rapidly gaining im-
portance at the international level. These is-
sues, as well as the role Islam plays as a vehi-
cle of economic, political and ideological re-
orientation in many African societies, con-
necting them to broader society and appeal-
ing to more universal ideas and values, were
discussed by Professor Wim van Binsbergen
(Philosophy Faculty, Erasmus University Rot-
terdam) in his opening speech. 
Professor Muhammed Khalid Masud, Aca-
demic Director of the ISIM, discussed the no-
tion of transformation in Islam as a complex
phenomenon of a public and sacred nature.
Professor Louis Brenner (keynote speaker)
from the School of Oriental and African Stud-
ies (SOAS, London), elaborated on the kind of
transformation represented in the case of the
volunteer association, the model of Muslim
socio-political organization in contemporary
Mali. One of the questions raised by Professor
Brenner was whether the epistemic shift from
esoteriscism to rationalism, to which his well-
documented paper testified, is in fact a prod-
uct of the increasing influence of Islam or a
consequence of the conflicting social and po-
litical forces of the societies to which Muslims
belong. The second keynote speaker was Pro-
fessor Lamin Sanneh from Yale University
(USA), who raised the issue of mobility and
liminality, physical as well as symbolic, in the
processes of transformation and the contest-
ed identities they generate. Drawing on the
work of Van Gennep and Victor Turner, and
the latter’s notion of communitas in particu-
lar, Sanneh isolated various types of marginal-
ity of which ‘prescriptive marginality’ exem-
plified in the hijra is particularly relevant for
the understanding of Muslim movements in
sub-Saharan Africa.
Travelling from the west to the east of Afri-
ca, the various contributions to the confer-
ence brought to light the multifaceted mani-
festations of Islam and Islamic identities on
the African continent. Marloes Janson (CNWS,
Leiden University) discussed the attempts of
the female bards, who colour the streets of
many Gambian towns, to legitimize their of-
ten-contested profession in terms of an Islam-
ic discourse. Kirsten Langeveld (University of
Utrecht) argued that in the neighbouring Cas-
amance region (Senegal), the Jola Kumpo
mask performance is under severe attack by
Muslims though it still remains a (supernatu-
ral) force with which to be reckoned. Ed van
Hoven (CNWS, Leiden University) examined
the various attempts to ‘muridize’ Senegal’s
national culture, and the efforts of the state to
mould political affiliation in terms of the
sheikh/murid relationship.
The role of Islam and the motivation to trav-
el of the Fulbe pastoralists living in Central
Mali was discussed by Mirjam de Bruijn (Lei-
den, African Studies Centre), while Frauke Jä-
ger (Berlin, Germany) analysed the adapta-
tion of Islam to specific socio-religious con-
texts with examples from Northern Nigeria
and Northern Cameroon. The role ethnicity
plays in the process of conversion to Islam in
the North West Province of Cameroon was
discussed in the combined presentation of
Caroline Angenent (Leiden, LISOR) and An-
neke Breedveld (African Studies Centre, Lei-
den). That Islam in this region is receiving new
impulses with the Islamic movements opting
for purification with far-reaching consequen-
ces for the moral discourse on gender rela-
tions, was argued by José van Santen (Depart-
ment of Anthropology, Leiden University). Ka-
rin Willemse (Department of Non-Western
History, Erasmus University Rotterdam) dis-
cussed the phenomenon of Islamism in the
case of West Sudan and showed that Islamic
discourses on gender entail both femininity
and masculinity. 
Further south, in Tanzania, Marc de Meij
(IIMO) analysed the Muslims’ attitudes to-
wards the pluralistic state and the role of Swa-
hili as a religious language. Wim van Binsber-
gen closed the conference with a well-docu-
mented analysis of the role of Islam as a con-
stitutive factor in so-called African traditional
religion. ♦
Dr Ed van Hoven is a post-doctoral researcher at the
School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies,
University of Leiden, the Netherlands.
E-mail: e.vanhoven@inter.nl.net
For a full list of participants, see ISIM Newsletter on
the ISIM website.
For information contact: Arbeitskreis Moderne und
Islam Geschäftsstelle: Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin,
Wallotstraße 19, D–14193 Berlin, Germany
Fax: +49 - 30 - 89 00 12 00
Georges Khalil, MA, works at the Wissenschaftskolleg
zu Berlin / Institute for Advanced Study as the
coordinator of the Working Group Modernity and
Islam. E-mail: khalil@wiko-berlin.de
discipline and order. Working days were
long and rather intensive with discussions
being based on the projects of the partici-
pants and a collection of basic readings,
which had been made available to the par-
ticipants in a reader. Working days started
with a lecture by one of the tutors and
closed with a plenary session in which a re-
cent paper or article by the tutor was dis-
cussed, to be continued in the evening in
more informal settings. A number of guest
lectures by renowned Moroccan scholars
and intellectuals linked the academy work
to the ongoing debate on law and order in
the host country. Most of the time, however,
was devoted to discussions within working
groups of five to seven participants and two
tutors, where the projects of the partici-
pants and the general themes were debat-
ed. As the academy had a workshop charac-
ter, the major challenge for everyone was to
present and rethink his or her work, which in
most cases was highly specialized, relating
it not only to the overall topic of the acade-
my but also making it relevant to the other
participants. 
As shown by their written evaluation, the
participants found the Summer Academy
exhausting but also stimulating in terms of
helping them to broaden, clarify and refine
their approaches as well as to meet and
communicate with colleagues. 
The Summer Academy 2000 will be held at
the Institute of Islamic Studies of the Free
University of Berlin on the theme: History
and Historiography. New Perspectives of Re-
search. The deadline for applications is 15
January 2000. ♦
ISIM, the Institute of
Islamic Studies of the
Free University of Berlin,
and the Wissenschafts-
kolleg will cooperate in
academic meetings in
2000 and in the Summer
Academy 2001.
New ISIM Fellowships 
The ISIM invites applications and research proposals for various fellowships throughout
2000. Applications from candidates in all fields of the social sciences, humanities and re-
ligious studies will be considered. All candidates should be competent in academic Eng-
lish. 
The ISIM fellowships include:
– PhD Fellowships: ISIM PhD fellowships are granted for a period of up to 4 years. The ap-
plicants should hold an MA degree or similar qualification in their field. Most of the
PhD fellowships are placed within one of the ISIM Research Programmes. However, in-
novative individual PhD research proposals are also invited.
– Postdoctoral Fellowships: ISIM postdoctoral fellowships are granted for a period of up
to 2 years and are available to young scholars who have received their PhD degree less
than 5 years prior to application. 
– Visiting Fellowships: ISIM visiting fellowships are granted for a period of up to 3
months. Some of these senior research fellowships will be offered upon invitation,
others will be awarded in open competition. 
– Sabbatical Fellowships: the ISIM offers facilities to academic staff of participating and
other universities to conduct research. In specific cases, the ISIM makes funds avail-
able to finance the temporary replacement for teaching at the home university.
For more information on the various fellowships and to download an application form, see the ISIM Website: 
h t t p : / / w w w . i s i m . n l




The one-year ISIM MPhil Programme in Islamic Studies was inau-
gurated in November 1999. The programme is interdisciplinary
in approach and focuses on Islam and Muslim societies in the
context of modernity and globalization. It consists of five cours-
es and a thesis. Seven students, from Egypt, Germany, Indone-
sia, Lebanon, and Pakistan as well as the Netherlands, were ad-
mitted to the programme in this first year. In addition to the aca-
demic staff of ISIM and participating universities, a number of
internationally renowned scholars are involved in teaching. In
December, Brinkley Messick (Columbia University) lectured the
MPhil students. Others, including Richard Bulliet (Columbia Uni-
versity), Reinhard Schulze (University of Bern), and Stephen
Humphreys (University of California, Santa Barbara) will follow
suit in 2000. 
The MPhil prospectus for 1999-2000 and an application form
may be requested from the ISIM. Review of applications will
begin on 1 January 2000. 
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Rebecca Popenoe is assistant professor of Social
Anthropology, Linköping University, Sweden.
E-mail: popenoe@swipnet.se
Anthro p l og y o f  th e bo d y
R E B E C C A  P O P E N OE  
Is there a specifically Islamic vision of the body? Giv-
en the nuanced nature of cultural understandings of
the body and Islam’s own variable expressions, this
question is probably unanswerable, and indeed
poorly phrased. Phrased another way, however, the
question of the relationship between Islam and the
body becomes more interesting: how do bodily prac-
tices in different Muslim societies articulate with dif-
ferent versions of lived Islam? My research among
Arabs in remote northwestern Niger on the aesthetic
of corpulent female bodies, and the practice of force-
feeding young girls to achieve it, speaks to this issue.
Islam and the Body: 
Female Fattening
among Arabs in Niger
The approximately 20,000 Arabs who today
live in the Azawagh region in Niger arrived
there a century ago from what is now Mali,
and before that lived further north in what is
now Algeria. Resembling the Moors of Mau-
ritania in their use of Hassaniyya Arabic, a
nomadic way of life until recently, and the
fattening of girls, they call themselves sim-
ply ‘Arabs’, but I have chosen to call them
‘Azawagh Arabs’ after the region where they
reside. 
Fattening among Arabs
o f t h e A z a w a g h
While a corpulent female aesthetic is com-
mon in societies around the world, the prac-
tice of fattening is less so, though it too oc-
curs in many places, including among Tuar-
egs who are neighbours to Azawagh Arabs
and Moors, and in a number of sub-Saharan
African and Pacific societies. Many visitors
to the Sahel and Sahara have commented
on the female aesthetic there previously.
Ibn Battuta had already remarked on it
among Berbers in what is now Mali in 1356;
in 1799 the Scottish explorer Mungo Park
wrote poetically about ’a prevalent taste for
unwieldiness of bulk’ among Moor women;
numerous European explorers and colonial-
ists made passing reference to it; and, in the
1980s the French anthropologist Aline Tauz-
in finally put it in a more ethnographically
sensitive light in her writings on Mauritania.
The practice among Azawagh Arabs is, in
brief, as follows: 
When a girl of the higher caste loses her
first baby teeth, an older woman is
charged with overseeing her fattening
process ( a l - b l u uh- ). Until the girl reaches
puberty, she is given a large bowl of
milk or porridge several times a day and
is enjoined to empty its contents, under
threat of physical force at times. As a girl
goes through puberty, she slowly
‘learns the value of fatness herself’ and
no longer needs an overseer, though if
she has the good fortune to be married,
her mother-in-law may encourage her
progress. Adult women continue to try
to maintain their fat by ingesting large
quantities of grain, washed down with
milk or water. 
There are complex ethnotheories of nutri-
tion and fattening that prescribe what foods
to eat when and what foods to avoid, all
closely bound up with the maintenance of
proper ‘heat’ in the body. Women with
stretchmarks and folds of fat are celebrated
in song as well as everyday conversation.
When I asked men and women directly
why girls fattened and why women strove
for such corpulent forms, they answered me
in one of three ways: ‘because it is good/at-
tractive (z a y n)’, ‘because men like it’, and
‘because it makes a girl grow into a woman
faster’. My own research, based on one and
a half years in the Azawagh in the early
1990s, found that behind these simple ut-
terances lay a more complex story. This sto-
ry, though focused on notions of appropri-
ate male and female behaviour, sexuality,
and health, was not unrelated to Islam. Be-
fore I explore these connections in more de-
tail, however, I want to say something about
‘Islam’ in the context of Azawagh Arab life.
Islam for Azawagh Arabs
Unlike many other nomadic Arab peoples,
for whom Islam has been described as
something of a backdrop to more immedi-
ate tribal or ethnic concerns, the Azawagh
Arabs, both men and women, asserted their
Muslim-ness above all other aspects of their
identity. They consider themselves to be di-
rect descendants of the companions of the
Prophet, and hold their own Muslim-ness to
be of a higher, truer standard than that of
the peoples around them. Although they
themselves hold their Islam to be ‘true Is-
lam’, I want to distinguish their form of lived
Islam from Islam as some essentialized cate-
gory. The Islam of the Arabs of the Azawagh
shares elements with Muslims everywhere,
but also has its own local particularities. 
Although no one I spoke with ever con-
nected the practice of fattening to Islam (as,
say, people in some societies mistakenly
claim for female circumcision), the practice
nevertheless contributed to a life that was
in keeping with Azawagh Arabs’ lived un-
derstanding of Islam. For heuristic purposes
I divide these connections between Islam
and fattening into two categories: ideas
about the sexes and reproduction, and
ideas about the body.
Islam and Fattening
The three ‘simple’ answers I received to
the question of why girls fattened were
grounded on three unstated assumptions
about the sexes and reproduction which
found legitimation in a particular reading of
Islamic scripture: (1) that men and women
should be as different from one another as
possible, because God decreed that it
should be so, and fattening enhanced this
difference; (2) that desire was born of this
difference and that desire was positive, if
acted upon appropriately, and fat was sexy
in its extreme difference from masculinity;
and (3) that a girl’s (and a boy’s) God-given
duties were to marry and produce children,
and that fattening speeded up a girl’s ability
to reach this goal, by bringing her more
quickly to puberty. In these ways the self-ev-
ident attractiveness of corpulent women
was at least indirectly grounded in a vision
of the sexes and of the life course that Islam
upholds. To fatten, therefore, is a way for a
girl to accede to a God-given order, for it
constitutes an active embracing of sexual
difference, as well as an embracing of wom-
an’s destiny and purpose as a Muslim.
Islam also provides reinforcement, if you
will, for a particular way of understanding
the human body. During one of my first
weeks in the field, an incident occurred that
brought this home to me. While making a
rest stop on a trip, I pricked myself on a
thorn, and quickly sucked off the drop of
blood that emerged. A teenage boy in the
pick-up truck we were travelling in turned
and said to me immediately: ‘Muslims don’t
do that. Things that come out of one’s body
are not pure.’ 
By requiring ablutions, the emptying of all
bodily wastes, and the cleaning of all sexual
fluids from the body’s surfaces before every
prayer, Islam could be said to send a strong if
unarticulated message: that the body as the
physical icon of the person is most holy and
most valued by Allah when uncontaminated
by the flows, accretions, and processes of
regular physical life. By forbidding prayer
when there is any kind of discharge from
women’s bodies, Islam portrays the uncon-
tained, unbounded, leaking body as prob-
lematic, and holds up the whole, ‘closed’
body as pure and desirable. That is, while the
body in many ways constitutes a vehicle for
religious expression (ablutions, prayer pos-
tures, wearing of amulets), some aspects of
bodily nature, especially women’s bodily na-
ture, are perceived as profoundly contradict-
ory to the body that Islam upholds as pure
and virtuous. This, at least, seemed to be the
way in which Azawagh Arabs ‘read’ Islam.
‘Openness’ and ‘Closedness’
This particular Islamic understanding of
the body played itself out in one of the most
common tropes used by Azawagh Arabs to
analyse illness: ‘openness’ and ‘closedness’.
Sickness was widely considered to be due to
and to result in bodily ‘openness’, and an at-
tractive and desirable woman should be
‘closed’, as well as ‘hot’ (the two qualities in-
deed go together). Women, with their many
natural openings (mouth, anus, and espe-
cially vagina), needed to be particularly
careful to keep their bodies closed. Fatten-
ing contributes to the ‘closedness’ of the
body in several ways: by closing off the
body’s openings amidst swelling flesh; by
increasing the ‘heat’ of the body, which
keeps the body from leaking; and by making
it physically more difficult for women to
move about, thereby containing them in
less danger-laden inner spaces of the tent or
yard. 
This trope not only made sense in light of
Islamic rules about the necessary state of
the body for prayer, but was also itself ap-
plied to Islamic scripture. For example, the
body’s ‘openness’ and ‘closedness’ was a
central trope of the creation story as it was
related to me by an old woman. Both Adam
and Eve bit into the apple, but for Adam it
stuck in his throat, creating the Adam’s ap-
ple, while for Eve it flowed right through
her, creating her menstrual period. Eve’s
punishment was, in a sense, that the female
body became plagued with uncomfortable
and impure secretions, while the male body
was able to contain things and keep its
boundaries clear, enabling life in spirit- and
wind-laden open, public spaces. 
The struggle of women against their bodi-
ly ‘openness’ emerged in another religious
context as well: how heaven was imagined.
In addition to flowing milk and the ever-pre-
sent company of female relatives, women’s
representations of heaven also included
bodily wholeness and containedness. In the
words of one young woman, in heaven, ‘you
won’t defecate, or have mucous, or be sick.’ 
In short, while Azawagh Arab women’s
bodily practices were in no way determined
by Islam or even read explicitly as grounded
in Islam, they fit with ways of understanding
the body that were also upheld by the Islam
of Azawagh Arabs. Even though fattening
and notions of the body’s ‘openness’ and
‘closedness’ almost certainly have their
roots in a pre-Islamic world, local expres-
sions and understandings of Islam, and local
ideas about the body, coincided with and
reinforced one another. In this particular
context, it may not be inappropriate to
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Vei l ing  
FA D W A  E L  G U I N D I
Research on the contemporary Islamic movement
that emerged in Egypt in the 1970s, after the Rama-
dan war, revealed a centrality of the dress code
adopted by the I s l a m i y y i n (Islamic activists), which
has spread throughout the Arabic-speaking and Is-
lamic region. The newly constructed dress form was
visible and dramatic. Too much focus, however, was
on the fact that previously secularly dressed college





‘The veil’ had become problematized in the
1970s – not the conservative dress code.
And gradually there was an avalanche of
discourse and publications on ‘women’s Is-
lamic veiling’. Most used a ‘women’s studies
approach’ which confined the issue to wom-
en’s clothing and behaviour, invariably pre-
senting it as reflecting women’s invisibility
and anonymity, linking veiling to seclusion
and seclusion to institutions such as ‘the
harem’. Reductionist explanations ranged
from female subordination to patriarchal
ideology to women’s nature. Ethnographic
evidence challenged these observations
and claims.
Upon close examination it was revealed
that the code underlying the dress should
be the focus and not the dress form per se.
Indeed the disproportional focus on wom-
en’s veiling is misleading, and once this was
re-framed it became evident that men (col-
lege youth) were also ‘veiling’ as it were. In
one sense they materially veiled by wearing
the kufiyya as head cover. But they also used
it on specific occasions to partially cover
their face.
In the course of my fieldwork, I personally
observed one such incident which occurred
on the university campus in Cairo. This turned
out to be ethnographically and analytically
revealing:
It was during the semester when college
lectures were in session, and I was en-
gaged in fieldwork, that is, spending
time on campus observing and talking
with students in and outside the move-
ment. While I was with women students
in the women’s lounge, a man knocked
on the door. 
The women scrambled for their hijabs
and qina’s. Moments of confusion and
tension passed, after which the man
knocked again on the door. Finally, al-
though still unsettled, the women lead-
ers among them invited him in. I looked
out of the door and saw a man in a gal-
labiyya (an ankle-length white, unfitted
gown with long sleeves). He pulled his
kufiyya (head shawl) over his face and
entered very cautiously, literally rub-
bing against the wall trying not to look
in the direction of the women until he
reached a curtain diagonally hung in the
corner of the room. He went behind it
and sat facing the women from behind
the curtain. That is, it was the man who
both face-veiled when with women and
sat behind the hijab (curtain). His shad-
ow showed him lifting the kufiyya off his
face and letting it down to his shoul-
ders, but keeping it on his head. 
He proceeded to discuss Qur’anic
suras, particularly those pertaining to the
hijab, according to the interpretation by
Mawdudi (1972, 1985; see note 119). The
women asked him questions, and mildly
challenged some of his comments, but
all in all did not seem to be awed by or
subservient to his performance. They
were abiding by their own self-imposed
rules of ritualized cross-sex encounters in
public space. After about thirty-five min-
utes, he excused himself, and went
through a ritualized exit, similar to his
e n t r y .
Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance,
p . 1 1 8 .
Through both this incident and additional
observations, and also after examining text
and ethnography, it became evident that in
order to understand the phenomenon of
veiling, the study cannot be restricted to
the superficially obvious or the obviously
visible (women veiling). It must, rather, ex-
tend to intangible spheres and hidden
codes. The ‘dress’ movement, as it turned
out, was carried out by men and by women,
and was similar in manifestation among
b o t h .
The empirical inference that men do ‘veil’
opened the research exploration further
and led to findings on men’s veiling in vari-
ous Arabo-Islamic contexts. This challenged
single gender explanations for veiling. And
it was not a matter of ‘add men and stir’. The
overall approach was to be reconsidered.
The commonly produced linkage of h a r i m
with seclusion and sex derives from a per-
spective that embeds the phenomenon of
the veil (and its assumed environment, the
harem) in the sphere of gender, rather than
in the broader contexts of society and cul-
ture. First, the ethnographic evidence ex-
plored in this study shows that veiling occurs
without seclusion and seclusion occurs with-
out veiling. Analysis of historical records re-
veals that seclusion of women more accu-
rately describes Christian (Mediterrane-
an/Balkan) culture than it does Muslim socie-
ty. And in the Christian culture seclusion is
more associated with religion and religious
concepts of purity which are absent in Islam.
Finally, there is a need to fill the historical gap
in the scholarly coverage of women’s roles.
The veil is clearly a complex phenomenon.
The research which led to the publication of
Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance c o m-
prised a journey into history, scriptures, eth-
nography, poetry, and even photography. A
search was conducted through different
bodies of data and across national borders.
How far back does the evidence for this
practice go? Who practised it? Is it every-
where the same phenomenon? Does it have
the same meaning across eras, empires, and
religions? The quest for answers became a
voyage of discovery.
Accordingly, the veil was examined in
many contexts in a synthesis of many sour-
ces of data. In addition to ethnography and
historical materials, the study consulted Ar-
abic Islamic-textual sources as well as con-
temporary and historical materials to pro-
duce a new understanding. The procedure I
used in exploring text was contextual and
relational. Segments of text relevant to my
subject were examined against other seg-
ments in the same source. That is, a relevant
concept that is located in a particular a y a h
in a s u r a was examined against its presence
in other a y a h s in the same s u r a and also in
other s u r a s . Information in the Qur’an was
examined against t a f s i r and in h a d i t h. This
procedure had to be systematic to yield the
observations and meanings I was able to de-
rive. These are then examined against eth-
n o g r a p h y .
Drawing upon these various bodies of
knowledge, the analysis of the veil reveals a
fundamental code underlying many aspects
of Arabo-Islamic culture, which embodies
related concepts that are meaningful in tex-
tual and social contexts. I contend that the
modesty-based code (modesty-shame-se-
clusion) represents an ethnocentric imposi-
tion on Arabo-Islamic culture. Clustering
these notions obscures the nuanced differ-
ence that is characteristic of Arabo-Islamic
culture. The modesty-honour gendered op-
position is equally inappropriate.
In the course of this anthropological ex-
ploration it became evident that veiling
consists in a language that communicates
social and cultural messages, a practice that
has been present in tangible form since an-
cient times, a symbol ideologically funda-
mental to the Christian, and particularly the
Catholic, vision of womanhood and piety,
and a vehicle for resistance in Islamic socie-
ties. 
The veil is currently the centre of scholarly
debate on gender and women in the Islamic
East. In movements of Islamic activism, the
veil occupies centre stage as a symbol of
both identity and resistance. The veil, veil-
ing patterns and veiling behaviour are
therefore, according to my analysis of Arab
culture, about sacred privacy, sanctity and
the rhythmic interweaving of patterns of
worldly and sacred life, linking women as
the guardians of family sanctuaries and the
realm of the sacred in this world. I argue for
the centrality of the cultural notion of priva-
cy, as one that embodies the qualities of re-
serve, respect and restraint as these are
played out in fluid transformational bi-
rhythmic space. Dress in general, but partic-
ularly veiling, is privacy’s visual metaphor.
My argument (developed in Part II of the
book) is that veiling in contemporary Arab
culture is largely about identity, largely
about privacy – of space and body. I con-
tend that the two qualities, modesty and se-
clusion, are not adequate characterizations
of the phenomenon as it is expressed in the
Middle East. In their social setting, veiling
proxemics communicate exclusivity of rank
and nuances in kinship status and behav-
iour. Veiling also symbolizes an element of
power and autonomy and functions as a ve-
hicle for resistance. It was no accident that
colonizing powers and authoritarian local
states both consistently used the veiling of
women (and dress form for men as in Iran
and Turkey) as their theatre of control. ♦
Fieldwork for the book was conducted in Egypt and
was complemented by observations from research
trips to the Arab East, South Asia, and Andalusian
Spain. Support was provided by the UCLA African
Studies Center, the Ford Foundation, and the
Fulbright Fellowship programme.
Fadwa El Guindi is adjunct full professor 
of anthropology at the University of Southern
California, USA. She is the author of the newly
published monograph Veil: Modesty, Privacy
and Resistance. Oxford: Berg Publishers. 
E-mail: elguindi@bcf.edu
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Continued from front page: A Sufi Apocalypse / b y David Damrel
even when the predictions are discredited.
Explaining the year 2000 – and not the year
1420 – becomes the point of entry to a larg-
er project of inviting a generation of Euro-
peans and North Americans to discover
Islam. ‘Last day’ imagery serves as a timely
and effective teaching tool with which the
shaykhs drive home to their followers more
subtle spiritual teachings about the afterlife,
mystical praxis and Islam. The Haqqanis
speak to modern millennial anxieties, reli-
gious disenchantment, interest in prophesy,
and the search for spiritual truth – familiar
themes informing some of the most diverse
and dynamic expressions of spirituality in
the modern West – and change the conver-
sation from one about the end of this world
to an Islamic dialogue concerned with life in
the next. ♦
N o t e s
1 . Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, (1993),
Mercy Oceans Secrets of the Heart, Haqqani Islamic
Trust, Fenton, Michigan, p. 10. I am grateful for Mr
Mateen Siddiqui’s help in clarifying the meaning
of this passage.
2 . Shaykh Muhammad Nazim Adil al-Haqqani an-
Naqshbandi, (1994), Mystical Secrets of the Last
D a y s, Haqqani Islamic Trust for New Muslims, Los
Altos, California, pp. 125-129.
Dr. David W. Damrel is a lecturer in the Department
of Religious Studies at Arizona State University,
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Since the arrival of migrant labourers with
their families in the late 1960s and early
1970s, and with it the appearance of the
headscarf in public life in Europe, the prac-
tice of veiling has become a major issue. This
also holds for the Netherlands. The scarf was
not associated with fashion, but rather with
the issues of cultural discord and discrimina-
tion against women. Although in Western
fashion the wearing headscarves was a ma-
jor trend in the 1950s and early 1960s, veil-
ing by/of Muslim women has become the
subject of debate in terms of whether it con-
tributes to or inhibits the integration of Mus-
lims in European societies. 
Instances of being forbidden to wear
headscarves in the Netherlands have oc-
curred with some frequency. Muslim girls
and women here have filed many a com-
plaint with the Committee for Equal Treat-
ment, a state institution created to fight dis-
crimination on grounds of race, gender, and
conviction. Some years ago, this committee
declared that no-one should be denied the
right to wear a headscarf, however, more re-
cently the same committee stated that the
commonly worn headscarves created a pos-
sible danger during sports activities. It was
suggested that girls simply wear a swim cap
with a high turtleneck instead. No Muslim
girl took this alternative seriously. Many con-
tinued to skip gym class. Because it is held
that gym class is meant to stimulate team
building and interaction among students,
the controversy may constitute a hindrance
to further integration. 
As a designer, the veil poses an interesting
challenge for me: how to come up with a so-
lution which combines Islamic precepts
with Dutch regulations and expectations. I
had to design a new headscarf that is safe
for sports and at the same time covers the
head, hair and neck. I also had to avoid re-
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V e i l i n g
C I N DY  V A N  DE N  B R E M E N
Veiling has been – and still is – the subject of much
discussion in Europe, the Netherlands being no ex-
ception. Some argue that the veil counters women’s
rights. Others even see it as a provocative gesture
against European values. From a seemingly more
practical point of view, the question of safety has al-
so entered the debate on wearing headscarves, in
particular during sports activities. 
producing an already-existing solution,
such as a hood or a cap. These alternatives
are an offer without engagement. There-
fore, I designed an accessory with its own
originality and charm; one that refers to the
headscarf and thus carries its religious val-
ue. At the same time, due to the stigmatiza-
tion, I wanted to create something that did
not too literally refer to religion. That way it
would be seen as simply an accessory –
wearing it not necessarily meaning one is a
Muslim. Many Muslim girls and women that
I interviewed during my research com-
plained that they constantly felt that they
had to defend their choice of wearing a
headscarf. 
While designing the sport headscarves, I
did not only focus on the target group: I de-
signed a head-cover that is still suitable for Is-
lamic purposes, yet without having to convey
that message. I created a line of sports acces-
sories that can be worn by anyone, regardless
their choice of function, religion or even gen-
der. Four types emerged, each with special
colours, materials and shapes depending on
the particular sport. For instance, for the ‘ten-
nis model’, I looked into conventional tennis
clothing for women, which includes a short
skirt. However, many Muslim women would
never wear such a skirt. Nonetheless, since it
is so characteristic of the sport I assimilated it
in the collar. I also designed a black and white
tricot ‘Aerobics model’, a dark and light grey
lycra ‘Skate model’ with neon accent, and a
dark red fleece ‘Outdoor model’. During the
design process I asked Muslim girls for their
opinions. Since I myself do not wear a head-
scarf, their feedback on the choice of design,
material, colours and the way they close was
vital. This cooperation proved interesting and
useful, as it revealed, for example, the impor-
tance placed on the fact that the headscarf
should not make noise and that using a zip-
per at the neck is uncomfortable. Besides vis-
iting the various organizations that deal with
Muslim women, I also sought the advice of an
Imam so as to have my designs judged in
terms of Islamic regulations. He was very en-
thusiastic about this undertaking. 
My choice to undertake this subject was not
only motivated by the will to help resolve
the problem of Muslim girls in gym class, but
also to create awareness in the Western
world that many women do actually choose
to cover themselves. In the Netherlands, the
opinion that ‘all girls wear them because
their fathers tell them to’, and that ‘all wom-
en wear them because their husbands tell
them to’ is far outdated. Many girls who are
born in the Netherlands but raised with the
culture and values of their immigrant par-
ents, find themselves struggling with identi-
ty. They are, in the eyes of some, still ‘for-
eigners’ and yet to others they are perceived
as ‘Dutch’: perhaps they are both. While em-
phasizing their individuality, they find com-
fort in wearing the headscarf – symbolic of
their religion and beliefs. Many women even
experience wearing the headscarf as a free-
dom. They can interact and integrate with-
out loosing their own values and without be-
ing judged by their own community.  ♦
Cindy van den Bremen is a designer (concept, design
& styling) in Eindhoven, the Netherlands.
E-mail: cvdbremen@hotmail.com
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Sci enc e a nd Tec hno lo gy
MA Z Y A R  L O T FA L I AN
With Islamic resurgence, there has been an increased
concern that science and technology are not value-
free agents that can be appropriated and expropriat-
ed without inducing social and cultural violence.
There is a complex relationship between culture, reli-
gion and society on the one side, and science and tech-
nology on the other, that is far from being value free.
The way people understand and adopt this relation-
ship between culture, science, and technology, can be
termed ‘technoscientific identities’. This relationship
has seldom been explored in the Islamic world. 
Understanding Muslim
T e c h n o s c i e n t i f i c
I d e n t i t i e s
It can be argued that the resurgence of Is-
lam and the changes in the identity of secu-
lar states in the Islamic world have opened
up new spaces for the transformation of
technoscientific identities, creating a ‘meta-
linguistic landscape’, a landscape of global
scope. There are different modalities of dis-
course that are interacting, each making a
linguistic landscape. Ideas and concepts,
whether technological or discursive, are
formed in these landscapes and affect one
another. 
Technoscience and Islam 
in debate
In the late 1800s, the Islamic reform move-
m e n t Salafia, facing the onslaught of West-
ern scientific and institutional discursive
practices, sought to prevent the perceived
marginalization of Muslim tradition. Al-Af-
ghani argued that science in the West is the
continuation of the medieval Islamic sci-
ence and therefore Muslims can adopt it
while remaining Muslim and following their
traditions. In this interpretation, science
and the effect of European planning were
understood as inherently and potentially Is-
lamic. Science and discursive planning,
such as Timothy Mitchell explores in his ac-
count of the effects of European colonial
powers on the urban structures and life in
Cairo,* were understood not in the context
of the modern epoch as a set of interrelated
episteme, but rather as a disjointed body of
objects that might even bear Islamic roots.
This moment was marked by intellectual
debates on the relevance of Western sci-
ence (such as Darwinian evolution or Galile-
o’s astronomy) to Islam and the creation of
new imaginaries through the work of cul-
tural translation (e.g., theatre and cinema,
or the formation of the ‘new curious indi-
vidual’ as a knowledge seeker). These de-
bates came to an end around the 1920s,
when secular states adopted a hegemonic
view of science as universal, value and cul-
ture free. Consequently, Islam and other lo-
cal cultural traditions were increasingly
rendered irrelevant. 
The debates over the identity of technos-
cience have been re-opened in this turn of
the century. Now, however, a new condi-
tion frames the relationship between tech-
noscience and the Islamic world. This con-
dition can be illustrated in the following
way: first, with the resurgence of Islam,
which is a source of cultural and political
identity formation, the structure of state
and of scientific and educational institu-
tions is undergoing some changes and/or
challenges. Second, there is a new emerg-
ing discursive view, based on both Islamic
metaphysical foundations and historical
developments of the West, that sees the
West as an epoch, a set of interrelated epis-
teme. Third, references to Islamic meta-
physical foundations have become de-lo-
calized, travelling through transnational
movements of people and technological
devices such as the Internet. And fourth,
Muslim experiences of modernity/post-
modernity are multileveled, trans-local, and
i n t e r a c t i v e .
Competing discourses
The quest of Muslims in the late 20t h c e n t u-
ry is to find appropriate cultural and institu-
tional models for implementing science and
technology. Islamic countries today are far
different from the time when Europeans ar-
rived in Egypt, for instance, and ‘found’ it
‘unplanned’ and ‘undisciplined’, as they set
out to subject Egypt to new disciplined spa-
ces in order for them to be understood ac-
cording to new rules of scientific methods.
The late 20t h-century Islamic world is a con-
struct of hybrid norms and forms: on the one
hand, scientific discourses from the West de-
fine life and its natural milieu through instru-
mental reason. On the other hand, Islamic
discourses challenge this adoption of West-
ern epistemology based on instrumental
reason. The condition of technoscience,
therefore, consists of competing discourses
about how science and technology should
be implemented, taught, and practised. 
‘Science studies’ as an interdisciplinary
approach to the study of science and
technology is scarce in the contemporary
Islamic world. In this project I am at-
tempting to delineate the relationship
between science, language, religion, cul-
ture, and society. The complex relation-
ship among these categories is what I
refer to as technoscientific identities. The
problem about which is being theorized
here has to do with understanding the
fluid scene where many levels of dis-
courses, institutions, and individuals are
interacting. Current work on the philoso-
phy of language is an important contribu-
tion to the study of Muslim techno-
science. The relationship of language, cul-
ture and science can be understood as a
set of linguistic enactments that con-
struct institutional, epistemological, and
cultural bases for science and technology. 
Linguistic enactments are discursive and per-
formative articulations of ideas that float be-
tween individuals and institutions. These ar-
ticulations, in turn, are indexical of some
events, including: the demise of medieval Is-
lamic science and the effort to explain its his-
torical and cultural roots; the reform move-
ment of the late 19th century to revive Islam
and reconcile it with modernity and the at-
tendant emergence of the epochal under-
standing of the West; and, most recently,
what one might call the demise of the secular
state and the role of Islam as a political force
for the reconfiguration of the state in the
global context. These events have played de-
constructive roles in recent reconfiguration of
Muslim technoscientific identities. However,
the articulation of these events into institu-
tional settings must be understood in the
larger discursive field of many competing
modalities. There is a global context for the
latter where multi-mediations, actors/institu-
tions/technologies, frame the dynamics of
change. This is what is referred to here as the
metalinguistic landscape. 
Malaysian experiences
To illustrate the ways in which technoscien-
tific identities are shifting, Malaysian experi-
ences of institution building can be consid-
ered. The resurgence of Islam in Malaysia
since the 1970s has aimed to recast the socio-
political structure of the country. The result
has been the creation of many intellectual, ac-
ademic, and non-governmental interest
groups and agencies that suggest new poli-
cies to, or criticize, the Malaysian govern-
ment. In 1984, Islam was introduced into the
national curriculum of primary and secondary
education. Almost ten years later, in the 1996
Educational Act, yet a different direction was
forged when the government allowed for the
privatization of the universities, thus ending
the enforcement of a national unified curricu-
lum and yielding the creation of a variety of
private schools. Foreign universities could
now establish themselves in Malaysia and
Malaysian universities could open branches
in the region. 
The effect of these changes in socio-politi-
cal structure, e.g., the global Islamist move-
ment and changes in the state, is evidenced
in the establishment of transnational univer-
sities and institutes, such as the International
Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), based in the
US, the International Islamic University (IIU),
and Institute of Islamic Thought and Civiliza-
tion (ISTAC). The resurgence of Islam in Ma-
laysia, by drawing on Islamic metaphysical
and cultural norms, has become a mobilizing
force for social change, affecting Malaysia’s
technoscientific identities. Debates that are
indexical of larger global concerns of Islam,
such as the epochal understanding of the
West, have been localized and have been
translated into particular institutional discur-
sive frames. 
In addition, there is the appropriation and
expropriation of technoscience as instrumen-
tal reason. Whereas the appropriation of the
latter from the West has typically been associ-
ated with the emergence of the secular state,
in the present condition this is happening in
different ways. An interesting case is the joint
project between Malaysia and the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (MIT) to open a
university of science and technology, in that
in the initial planning, the desire was to in-
clude the actual physical layout of MIT. The
idea behind importing the MIT model as an
institution formed through Western episte-
mology based on instrumental reason, re-
flects the view of Western science as embod-
ied in the cultural, social and spatial ways in
which it is practised. The hegemony of neo-
liberal political economy allows this appropri-
ation to take place in a manner similar to that
of the earlier part of the 20th century. Howe-
ver, what has changed is the landscape in
which competing programmes co-exist,
namely, the Islamic institutions that have
been emerging alongside Islamic resurgence.
The apparent lack of understanding of the de-
signers of this initiative, as well as other polit-
ical events such as the crisis over Anwar Ibra-
him, point to the complexity of this current
landscape of competing discourses.
These institutional discourses are situated
in global/local modalities. For example, Islam-
ization can be seen in the local institutional-
ized forms of affirmative action and educa-
tion curriculum as well as in the global project
of Islamization. Other instances include the
rise of inter-regional educational activities.
These modalities become scenes of constant
dialogue between these different articula-
tions of foundational ideas, discourses, and
programmes, interacting and affecting one
another in the metalinguistic landscape. 
The deconstructive role that the resur-
gence of Islam has played needs to be theo-
rized in this performative landscape in order
to be able to draw reconstructive pro-
grammes. What can the recent debates over
technoscientific identities in Malaysia teach
us? In this context of different modalities
that cut across and also constitute the land-
scape of technoscientific identities, the Is-
lamic challenge is aimed at the hegemonic
discourses of technoscience. The remaking
of technoscientific identity is not program-
matic. Rather it is a performative act of
meaning making, through dialogue among
emerging views, a process of revealing what
will be the future of Muslim technoscientific
identities. ♦
N o t e
* T. Mitchell, (1988), Colonizing Egypt. Cambridge:
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De ba te 
B R U C E  L AW R E N C E  
There is a new stress on civil society. It has come in
the aftermath of the Cold War, and in some sense it
still perpetuates the Cold War. Equated with private
property, the market, and pluralistic culture – the fa-
miliar teleological mantra of neo-liberalism – civil so-
ciety is trotted out as the answer to all issues of glob-
al competitiveness and national reconstruction. 
Neither Civil  nor
Info Society 
offers Muslims the
Hope of Global Equity 
The history and current deployment of the
use of civil society apply but obliquely to Arab
civil society, as is apparent from the most sig-
nificant study yet on this crucial topic: R. Au-
gusus Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East, 2
vols. (E.J.Brill: Leiden, 1995-1996). The scope
of this edited volume is vast and includes an
overview of Middle East and North Africa, and
then country-by-country analyses. If the les-
sons for civil society in the Middle East are so-
ber, they depend on grappling with an elu-
sive term that does not resonate at the same
level for all researchers. In the preamble to a
study of the Jordanian case, we are told that: 
’In traditional western writing … civil
society has been associated with the de-
velopment of capitalism, with the right
to private property, and the need to
protect other individual (initially, male)
rights … Civil society is defined by three
elements: associational life (including
political parties outside the state), citi-
zenship (meaning full rights and re-
sponsibilities), and civility in interaction
… It is concerned above all with a liber-
alization process, with carving out an
even larger realm for civil non-state, as-
sociational activity and for civil rights.’
A quite different, more nuanced, model of
civil society appears elsewhere in the same
volume. On the one hand, ‘civilian rule, citi-
zenship, civisme, civility, civil liberties – all
are remedies to different forms of despotism
and all are evoked by the term “civil society”.
…Yet not all these remedies go together
and none of them is easily achieved … The
protection of individual liberty, for instance,
proscribes imposing conformity of values or
identity upon the citizenry and hence con-
tributes little to nurturing the solidarity de-
mocracies require. Civil liberties and civic
spirit may then be modestly conflicting
goals, and (we should not be surprised) that
democracies everywhere experience a con-
flict between the goals of liberty and com-
munity.’ Neither of these definitions, or the
cases they explore, calls into question the
relevance of civil society to Arab/Muslim so-
cieties. Not so in the case of Gaza. When we
look at the evidence of Gaza, civil society ap-
pears in a starkly different light. Sara Roy, au-
thor of the essay on Gaza, challenges extant
models of civil society as they apply, or do
not apply, to Gaza. She begins by posing a
contrast between the liberal pluralist model
and the Marxist model à la Gramsci: 
’The liberal pluralist model posits an
arena of potential freedom where citizens
can engage in voluntary associations
apart from, but not in opposition to, the
state. By contrast, the Gramscian model
privileges civil society over the state. It
sees civil society as a weapon against cap-
italism, not an accommodation to it. Civil
society becomes the sphere of resistance,
where those who are marginalized, domi-
nated, and exploited can struggle against
state control. Who struggles? The family,
political parties and labour unions, in-
deed, all those who are intent on mobiliz-
ing opposition to state-directed, capital-
ist-motivated hegemonic practices.’ 
In a deft move, at once original and produc-
tive, Roy then goes on to note how both
models – the liberal pluralist and the Gram-
scian resistant – presume a certain kind of
state. Both presume that there is a unitary
state, but with limited powers. They also
presume that pluralism is invariably good,
at once welcoming difference and promot-
ing tolerance. Further, they presume that
there exists a kind of social contract about
what counts as good. Finally, they aver what
Michael Walzer calls ‘speaking in prose’, that
is, a normal life. Yet Roy goes on to demon-
strate that neither of these models can ap-
ply in Gaza because neither the state nor the
society is unitary; not only moral consensus
but even normality are elusive, if not fictive.
The result? ‘The possibility of civil unrest’,
concludes Roy, ‘appears greater than the ca-
pacity of civil society to address it.’ Let us
call this the Liberal Model (of civil society),
in a phrase from Michael Gilsenan, Turned
Inside Out. 
Even while there is keen attention to the
benefits of civil society in many quarters,
there are also other moves to go beyond the
traditional concept and use of civil society. If
Roy questions its applicability in the desper-
ate circumstances of current day Gaza, oth-
ers note that it no longer applies at the top
end of the global/local hierarchy, to those
empowered by the Information Age. It may
be time to explore a radical prospect: civil
society has been, or is about to be sur-
passed by, cyber society. 
Are we perhaps witnessing not merely
new forms of social practice and labour that
limit the utility of civil society, as in Gaza,
but also the rapid shift from a state-civil so-
ciety model to an all-pervasive information
society? Whether we call it an information
society or cyber society, its very possibility
underscores the radical technological shifts
that envelop both the state and its adjuncts,
including civil society, especially but not
solely in Western Europe and North Ameri-
ca. It was Marshall Hodgson, the major Is-
lamic historian of the 20t h century, who
warned us in an essay published over 30
years ago (in 1967) that the speed and
scope of technicalism would overwhelm not
only Orientals but also Occidentals: both the
West and the East would be transformed by
‘the expectation of continuous innovation’
and its (often unintended) consequences. 
Among the major respondents to techni-
calism has been Manuel Castells. A Berkeley
urban sociologist, Castells has tried to theo-
rize the unexpected advent of the computer
and also to assess its long-term social im-
pact. Looking at what Hodgson termed the
latest phase in the cumulative history of the
whole Afro-Eurasian Oikumene, Castells
calls it the Information Age. Like Hodgson’s
earlier trilogy, Castells’ The Information Age:
Economy, Society and Culture ( B l a c k w e l l ’ s :
1996-98) is at once spatially comprehensive
and boldly predictive. Castells traces how
computer-driven telecommunications have
intensified global interactions at the same
time that they have created innumerable
networks which reconfigure indeterminate,
atomized groups of individuals into new vir-
tual communities. What is emerging, in his
view, is a global network society. The dark
side of the Information Age does not escape
Castells. He notes how informational poli-
tics renders the state less powerful in its su-
pervisory, regulatory and disciplinary func-
tions, and most conservatives would wel-
come that shift, but informational politics
also reduces the protective and redistribu-
tive functions of the state, which most liber-
als would not applaud. Moreover, Castells
laments the ‘black holes of informational
capitalism’. They give rise to social exclusion
and the rise of what he terms ‘the fourth
world’. The radically divided benefits of the
Information Age portend a global economy
that is at once mercurial and criminal, and
its outcome may well be a prolonged expe-
rience of the ‘New World disorder’. 
Central to Castell’s argument is the role of
world cities, and world cities as the sites of
immigrant experience. It is, above all, urban
location that defines the current diasporas
of the post-Vietnam and now post-Cold War
eras, in both North America and Western Eu-
rope. Among those refining and developing
an urban accent for the immigrant experi-
ence in late 20t h-century America is the fem-
inist theorist, Saskia Sassen. Her G l o b a l i z a-
tion and its Discontents: Essays on the New
Mobility of People and Money (1998) docu-
ments the pernicious effect of ‘cyber-seg-
mentations’ or increasingly disparate and
unfair distribution of economic wealth, so-
cial benefits and life options. For Sasken glo-
balization is above all the hyperlinkage of
global cities through international nodes
which constitute a new transterritorial ‘cen-
tre’ of global economic activity. Yet it is diffi-
cult to give specificity to particular groups
of immigrants, mostly labourers from third
world countries, who participate in this sys-
tem from the margins even while seeking
citizenship on new terms. Civil society drops
out of the discourse, except insofar as it is
inflected through the international human
rights agenda, and the specific groups with
whom we began this survey only reappear
as foreign others – not the domestic others
who are both Arab and netizens. Jon Ander-
son has made a singular effort to address
what he calls ‘cybernauts of the Arab Dias-
pora’. Yet electronic mediation in transna-
tional cultural identities has impacted over-
seas Arab emigres, exiles, labour migrants,
students and new professionals unevenly,
yet they are often glossed as global citizens,
difficult to analyse socio-economically or to
identify with particular cities, whether in
Western Europe or North America. 
To the extent that the Internet has begun
to connect the global with the local, the
overseas with the home, we are told that
‘the members of Middle East diaspora com-
munities most able to reconnect with the
homelands through the Internet are (above
all those) engaged in business, at least ini-
tially.’ In other words, the commercial class-
es and those related to them who need
commerce-enabling information still have
the greatest access to, and use of, the Inter-
net. And so information technologies re-
main inherently conservative. They rein-
force global capitalist structures and asym-
metries, as Sasken has demonstrated, and
they do not augur a new or revisionist no-
tion of civil society. What we are likely to see
as the lure of cyberfantasies expands is the
further marginalization of the already mar-
ginal. 
Euro-American elites, together with their
Asian, African, and Arab counterparts, will
continue to project interests and promote
options via the Net, but most of their ener-
gies will be directed to non-political goals;
neither a new civil society abroad nor a re-
constituted civil society at home is high on
their list, and to the extent that the under-
valued become less visible as also less em-
powered, we may well wonder how socially
transformative the revolution, which Cas-
tells has deemed the biggest since the in-
vention of the Greek alphabet in 700 BCE,
will be. Muslims, especially the urban poor
in Africa and Asia, will likely be the least of
its beneficiaries.  ♦
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Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the
world and is often perceived as the favourite of the
discriminated against and economically underdevel-
oped. It has drawn a huge influx of converts in recent
decades, despite endless assertions about the declin-
ing influence of religion in the lives of people in the
wake of modernization and globalization. Islam’s
manifestation and continuity in Hong Kong is surpris-
ing because religious affinity is less recognized or re-
warded. The popular religions here are Buddhism,
Taoism and Christianity, adherents to Islam constitut-
ing only 1% of the population. However, a notable
number of conversions to Islam amongst Filipino do-
mestic workers in Hong Kong are occurring. 
R e l i g i o u s
C o n v e r s i o n
of Filipino Domestic
Helpers in Hong Kong
According to Hong Kong’s Majid Ammar
Mosque, conversions in the territory aver-
age 60–70 per year, and more than 70% are
Filipino domestic helpers. The vast majority
are women. This, added to the fact that
there is a long history of bitter relations be-
tween Muslims and Christians in the Philip-
pines, makes the confluence of these factors
unique in the worldwide experience of con-
version to Islam.
Filipinos in Hong Kong
Migration is not a new phenomenon, es-
pecially not to Filipinos, since their country
has been facing severe economic crisis for
well over two decades. What started as a
temporary measure to alleviate economic
pressure, has became a permanent way of
life for many Filipinos. Hong Kong became
a popular destination due to its proximity
to their motherland and the higher wages.
In the early 1970s, Hong Kong began to ex-
perience enormous urbanization and in-
dustrial development resulting in a huge
demand for labour. Local women escaped
domestic service for regulated and well
paid factory jobs, which led to a shortage of
female domestic workers in Hong Kong. Fil-
ipinos became the best option because of
their reputation for language skills, educa-
tional levels and pleasant personalities. Ini-
tially employed by a few expatriate com-
munity members, their number steadily
rose to 141,000 (September 1999), making
them the largest non-Chinese community
in Hong Kong. 
Filipinos nonetheless comprise the most
disfavoured community in Hong Kong. Dis-
crimination is reflected in particularly strict
immigration rules and pay slashes for do-
mestic workers by the Hong Kong Govern-
ment, public criticism of their weekend
gatherings in public spaces, and labour
abuses such as the inordinate monitoring of
their work areas by employers. These are
only a few examples; many others occur
more subtly. Filipinos resist this discrimina-
tion by forming strong social networks
among themselves, which become the pri-
mary agency through which Filipinos come
into close contact with Pakistani men, giv-
ing rise to the circumstances conducive to
potential conversion. Apart from romantic
involvement and inter-marriage with Paki-
stani men, their prior contact with Muslims,
work experience in the Middle East, influ-
ence from converted family members, em-
ployers or co-workers, dissatisfaction with
their former religion, mere curiosity, or a de-
sire for enlightenment also motivate poten-
tial converts. Pakistani migration to Hong
Kong began during the colonial era, when
most served as policemen and soldiers.
Many now work as private watchmen and
security guards.
Religious conversion is not an impulsive
overnight decision and many converts un-
dergo a difficult period of transition. Often
converts are seen as deviant and face ostra-
cism from their own group. Financial, emo-
tional and social support derived from
among new organizational and social ties
provides inner strength to endure such
challenges. Many of the converts undergo
several or all of the following stages.* 
Context, Crisis and Quest
Though Pakistanis and Filipinos in Hong
Kong possess ample similarities – such as
their relatively low status in Hong Kong, a
large component of single people, the large
size and minority status of each group, and
English language ability – there are two
sharp distinctions – their educational attain-
ment and religious affiliation. Filipinos are
generally credited with high educational at-
tainment where as Pakistan’s literacy rate is
low compared to the developing world’s
standards. As far as the religious difference
is concerned, Islam is predominant in Pakis-
tan, while Catholicism is the dominant reli-
gion of the Philippines. These similarities
and differences play an important role in
their relationship. 
Marital laws in the Philippines, such as the
denial of divorce, severe restrictions on
birth control methods and a legal ban on
abortion, can result in marital dissatisfaction
and single motherhood. At the same time,
marriage in Pakistan is viewed as an obliga-
tion toward family and arranged marriage is
the rule, sometimes leaving little room for
romance. Migration to Hong Kong gives
both the Filipinos and Pakistanis greater au-
tonomy and a sense of liberation. They try
to exert their influence over their new mari-
tal choices here. The Hong Kong govern-
ment’s restrictive rules on the entrance of
the domestic workers’ families forces many
of the women to live a single life. At the
same time, the Pakistani men’s perceived
fear of the influence of alien culture on their
immediate family members results in a simi-
lar situation. Both may have already estab-
lished a family back home. 
The lower position of women in Pakistan,
especially non-Muslim minority women, is
reflected in Pakistani men’s treatment of Fil-
ipinos in Hong Kong. Often, ill treatment re-
sults in conflict relationships. Women have
told me that they react to such powerless-
ness by converting to Islam. In doing so,
they empower the men and seek to obtain
moral identity, gain respect among the men
and secure themselves protection from har-
assment by men in their public and private
lives. Catholic and Islamic laws concerning
inter-marriage, economic responsibilities
toward their respective families, cultural dif-
ferences between the two ethnic communi-
ties, and their immigration status in Hong
Kong become factors influencing marital
success. Employment conditions in Hong
Kong such as the compulsory one paid 24-
hour holiday per week and statutory holi-
days, the absence of immediate family pres-
sure to conformity, strong social network,
the recognition by the mosque of their im-
mediate needs, and above all, their need for
a physical space to escape the stigma at-
tached to their gathering at public places,
all favour the conversion of Filipinos. 
Encounter and interaction
with the advocate 
One person stands out as a prominent fig-
ure in Islamic conversion in Hong Kong: Sis-
ter Madiha, a Filipino convert who assists
the newcomers. Under her guidance, three
hundred women have already embraced Is-
lam in 5-6 years. Her nationality, language,
religious background, Islamic and biblical
knowledge, and occupation are very ap-
pealing to the newcomers. Being a Filipino
domestic worker with a fluency in Tagalog
and English, and herself a convert, Sister
Madiha becomes the ideal model for sisters
undergoing conversion.
The mosque provides a comprehensive
training programme that includes compara-
tive religion lectures, Islamic knowledge
classes, elementary Arabic lessons, Quran
reading sessions, open forums and discus-
sion of the converts’ social problems. It em-
ploys various retention programmes, such
as conversion ceremonies where previous
converts are invited to witness new con-
verts pronounce the S h a h a d a h ( d e c l a r a t i o n
of faith), converts gatherings, and picnics.
Converting to Islam requires one to exhibit
certain expected public and private behav-
iour and the women face resistance from
their employers, friends and family in the
course of performing their new religious ob-
ligations. 
Commitment and
c o n s e q u e n c e s
The first recognition of a convert as a Mus-
lim comes from the conversion ceremony, a
symbolic ritual that marks the first day of
her transformed religious life. The basic ob-
ligations of Islam, including the wearing of
h i j a b, consumption of h a l a l food, and the
performing of the five daily prayers exert
enormous pressure on the converts. Some
balance the religious obligations and situa-
tional context of Hong Kong by abstaining
from pork, but not from other non-h a l a l
foods, such as beef or chicken. Some wear
loose clothes, instead of the h i j a b, and may
pray during the absence of their employers
or during their leisure time instead of pray-
ing at the times designated by Islamic laws.
Though the women are primarily brought
to Islam through their boyfriends, one can-
not discount their genuine strength of be-
lief. If their relationship with the man is
stronger during their transition period (from
Christianity to Islam), most turn into com-
mitted converts. Many women face physic-
al, psychological, financial and marital prob-
lems and are conflicted over many issues,
such as the position of a converted woman
whose Christian husband refuses to convert
along with her, how to avoid staying alone
with a male employer, how to handle pork
when cooking for employers, how to justify
wearing the h i j a b to the employers, how to
avoid confrontations over religion with their
family and friends and how to convince the
family to carry out Islamic burial arrange-
ments. 
Gender and conversion
Though there is little evidence from previ-
ous studies as to whether women or men
most often convert to Islam elsewhere, the
overwhelming majority of the converts
among Filipinos in Hong Kong are women.
The main reason is that there is an imbal-
ance in the population distribution of Filipi-
nos in Hong Kong based on gender. The in-
tensity of religious faith of Filipino women
and their prior tendency to shift among dif-
ferent denominations within Christianity
are also instrumental in facilitating conver-
s i o n .
The general slow down of the economy in
Hong Kong, particularly the inability of the
Mosque to fund sisters in terms of financial
crises, the absence of a physical space for
converts with terminated contracts, and the
unwillingness of fellow Muslims to employ
the converts, leave them vulnerable to re-
version to their former religion. In some cas-
es Muslim men behave in ways that dissatis-
fy many of the women, whose lack of knowl-
edge of Islam allows them to make gross
generalizations about the teachings of Islam
and cultivate negative images of Islam and
Muslims, thus sometimes contributing to re-
v e r s i o n . ♦
N o t e
* See also Louis R. Rambo (1993) U n d e r s t a n d i n g
Religious Conversion. Yale University Press.
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Ea st As i a
E L I Z A B E T H  A T T AN É
With the end of the reign of the Manchus who gov-
erned the Chinese Empire for three centuries, and
with the advent of the Republic (1911), the minority
issue took on a dimension impossible to imagine in
1 9t h-century China. Aware of the fragility of national
cohesion in this immense land of heterogeneous
population groups, Sun Yatsen, founder of the Re-
public, still minimized the influence of minorities, af-
firming the supremacy of the Han, the majority eth-
nic group and founders of one of the first Chinese dy-
nasties. The question of numbers quickly became a
focus of debate. Proclaiming that, of a population to-
tal of 400 million inhabitants at the time, the minori-
ties represented only slightly more than 10 million,
Sun Yatsen implicitly called upon them to disappear
into the Chinese melting pot. The statistics published
at the time, however, contradicted the President’s
assertions by listing 26 million non-Han Chinese. 
Fertility and
I d e n t i t y :
Muslims in Xinjiang
In China, the 55 national minorities (m i n z u)
recognized (nearly 120 million persons to-
day, 10% of the total population) are identi-
fied on the basis of ethnic, cultural, and –
paradoxical for a country led by an officially
atheist party – religious criteria. Ten of the
55 minorities are adepts of Islam, the most
important of which together constitute a to-
tal of 18 million persons: Hui (approximately
9 million), Uygurs (7.5), Kazakhs (1.2) and
Kirghizes (0.2). 
The ‘cooked’ and the ‘raw’
The Hui, descendants of Arab and Persian
merchants that had settled by the thou-
sands in China beginning in the 7t h c e n t u r y ,
and the Muslims of Central and Western
Asia brought by the Mongolian army in the
1 3t h century, belong the category referred
to as the ‘cooked’ (s h o u, cooked by the civil-
ization, submissive, acculturated). By mar-
riage with Han women, the Hui were able to
assure their reproduction, but this exogamy
led to their rapid sinization: they would no
longer be distinguishable from the Han
(customs, traditions, physical appearance)
apart from their religion, Islam, and the con-
straints which it imposes (dietary prohibi-
tions, particularly severe in the rejection of
pork, the most appreciated meat of the
H a n ) .
Uygurs, Kazakhs and Kirghizes belong to
the category of the ‘raw’ (s h e n g, unrefined,
independent, having kept their original cul-
ture). Their largest majority being concen-
trated in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan), this
category forms the most visible Islamic
community in China. Cousins of the Turkic
speaking Muslims of the ex-Soviet Republic
borders, they speak Turkic languages and
consider Chinese a foreign language; they
have rich cultural traditions, common to
those of Central Asian Muslims, and have
nothing in common with the Han. Their on-
ly connection was made under constraint,
after the capture and annexation of Xinjiang
by the Qing in the 18t h century. 
The communist regime in 1949 broke off,
at least in its discourse, from the homoge-
nizing views of the nationalists by insisting,
contrary the latter, on the multinational
character of China. However, according to
the facts, it was under this regime that the
policy of sinization by population transfer
began to veritably boom. Thus, between the
censuses of 1953 and 1964, the number of
Han in Inner Mongolia had doubled, passing
from 5.1 to 10.7 million. In Xinjiang, the
number had multiplied by seven (from 330
thousand to 2.3 million), and further dou-
bled between 1964 and 1982. More so than
its discourse, these colossal population dis-
placements of Han in the border zones
translate, at best, the strategic fears, and at
worst, the hegemonic views of the central
power. Migration alone, however, does not
suffice. 
Indeed, parallel to this population policy
with its assimilationist aims – yet in order to
avoid aggravating the political and strategic
contention – China conceded substantial
privileges to the frontier minorities in dem-
ographic terms. This was done, however, at
the risk of seeing, in the end, the effects of
divergent demographic growths jeopardize
Han supremacy in these regions.
Is religion influencing
fertility? 
In a national context of strict limitation of
births, China allows its minorities a much
greater demographic growth than that of
the Han. Accordingly, in the latest popula-
tion census of 1990, Uygur women, Kazakhs
and Kirghizes, had an average of two times
more children than Han women and 1.5
times more than Hui women, the latter
nonetheless being Muslim. These minorities
of Xinjiang have thus not obeyed the gener-
al rule: while there was a rapid decline in fer-
tility rates for the Han (the average number
of children per woman dropped from 5.2 in
1970 to 2.6 in 1990) and for the Hui (5.5 in
1970, 3.1 in 1990), they continued to bring a
higher number of children into the world, 6
in 1970, and still 4.6 in 1990 (Figure 1). 
The behaviours of the Hui, Chinese Mus-
lims, have evolved parallel to those of the
Han, with hardly one child more on average.
Remaining completely disconnected with
the Muslim minorities of Xinjiang, the Hui, a
group that is geographically diffused and
mixed with the Han population, have adopt-
ed as it were the reproductive norms of their
surroundings. The cultural factor has clearly
held pre-eminence over the religious factor:
the Hui, by their fertility, are much closer to
the Han than to their Turkic speaking co-re-
ligionists. 
The phase difference of the Uygurs, Ka-
zakhs and Kirghizes in relation to the Han,
and all the more so in relation to the Hui,
was substantial: throughout the 1980s, the
women of these minorities gave birth to at
least two more children each than the Han
or Hui women. Was this demography, signif-
icantly disconnected from the rest of the na-
tion, to be the precursor of the vague at-
tempts at autonomy or independence that
were to become exacerbated especially in
the decade that followed?
The Chinese birth control policy, more tol-
erant towards its minorities than towards
the Han, played an incontestable role in
widening the gaps in fertility. But that is not
the only reason. Although many Sunni Mus-
lims are critical towards birth control, the
high fertility rates of the people of Xinjiang
are not imputable to a religious factor alone:
we have seen that Islam did not by any
means impede the fertile transition of the
Hui, themselves Sunni Muslims. However,
the high fertility of the Turkic speaking pop-
ulations, which naturally translates into a
more abundant population, seems to rein-
force the centripetal inclination. It is indeed
disconcerting that their fertility is far superi-
or to that of their cousins in the ex-Soviet re-
publics (Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, etc.) and is
even greater than any other Turkic speaking
area in the world, where fertility has fallen
to a level below those of developing coun-
tries. 
The example of the Hui demonstrates very
well that the stricto sensu religious factor ac-
tually has little influence on the process of
transition in fertility rates. Furthermore, it
leads one to conclude that the atypical be-
haviours of the Xinjiang Muslims entail an-
other dimension, which could well be politi-
cal. 
High fertility to affirm
i d e n t i t y ?
Following the example of other minority
groups aspiring, if not to autonomy, than at
least to obtaining greater recognition, the
Turkic speaking Muslims of Xianjiang seem
to have found, in this high fertility, a means
to affirm their ethnic identity and to rein-
force their resistance to the Han. The Hui,
who are spread across the territory in a rath-
er homogenous fashion, who are today
strongly sinized and have never had their
own territory, greatly differ from the Uygurs,
Kazakhs and Kirghizes, who have cultivated
a strong sense of identity – bound to their
geographic concentration in their own terri-
tories where they hold the majority – which
has given rise to ethnic, cultural, and even
separatist claims.
Xinjiang (‘new frontier’) has only been
part of China since 1759, when it was con-
quered by the Manchu dynasty. From then
until 1949, only ten generations went by,
which is relatively short when considered in
the light of the collective memory of a peo-
ple, and their sinization is but superficial.
Moreover, contrary to the Hui, these Turkic
speaking peoples had their sights set on
places of ‘high civilization’: those being Is-
tanbul, Samarkand or Boukhara, rather than
Peking. During this period, the links with the
central powers remained very loose, to such
an extent that on several occasions Xinjiang
found itself in a situation of quasi independ-
ence. Since 1949, Xinjiang has been increas-
ingly firmly tied with China and is the target
of massive colonization: from 7% in 1953,
the percentage of Han within its total popu-
lation has risen to 40% today. In this con-
text, maintaining a high level of fertility –
even higher than that of their Kazakh or Kir-
ghiz neighbours in the ex-Soviet republics,
an average of one child more – seems to be
the most elementary means, but perhaps
eventually the most efficient, to resisting
the Chinese invasion. 
China, apparently contravening its own
long-term interests, concedes to minorities
occupying the most sensitive zones of fric-
tion – Tibetans of Tibet and Muslims of Xin-
jiang in particular – the privileges important
in terms of limitation of births, thus author-
izing a demographic growth far greater
than that of the Han. Because Islam remains,
China being no exception, a political force
to be reckoned with, the Chinese govern-
ment is in a way bound to satisfy the need
for ethnic and religious affirmation of the
peoples of Xinjiang, this region being an im-
portant strategic zone as well as a precious
link to the Muslim world and the oil emir-
ates. Hardly being able to counter their na-
tive traditions, China tried to dilute the ef-
fects of their natural growth rates through
Han immigration. 
However, this policy seems short-sighted.
If the current rhythm of Muslim population
growth in Xinjiang is maintained (+2.5% an-
nually, compared to the +1.5% for the Han)
it will double between 1990 and 2020. It will
then become – should the installations of
Han migrants in Xinjiang cease – with its 18
million people, a majority of approximately
70% in this region, as compared to its slight-
ly over 50% currently. 
At present, China is attempting to fill in
the gaps by waves of controlled migrations,
and is using repression to maintain its hold
on Xinjiang: closing Koranic schools and
mosques, imprisoning imams, confiscating
religious works, and arresting dissidents.
But can the nation-state resist much longer
the centripetal manifestations, especially
when these receive the reinforcement of
such an impressive demography? ♦
Figure 1. Evolution of the average number of children per woman for
t h e Han and the principal Muslim ethnic groups, 1970 – 1 9 9 0
Source: Attané, E., Courbage, Y.,
(1999), ‘Transitional stages and
identity boundaries: the case
o f ethnic minorities in China’,
Population and Environment.
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J AC QU E L I N E  A R M I J O- H U S S E I N
In the years immediately following the end of the
decade known as the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976), the Muslims of China1 lost no time in rebuild-
ing their devastated communities. After ten years of
intensive and often violent persecution by govern-
ment forces in which all forms of religious expression
were outlawed and hundreds of religious leaders
were imprisoned, Muslim communities throughout
China began slowly to restore their religious institu-
tions and revive their religious activities. The re-es-
tablishment of educational institutions plays a vital
role in this still ongoing process.
Resurgence of Islamic
Education in China
The first priority of Muslims in China was to re-
build their damaged mosques, thereby allow-
ing communities to create a space in which
they could once again pray together, but also
so that the mosques could reassert their role
as centres of Islamic learning. Over the next
two decades, mosques throughout most of
the country organized classes for not only
children and young adults, but also for older
people who had not had the opportunity to
study their religion. 
When asked how to explain this recent re-
surgence in Islamic education, religious lead-
ers, teachers, students and members of the
community cite two main reasons: a desire to
rebuild that which was taken from them, and
the hope that a strong religious faith will help
protect their communities from the myriad of
social problems presently besetting China in
this period of rapid economic development.
Early Islamic education in
southwest China
First settled by Muslims from Central and
Western Asia in the Yuan period (1271-1368)2,
Yunnan has for centuries attracted Muslim
students from throughout the region and the
country. As early as the Ming period (1368-
1644), Muslim scholars from Yunnan were in-
vited to teach in other parts of China, and
scholars from outside were invited to teach in
Yunnan, thus creating networks linking the
Muslims of Yunnan with Muslims in the rest of
China and Southeast Asia. Throughout this
period, Islamic education took place in
mosques and was known as jingtang jiaoyu
(education in the Hall of the Classics). Begin-
ning in the late Qing period (1644-1911), Mus-
lims were once again allowed to make the pil-
grimage to Mecca and study in the major cen-
tres of learning in the Islamic world. During
this period several Muslim scholars from Yun-
nan studied abroad and when they returned
they started a movement to revitalize Islamic
studies there by translating the most impor-
tant Islamic texts into Chinese, rendering
them more accessible. 
While in other parts of China Islamic educa-
tion has always concentrated on the study of
Arabic, Persian and Islam, in Yunnan the tradi-
tion has always been one of Zhong-Ah bing
shou (Chinese and Arabic side-by-side educa-
tion). In the past this consisted of intensive in-
struction in classical Chinese, whereas today
it includes the study of modern Chinese with
Chinese history and culture, together with Ar-
abic language and Islamic studies. All the
Muslim teachers and scholars with whom I
have spoken have emphasized the impor-
tance of mastering the Chinese language and
studying traditional Chinese culture and his-
tory. One explanation given to me by a lead-
ing imam was that ‘while we are proud of the
fact that our ancestors were Arabs and Per-
sians, we must acknowledge that today we
are Chinese, and in order for us to strive for-
ward we must use both of our legs.’
’Educate a woman, 
educate a nation’
Another area in which Islamic education in
Yunnan is unique concerns the role of wom-
en. Of the twelve major independent Islamic
schools, four are for women only, and most of
the other schools, while predominantly male,
do allow women to attend. The female gradu-
ates of these schools have taken a very active
role in spreading Islam. Most become teach-
ers themselves upon graduation, either work-
ing in Islamic schools that are already estab-
lished or helping to establish new schools in
poorer regions. Several recent graduates
have also established Islamic pre-schools and
after-school programmes for Muslim chil-
dren. 
The women with whom I spoke expressed
clearly and confidently the importance of Is-
lam in their lives, their commitment to Islamic
education, and their determination to edu-
cate others. I met several young women who
had volunteered upon graduation from Is-
lamic colleges to teach in remote impoverish-
ed villages, isolated from friends and family. I
also met several exceptionally strong-willed
women who had established independent Is-
lamic girls’ schools. One spoke of the funda-
mental role women played in society and the
importance of the role of education; for as she
put it, ‘by educating a woman, you educate a
nation.’ Sitting in a small village in a remote
part of China, she listed to me the various
ways in which a young girl’s education could
have a major impact on the health and social
well-being of her future children and grand-
children. Another woman in a large industrial
city in northwest China spoke to me about
how she established a women’s Islamic
school, which had quickly grown, and now
had over 500 full and part-time students ran-
ging in age from 5 to 85. In addition to offer-
ing a wide range of day and evening classes,
the school also was very active in community
development work in the more impoverished
Muslim villages in the region.
Expanding networks
While travelling to different relatively re-
mote regions of China, I was struck again and
again by the extent to which Muslim villagers
were informed not only about the situation of
their co-religionists living in other parts of
China, but also about the latest issues con-
cerning the Muslim communities throughout
the world. This phenomenon is in part the re-
sult of the large number of Chinese Muslims
travelling to different regions of China to
study, but also the increasing number of stu-
dents who go overseas to study. Although
there are no official records kept, it is estimat-
ed that there is a total of between 500 and
1,000 Chinese Muslims presently studying in
Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Lib-
ya, the Sudan, Turkey, Malaysia, and Indone-
sia. Al-Azhar has the largest number, with ap-
proximately 300 students. Most of the stu-
dents are sponsored by their family and com-
munity, and receive a small stipend at which-
ever Islamic university they attend. The stu-
dents at Al-Azhar spoke of the difficulty in
adapting to life in such a crowded and over-
whelming city, but were also very cognizant
of the importance of Al-Azhar and its role in
Islamic history. Some, however, expressed
disillusionment with the realities of living in a
modern Muslim society. For the Muslims of
China, who have always been a small minority
amongst the Han Chinese majority and who
have survived for centuries isolated from the
rest of the Islamic world, often experiencing
intense periods of persecution, the idealistic
expectations they have of Islamic countries
can become the basis of considerable disap-
pointment.
The students studying in Damascus
seemed the most content. They spoke en-
thusiastically about their studies, the Syrian
people, and their lives in Damascus. With
over 100 Chinese students studying there
and a constant flow of new students and vis-
itors from China, they were able to keep
abreast of conditions back home. I was also
able to meet with a student who had gradu-
ated from an Islamic university in Iran. Little
is known of the students studying in Iran, for
almost all of those who have completed
their studies there have chosen to stay. In-
deed, this student spoke very highly of the
quality of the education and living condi-
tions of the Chinese students in Iran. 
As this research project continues to ex-
pand, I will interview Chinese Muslim stu-
dents studying in other centres of Islamic
learning throughout the Muslim world, as
well as return to China several times over the
next few years to document their impact on
their communities upon their return. How
their experiences overseas influence their
identities as both Muslims from China and
members of an international Islamic commu-
nity, is one of the issues that will be ad-
dressed. Recent studies of globalization have
all focused on Western cultural influences, ig-
noring among many other important move-
ments, the globalization of Islamic values.
However, by concentrating on the role of in-
ternational centres of Islamic learning, one
can reveal both the independent as well as in-
terrelated flows of different Islamic educa-
tional traditions throughout the world. ♦
This research project was funded initially with
a grant from the Wenner Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research.
N o t e s
1 . The combined population of these Muslim groups
is presently conservatively estimated to be over 
20 million.
2 . The degree of government control on religious
activities varies from region to region.
Government control in Xinjiang is the strongest,
and there even small schools within mosques 
are not allowed.  
Dr Jacqueline M. Armijo-Hussein is assistant
professor and coordinator of the Chinese Studies
School of International Affairs and Development,




school class in a
village in central
Y u n n a n .
A graduation ceremony for a h o n g (from the Persian a k h u n d) who have completed
their studies in a village in central Yunnan.
My present interest in the resurgence of Islamic
education is the result of several years living in
Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan
Province in southwest China, where I first
carried out my doctoral research and then wrote
up my dissertation. Upon completing my
dissertation, which concentrated on the early
history of Islam in China, I decided to begin
fieldwork on contemporary issues facing the
Muslim minority population of China today.
After several months travelling to different
regions and meeting with Muslim villagers and
religious leaders, I came to the conclusion that
a study of the recent resurgence of Islamic
education would provide a significant
contribution to our understanding of Muslim
society in China. Through the course of this
research, which concentrated on southwest
China, but included interviews with Muslims
living in the northwest, I learned of the
increasing number of students studying
overseas at Islamic universities. I subsequently
travelled to the Middle East to interview
students there as well.
Regional IssuesI S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  4 / 9 9 13
Dr Farish A. Noor is a Malaysian academic who has
taught at the Centre for Civilisational Dialogue,
University of Malaya. He is currently a research fellow
hosted by the Wissenschaftskolleg of Berlin. 
He is also the Secretary-General of the International
Movement for a Just World, a Malaysian-based NGO
which campaigns for human rights while working
with and within religious communities. 
E-mail: korawa@hotmail.com
So uthea st As i a
F AR I S H  A .  N O OR
The political drama in the Malay archipelago contin-
ues to be played out in terms of the traditional Mal-
ay-Indonesian shadow theatre: the Wayang of Kera-
jaan. But it is impossible to deny that the latest de-
velopments in Malaysia and Indonesia have also
marked a major shift in the political terrain of the two
countries, with the Islamic parties and movements
there poised to enter the charmed circle of k e r a j a a n
politics once again. This is something to which both
the governments and the intellectual communities of




a n d I n d o n e s i a
The results of the recent Indonesian elec-
tions were quite surprising for many observ-
ers of Indonesian politics. Up to the last
minute, there were those who felt that vic-
tory for either the liberal democrat Mega-
wati Sukarnoputri or the conservative B. J.
Habibie was certain. It was expected that
the Muslim parties in the middle would
have made strong gains, and that popular
Muslim leaders like Abdulrahman Wahid
and Dr Amien Rais would eventually rise to
take up the role of kingmakers in the new
government. But few could have guessed
that the mantle of the state would fall onto
the leader of the Nahdatul Ulama, one of the
two biggest Islamist movements in Indone-
sia, Abdulrahman Wahid himself.
Observers, experts and laymen alike, are
now stumped to give adequate answers and
explanations for this radical turn in Indone-
sian politics. For years, the Indonesian state
has tried to ensure that Islamist organiza-
tions and parties would never be allowed to
mobilize strongly enough as to be able to
challenge the status quo. The Indonesian ar-
my (ABRI) played its part in keeping the so-
called ‘threat’ of political Islam at bay, even
when the appearance of Islamic groups
such as the Islamist separatist movement in
Aceh, North Sumatra, actually represented
the genuine grievances of poor and alienat-
ed Indonesians who felt that their rights had
been trampled on by the political elite
based in Jakarta. 
But the signs were there for those who
were able to see them: from the late 1980s,
the Indonesian elite began to accommo-
date itself to the changes in the public’s
mood. The government opened up Islamic
think-tanks and research centres, and be-
gan to patronize Islamic conferences and in-
tellectuals. It was clear that the powers-that-
be in Jakarta could not afford to neglect the
demands of this massive constituency out-
side the corridors of power. When Dr Amien
Rais declared that he and his movement, the
Muhammadijah, would no longer support
the Suharto government in 1998, it became
clear to all that the Islamic consensus had
been broken and that the Islamist move-
ments were no longer going to tolerate the
excesses and corruption of the Suharto
clique. The rest is history.
Today in neighbouring Malaysia, a similar
scenario seems to be on the verge of unfold-
ing. After decades of uninterrupted rule, the
Malaysian government which is made up of
the ruling National Front (Barisan Nasional)
alliance and led by the Conservative-Na-
tionalist UMNO (United Malays National Or-
ganisation) party, is facing the worse crisis
of its history.
The biggest gains in the 1999 Malaysian
election (though not necessarily in terms of
parliamentary seats) were made by the Is-
lamic opposition Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
(PAS). PAS has been the major nemesis of
UMNO since the 50s, and its tactic has been
to slowly whittle away support for UMNO
from the Malay-Muslim constituency that
happens to be the main supporter of both
parties. (Because of the polarized nature of
Malaysian race-centred politics, voters tend
to vote along racial, rather than ideological
lines. The Malays have traditionally split
their votes between the conservative UMNO
party and the Islamist PAS party. It is easy to
see why PAS has scored a victory here: the
Party has effectively placed itself on the po-
litical map of Malaysia as the main opposi-
tion party in the country, brushing aside the
liberal and leftist alternatives, the DAP, PRM
and PKN. The Islamist discourse that PAS es-
pouses has become part of mainstream po-
litical discourse in the country, and like it or
not, all the other parties are forced to recog-
nize that a new agenda has been laid on the
t a b l e .
Flawed perceptions
Why is it that the Malaysian government
and the UMNO party in particular have man-
aged to lose so much support from the Ma-
lays? To compare Malaysia to Indonesia
would be unfair, for the simple reason that
the two countries are literally worlds apart.
Yet both the Malaysian (and Indonesian) po-
litical elite have miscalculated on several
major points: Malaysia and Indonesia re-
main essentially Islamic countries where the
majority of the populations are Muslim
(60% in Malaysia, 90% in Indonesia). Thus it
is clear from the start that the governments
of both countries could not neglect the cul-
turally specific demands of their respective
electorates. What made matters worse for
the rulers of both countries was that the rul-
ing elite were seen to enjoy a standard of
life so radically different from that of the
masses. 
Secondly, the governments of both coun-
tries made the mistake of neglecting Islam
and Muslim concerns at the beginning, and
later compounded the error by trying to do-
mesticate Islam when it was seen as a
‘threat’ to their political and economic liveli-
hood. In Indonesia, the rulers regarded
many of the Islamist movements as essen-
tially rural concerns run by backward peas-
ants and village preachers. The Islamic party
in Malaysia was likewise treated as a farm-
yard phenomenon. Later when these Isla-
mist movements and parties grew more
powerful, the governments of both coun-
tries tried to defuse the threat they felt by
trying to co-opt the Islamists into the domi-
nant power structure. In Malaysia, this hap-
pened when the UMNO party co-opted the
leader of the Islamic youth movement, An-
war Ibrahim, into the government. Anwar
later rose to become the Deputy Prime Min-
ister of Malaysia until he was removed and
arrested in 1998. But by then the Islamists
had penetrated into practically every ad-
junct of political, governmental, economic
and educational life in the country. The co-
optation of Islamists in Indonesia did not
help the Suharto government either, as they
later withdrew their support from him dur-
ing the 1997-1998 crisis.
Thirdly, the governments made the mis-
take of thinking that they could force their
own Islamic agenda on a passive electorate
who would follow them obediently. Malay-
sia experimented with its own version of ‘of-
ficial Islam’ from the 1980s, as soon as Dr
Mahathir Mohamad came to power. Dr Ma-
hathir’s own brand of progressive Islam
seems rational and acceptable enough to
most sensible people: He opposed the fa-
naticism and intolerance that can be found
in other parts of the Islamic world and called
on the Malay-Muslims to be open-minded,
worldly and practical in their orientation.
But unfortunately for the government in
Malaysia, Islamic discourse, like political dis-
course in general, is not something that is
easily controlled and policed. Despite the
many measures made to develop a progres-
sive brand of modernist Islam in the country
(via initiatives such as the International Is-
lamic University, the Islamic Research Insti-
tute, the state’s Islamic Centre, etc.), there
has now appeared a more popular brand of
Islamist discourse which is shaped by devel-
opments both at home as well as abroad.
Developments in foreign lands such as the
Gulf War, the continuing struggle in Pales-
tine, the persecution of Bosnians and
Chechnyans, and the emergence of extrem-
ist Islamist movements in the Arab world,
have all contributed to the formation of a
new politicized Islamist discourse that has
taken a life of its own and is beyond the con-
trol of the state.
Enter the new discourse
This is why the political and economic cri-
sis that began in 1997 that affected Malaysia
and Indonesia were quickly reconfigured on
Islamist terms and turned into a religious
struggle against the incumbent political
leadership of both countries. It is ironic that
Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who first introduced
the Islamization programme to Malaysia, is
now being attacked by young Islamists on
the grounds that he is ‘secular’ and ‘un-Is-
lamic’. Unflattering comparisons between
him and the Shah of Iran, the Pharaoh of
Egypt, and the devil himself have become
the norm in the Islamist jargon of the
streets. The prevalence of this popular Isla-
mist discourse will shape the terrain of polit-
ical struggle in the years to come, and un-
doubtedly create new political frontiers and
political identities in the process. 
In the past, political struggles in the Malay
archipelago have been configured along
the lines of secular politics where the main
objectives were winning control of the state
and distribution of resources. But today the
struggles have been injected with an ethical
and religious dimension as well, colouring
the actors and agents concerned and up-
ping the stakes in the contest itself. The Mal-
ay political world made up of Malaysia and
Indonesia will now be battling for more
than control of governments and the ma-
chinery of state. What has become the ob-
jective of political struggle is the soul of the
people themselves. Trying to grapple with
this new development will be a task in itself.
The governments of Malaysia and Indonesia
therefore need to address the rapidly
changing socio-cultural terrain of their own
communities in order to make sure that
they will not be wrong-footed in the future.
With Islam now firmly planted on the politi-
cal map as one of the most important (and
unpredictable) variables, the elite in Malay-
sia and Indonesia need to be conscious of
how they proceed. The cost of failure will be
great, for it will have serious implications for
the creation of democratic space and civil
society in both countries. ♦
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Southe ast  As i a
MA R T I N  R A M S T E D T
The collapse of the Soeharto regime has undermined
the three legitimatory pillars of the Indonesian state:
the much acclaimed economic development of the
country is thwarted; the alleged preoccupation of the
Indonesian government with economic and political
equity has been recognized as the rhetorical decorum
of ‘crony-capitalism’; and the lauded socio-political
stability has finally erupted in social unrest and per-
turbation, gradually dissolving the ‘social glue’ pro-
vided by Indonesia’s ‘civil religion’, the p a n c a s i l a p h i-
losophy. The repressed ghosts of nationalist imagina-
tion – political Islam and the disruption of centre-pe-
riphery relations – walk again. Apart from gender, ‘re-
ligion’ became an issue in the run for presidency. 
M u s l i m – H i n d u
R e l a t i o n s
in Contemporary
I n d o n e s i a
Ever since the independent, unitary state of
Indonesia came into being in 1950, Indonesi-
a’s ‘Hindus’ have had to fight against cultur-
al and religious discrimination on the part of
the central government in general and the
Ministry of Religion, representing mainly the
interests of the Muslim majority, in particu-
lar. First of all, it was not until 1958 that ‘Hin-
duism’ was recognized as ‘religion’ by the
Ministry of Religion. Since religion was de-
fined as being a universal and monotheistic
creed, based on a holy book which had been
conceived by a holy prophet in divine revela-
tion, recognition was initially granted only to
Islam and Christianity. The various ‘animist’
traditions throughout the Indonesian archi-
pelago were classified as primitive and su-
perstitious belief systems, which were des-
tined to be transformed into local variants of
the modern Indonesian culture by the mod-
ernizing policy of the Indonesian govern-
ment and by the spread of religion. The Bali-
nese immediately reacted to the threat of
being proselytized by either Islam or Christi-
anity by redefining the tenets of their tradi-
tional belief system, originally called ‘Shiva-
Buddha-Religion’, and by reforming those
aspects of their culture that were not in
keeping with the modernist requirements of
the Indonesian government. Having stream-
lined their theology and ritual practices ac-
cording to the definition of religion by the
Ministry of Religion, they succeeded in
achieving the recognition of ‘Hinduism’ in
1958. 
New order Hinduism
With the onset of Soeharto’s ‘new order’,
‘Hinduism’ became the umbrella-institution
for various other local traditions (i.e. Aluk To
Dolo and Ada’ Mappurondo of the Sa’dan-
and Mamasa-Toraja as well as the tradition of
the Towani Tolotang in South Sulawesi, Pe-
mena of the Karo-Batak, Kaharingan of the
Ngaju- and Luangan-Dayak in Central and
East Kalimantan) whose adherents have
turned to ‘Hinduism’ with the hope of being
able to continue their ritual practices under
the protection of a more tolerant religion.
The integration of these new ‘Hindu sects’, as
they are called, into ‘Indonesian Hinduism’
has nurtured the prejudice against Hinduism
still prevailing among Muslims and Chris-
tians. Until today, Hinduism has frequently
been accused of being polytheistic and ani-
mistic, hence of not being a ‘religion’, or at
least a religion equal to Islam and Christiani-
ty. During the Soeharto regime, Indonesia’s 6
million ‘Hindus’ were protected against at-
tempts at Muslim and Christian proselytizing
by the government party GOLKAR and by the
army both of which promoted ‘religious tol-
erance’ as one tenet of the state ideology, the
so-called p a n c a s i l a philosophy. Since the fall
of Soeharto and the subsequent de-legitimi-
zation of GOLKAR, the army, and the p a n c a s i-
la philosophy, the non-Balinese ‘Hindus’
have again become the target of Islamization
and Christianization.
Since October 1998, the sensitive rela-
tions between Indonesian Muslims and
‘Hindus’ have suffered a further setback
from what has come to be known as the
‘A.M. Saefuddin Affair’. The whole affair
started on 14 October 1998, when the Minis-
ter for Nutrition and Horticulture, A.M. Sae-
fuddin, who had then recently joined the
vanity fair of those competing for the Indo-
nesian presidency in the 15 November 1999
elections, was asked by a journalist to assess
his chances v i s - à - v i s Megawati Soekarnopu-
tri, the popular daughter of the charismatic
former president Soekarno. Megawati had
just won massive support as a presidential
candidate at the congress of the Fighting In-
donesian Democratic Party (Partai Demok-
rasi Indonesia, PDI, Perjuangan), taking
place in Bali from 8-10 October 1998. 
The ambitious minister boasted that his
chances against Megawati would be very
good, since he himself is male and a Muslim,
whereas Megawati is female and a Hindu,
insinuating that the Muslim majority of the
Indonesian people would not approve of a
Hindu president. 
When accusing the liberal Muslimah Meg-
awati of being Hindu, Saefuddin referred to
a photo which had been published in sever-
al Indonesian newspapers. It showed Mega-
wati joining the prayers in one of the Bali-
nese temples. This breach of orthodox Mus-
lim convention was hitherto considered to
be quite a normal act for Indonesian politi-
cians and bureaucrats visiting Bali. That it
was now made an issue by Saefuddin
aroused massive protest and demonstra-
tions in Bali. 
Saefuddin himself is a representative of the
more radical faction of Indonesian Islam. Be-
sides, he shared much common ground
with B.J. Habibie, the short-serving succes-
sor of Soeharto. Like Habibie, Saefuddin
studied engineering in Germany and is
hence also a member of the Union of Alum-
ni from German Universities (Perhimpunan
Alumni Jerman) and the Union of Indone-
sian Engineers (Persatuan Insinyur Indone-
sia). He is furthermore a member of the
Guiding Council of the Committee for the
Co-operation for Indonesian Muslim Board-
ing Schools (Majelis Pimpinan Badan Kerjas-
ama Pondok Pesantren Indonesia) and a
member of the Council of Experts of the As-
sociation of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals
(Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia,
CMI), which was headed by Habibie before
he became president. 
Both moderate and fierce critics of Sae-
fuddin in and outside Bali agreed that his
statement had unnecessarily dragged pri-
vate matters of religion and belief into the
political arena, even that he had selfishly
tried to use religion against his political ri-
val. Criticism differed, however, on whether
Saefuddin had scorned Hinduism in general
and whether he had therefore violated the
principle of religious tolerance prescribed
by the p a n c a s i l a, which is still supposed to
be the ideological basis of the Indonesian
s t a t e .
Hindu protests 
When, due to Balinese pressure, then
President Habibie agreed to demand an of-
ficial apology from his minister, matters be-
gan to escalate, for Saefuddin’s apology
rang a rather contemptuous and insincere
note. In response to his half-hearted apolo-
gy, Bali went into strike and continuous
demonstration, demanding that Saefuddin
be removed from office and stand trial for
having endangered the national unity. Sev-
eral Balinese even went so far as to threaten
to call for an independent Balinese state
(Negara Bali Merdeka), should their de-
mands not be granted by Habibie. 
The demonstrations and strikes were ac-
tively supported by most segments of Bali-
nese society including representatives of
the tourist industry and a considerable
number of Muslims living in Bali. During the
demonstrations and strikes, every Hindu Ba-
linese wore white traditional clothing usual-
ly donned during prayers, rituals and cere-
monies. People even brought along some
musical instruments (b a l e g a n j u r), which are
normally used in ritual processions, and
sang ritual songs like traditional Balinese g e-
g u r i t a n and India-derived k i r t a n. Hundreds
of banners cursed A.M. Saefuddin and
threatened, for instance, to throw him into a
box together with pigs. The decorum of the
public protests revoked similar actions of
Balinese self-defence which took place at
the beginning of this century, i.e. the dra-
matic p u p u t a n or ritual self-destructive
fights against the Dutch colonizers. 
Smaller demonstrations also took place in
Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya where there
are large numbers of Balinese students, gov-
ernment officials and businessmen. In the
other ‘Hindu’ areas in Indonesia, protest was
almost non-existent. There, the ‘Hindus’ be-
long to the politically, economically and ed-
ucationally marginalized minority even
among their own respective ethnic groups,
the majority of which have already either
converted to Christianity or Islam. Hence,
they often do not dare to protest against a
kind of cultural racism which they have
come to regard as almost normal. The Bali-
nese, on the other hand, who have devel-
oped a strong affluent middle class, have a
very strong Hindu identity. And it is their re-
ligious symbols that have frequently be-
come the target of religious defamation. Re-
cent examples are the scandalous photo of
a Balinese offering containing a golf ball
which was published in the brochure B a l i
Kini in order to advertise the respective
tourist facilities of the island, or the plans to
build a huge Garuda statue in the south of
Bali in order to greet tourists arriving by
plane. In 1995, Bali-wide demonstrations at-
tempted in vain to prevent the construction
of the Bali Nirwana Beach Resort right next
to the famous Tanah Lot Temple. Since that
time, protest against (Muslim) Javanese sell-
ing Balinese religion to the tourist industry
has never really subsided. 
In spite of Balinese agitation, Habibie
eventually refrained from removing A.M.
Saefuddin from office. The president closed
the whole affair after another official apolo-
gy had been forwarded by the recalcitrant
minister. Meanwhile, some prominent u l a-
m a and Muslim intellectuals had urged the
Indonesian Council of Islamic Theologians
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) to issue a f a t-
w a on whether a woman can or cannot be-
come president. On 7 November 1998, the
same day that Saefuddin apologized for the
second time, an Islamic Congress (Kongres
Umat Islam) voted against women becom-
ing president or vice president. On 1 June
1999, this vote was officially expressed in
something stronger than a f a t w a, i.e. in a so-
called amanat – a mandate of the Indone-
sian Muslims represented by the Indonesian
Council of Islamic Theologians. During the
actual elections for presidency in October
1999, it became apparent that the Muslim
vote prevented a woman – at the least for
the time being – from becoming president
of Indonesia, notwithstanding her large
popular support. ♦
Martin Ramstedt is a European Science Foundation
(ESF) Alliance fellow at the International Institute 
for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden, the Netherlands.
E-mail: mramstedt@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
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N o t e
* Apart from b a k s h i and its variants, one principally
finds, designating Central Asian Islamized
shamanism: porhan, parhon, parihon (Persian p a r î
k h w â n, p a r î, ‘fairy, spirit’ + k h w â n d a n, ‘to read, 
to call’), t a b u p (Persian t a b î b, ‘doctor’), h o d z h a
(Persian k h w â j a, name of a lineage of honour),
folbin, falchi, palchi, palbin, or p a l b u n (f â l b î n, 
from Arabic f â l, ‘destiny, oracle’ + Persian Tadjik
b î n, from d i d a n, ‘to see’) d a r g e r and k i n n a c h i
(Uzbek k i n n a, ‘bewitchment’ + c h i, indicating
activity). Despite several particularities, 
these differently named shamans reveal as
essential that which one would say of the b a k s h i.
Patrick Garrone, PhD candidate, is secretary of
t h e Society of Islamic Culture and author of
Chamanisme et islam en Asie centrale
(forthcoming). E-mail: garrone@intnet.cf
A female b a k s h i
using the whip
and the knife





K y r g y z s t a n ) .
C entr al  As i a
P A T R I C K  G A R R ON E
It was in Central Asia that the shamanism of the
Turko-Mongolians and the Islam of the Arabo-Per-
sians were to meet. This zone is bordered by the Cas-
pian Sea, Afghan Turkestan to the south, Hindu
Kouch, the Pamirs, the Tian Chan and Altaï to the
east, and southern Siberia to the north. Today, sever-
al states, in part or in whole, are found in this quadri-
lateral: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tadjikistan and Afghanistan. The ancestral
shamanism of the Central Asians had to, after the
Muslim take-over (8t h century), progressively com-
promise with Islam. The result was an Islamized sha-
manism generally known as b a k s y l y k. 
B a k s y l y k:  
A Muslim Declination
of Shamanism
The term b a k s y l y k can be translated as ‘to
do the b a k s y’. Its officiant is in fact, most of-
ten, called b a k s y, b a k h s h i or b a k s h i . The lat-
ter are local variants of a common root. The
theories which attribute a Turkish or Chi-
nese origin to bakshi (this form of the word
is used henceforth) are insufficiently sus-
tained. The term, in fact, is derived from the
Sanskrit term for Buddhist monk, b h i k s h u.
B a k s h i did not always refer to the Central
Asian Islamized shaman as it does today. It
has designated the Buddhist priest, the sec-
retary to Turk chancelleries, the wandering
bard and even a dignitary of the Mogul ar-
my. However, from the 13t h and 14t h c e n t u-
ries, b a k s h i took on, in Central Asia, the
sense of shaman, while conserving some of
the preceding meanings elsewhere. 
Two types of b a k s y l y k coexist.* One,
northern (nearly all of Kazakhstan, certain
regions of Kyrgyzstan and Chinese Turke-
stan), results from an environment marked
by nomadism. The other, more southern
(Uzbekistan, certain regions of Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Afghan Turke-
stan), is the expression of a sedentary envi-
ronment. The ‘nomadic’ b a k s y l y k has a par-
oxysmic character, more evocative of tradi-
tional shamanism. This type of b a k s y l y k i s
less Islamized, the Muslim influence exert-
ing itself more strongly in the sedentarized
zone. The ‘sedentary’ b a k s y l y k allowed a
number of the characteristics of the original
shamanism to fade.
Generally, men officiate in the ‘nomadic’
b a k s y l y k and women (b a k s h a) in the ‘seden-
tary’ b a k s y l y k . The reason for this stems
from the greater presence of Islam in the ur-
ban zones of Central Asia. Shamanism, even
if it was more or less impregnated with Is-
lam, was placed in the periphery of social
life and was recuperated by the women. It
otherwise went beyond Syr-Daria where the
incessant movement of the populations
prevented Islam from profoundly penetrat-
ing the society. Shamanism thus remained
masculine there. However, the exceptions
are not rare of the b a k s h i officiating in the
‘sedentary’ b a k s y l y k and the b a k s h a in the
‘nomadic’ type. 
The ritual
The b a k s h i continues to intercede with
the Invisible but carries out, as does the
northern Siberian shaman, rituals that inter-
est the entire community. He intervenes on-
ly upon the request of individuals or small
groups. The most important affair of the
b a k s h i, who does not wear a specific cos-
tume, is the healing session during which he
combats the Evil Spirits responsible for the
illness. In order to do so, he is aided by his
Tutelary Spirit; itself often assisted by Auxil-
iary Spirits of inferior rank. The b a k s h i r e-
ceives these spirits by various means: inher-
itance (for example, gift of an ascendant),
voluntary quest (for example, by sleeping
close to a tomb of a saint) or by the decision
of spirits that appear in a dream or in ‘reali-
ty’. The election of the b a k s h i is accompa-
nied by an illness or an accident which oc-
curs before, during or sometimes after the
status has been conferred. Theoretical in-
struction of the Elected one then calls for
the intervention of an experienced b a k s h i. 
For each of the two b a k s y l y k , a structure
type can be deduced. In the ‘nomadic’ vari-
ant, divination – prerequisite for establish-
ing a diagnosis – habitually consists in play-
ing the k o b u z, a sort of rudimentary violin, in
order to call upon the spirits and be in-
formed by them. The b a k s h i can also burn
the shoulder blade of a sheep or execute
numerical combinations of rocks and de-
duce teachings by observing them. Divina-
tion is in principle separated from the ses-
sion as such. The latter generally takes place
during the night, inside of a dwelling (tent
or house) and an offering to the spirits in the
form of an animal sacrifice (often sheep or
goat) is necessary. The b a k s h i and the ill per-
son are in the middle of the audience. Play-
ing the k o b u z, the b a k s h i invokes the figures
of orthodox and popular Islam as well as
spirits. He describes the arrival of the latter
and captivates the audience by recounting
the stories of the Invisible. He urges his spir-
its to combat the forces of Evil. He lets his
kobuz fall, swirls around, gesticulates, cov-
ers the Evil Spirits with his imprecations and,
at the height of the trance, he testifies, by
such exploits as walking on razor blades or
by licking incandescent fire, to his condition
as superior to that which is profane. Scream-
ing and imitations of animal cries succeed
one another while he hits the ill person so as
to expulse the Evil Spirits. In order to do so,
he may only use his hands or one instru-
ment. One of the most widespread tech-
niques consists is utilizing one part of a sac-
rificed animal (often the lungs) to beat the ill
person and then disposing of it, for it is held
that it is then charged with bad influences
(the ideal model of this expulsion is that
which is effectuated by the ‘hole of smoke’
of the tent, opening to the Invisible). The
session ends with feasts regulated by di-
verse proscriptions.
Sedentary and nomadic
v a r i a n t s
The b a k s y l y k of the ‘sedentary’ type is
much less violent and paroxysmal than his
‘nomadic’ counterpart. Islam has left a more
visible mark on this type and the ritual is far
more codified and formalistic. Divination
here also constitutes a necessary precondi-
tion, clearly separated from the actual cere-
mony. The b a k s h i (or the b a k s h a) interro-
gates his spirits by invoking them through
chants supported by playing his d o j r a, drum
consisting of a circle of wood set with
chimes over which animal skin of a specially
sacrificed animal (goat) is stretched. The
skin is spangled with drawings made with
the sacrificial blood (e.g. sun, moon). Re-
flective surfaces, such as a mirror or a glass
of water in which one throws cotton, some-
times serve in divination. Once the diagno-
sis is established, the b a k s h i can envisage a
cure session. 
The above assumes a character less public
than that of the ‘nomadic’ b a k s y l y k. The rea-
son for this discretion stems from the pres-
sure exerted by Islam. The session can take
place day or night, the two types being
equally attended. The women generally aid
the b a k s h i. They have to be in a state of ritu-
al purity with respect to Muslim prescrip-
tions and ‘know the n a m â z’ (prayer). The ill
person – blindfolded, head covered with a
white cloth, certain parts of the body
anointed with the blood of a sacrificed ani-
mal (often a goat) before the ceremony, and
the b a k s h i up against his back – is placed in
the centre of the room in which the partici-
pants occupy three sides. The open side
principally indicates the direction of Mecca.
Placed in front of the ill person, on a carpet,
are a bowl filled with the sacrificial blood, a
glass of water, a plate of flour, a couple of
bills of money and lit candles. In each of his
hands, as well as on his head, bouquets of lit
candles are placed momentarily, being re-
moved at the beginning of each ceremony.
Herbal fumigation is conducted as well. 
The session consists in repeating, until the
ill person is healed, the ritual models called
k h a l q a. During a k h a l q a, the b a k s h i, beating
his d o j r a, invokes his spirits by beginning
songs of a Muslim character. His aids signal
the arrival of the spirits by belching, yawn-
ing and gurgling. In order for the course of
treatment to be successful, during a k h a l q a,
a trance must seize the ill person and the
aids of the b a k s h i, the latter doing nothing
more than simply accompanying. The ill
person (to whom several symbolic hits are
given) and the aids then improvise a sort of
dhikr jahrî (chanting out loud) that the b a k-
s h i leads. At the closing of the d h i k r, the
group exits the room after the ill person
takes hold of a coloured fabric from among
those laid out near him. The colour of the
cloth should correspond to that of the Evil
Spirit that appeared to the ill person during
the trance. Once outside, one removes the
cloth and thus the Evil Spirit. All re-enter the
room and the b a k s h i, as always, accompa-
nied by the d o j r a, sings in order to dismiss
the Auxiliary Spirits and render the ill person
his freedom. He then purifies those who
have assisted by depicting circles around
them with his dojra, rustling the chimes. He
sometimes practices divination in their ho-
nour. The evening closes with feasts where
the part of the sacrificed animal that was
not disposed of or that would not be taken
by the b a k s h i is eaten. 
The two types of sessions that have just
been succinctly evoked have various local
variants and have only been presented here
in general terms. In certain zones, even hy-
brid forms of b a k s y l y k can be found to take
part in two models simultaneously. To treat
these aspects would have been beyond the
scope of this article, but they are well worth
further reading as they comprise part of the
extraordinary wealth of Islamized shaman-
ism in Central Asia. ♦
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South As i a
MU JE E B  AH M AD
There has been considerable attention for the working
and significance of the Tablighi Jama’at, established
in 1927, but little has been done to study the origin
and rapid expansion of the more recently formed
Da’wat-i Islami (Invitation to Islam), whose motto is
‘love for the Prophet and Medinah’. The Da’wat-i Isla-
mi was launched by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri
in 1981.* Today, the spate of green turbans, its trade-
mark, can be seen not only in the rural areas of Pakis-
tan, but also in its metropolitan cities. 
Da’wat-i Islami: 
An Aspiring
T r a n s n a t i o n a l
M o v e m e n tWhen the military regime in Pakistan in 1977
banned all political activities and parties, Is-
lamic political parties were shocked for they
had launched the mass movement for Islam-
ic Order (nizami-i Mustafa) that paved the
way for the military take-over. The military
legitimized its rule on a religious basis
shared by these parties. The three main reli-
gio-political parties, the Jama’at Islami, the
Jam’iyyat Ulama’i Islam and the Jam’iyyat
Ulama’i Pakistan were hoping that the new
regime would allow them a broader role.
They had jointly campaigned for the estab-
lishment of the Islamic order and now were
experiencing a dilemma: should they sup-
port the new military regime or not? 
The Jam’iyyati Ulama’i Islam and the Jam’iy-
yat Ulama’i Pakistan both furthered the im-
plementation of the Hanafi school of law.
They, however, differed on certain details.
The former was supported by the Deobandis
while the latter by the Barelwis, the Ahl al-
Sunnat wa’l Jama’at, popularly called Sunnis.
The Deoband, a reformist educational insti-
tution established in India in 1867 was critic-
al of a number of popular religious practices
to which the Barelwis adhered. Contrary to
these two parties, Jama’at Islami criticized
both groups for their adherence to Sufi or-
ders and law schools; they favoured a puri-
tan interpretation of Islam. The three soon
fell apart on the question of supporting the
new regime. The Jama’at Islami joined hands
with the regime while the Jami’yyati Ulama’i
Islam publicly supported it. The Jam’iyyat-i-
Ulama’i Pakistan decided not to cooperate
with the Martial Law Regime. 
The Jam’iyyat-i Ulama-i Pakistan, founded
in March 1948, was the leading religio-politi-
cal party of the Barelwis. This state of isola-
tion and political dormancy was the main
cause of frustration among the young Sunni
Barelwi intelligentsia. Da’wat-i Islami
emerged as a catharsis to this desperate
state of affairs. In response to the leadership
crisis among Sunni Muslims and the frustra-
tion of young and middle class Sunnis, Dr
Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadiri (born in Februa-
ry 1951 at Jhang Saddar, Panjab) founded
the Idarah-I Minhaj ul-Qur’an (Institution of
Qur’anic Path) in October 1980 in Lahore. His
intentions were to enter into the political
arena under the guise of religion. Later, in
May 1989, he formed a political party, Pakis-
tan Awami Tehrik (Pakistan People’s Move-
ment). However, because Mawlana Ilyas
Qadiri was more respected as a religious and
devout scholar and more clearly associated
with the Barelwis when compared to Tahir
ul-Qadiri, the former managed to obtain a
constituency among a large number of Sun-
nis. Nowadays he is known as the a m i r - i a h l - i
s u n n a t (Leader of the Sunnis) among his fol-
l o w e r s .
The Da’wat-i Islami, catapulted by the Sun-
nis, comprising middle and lower-middle
strata of the Pakistani society, was founded
on the principles of d a ’ w a h (invitation) to
follow the s u n n a h, prophetic way. It aimed
to promote and deepen the love for the
Prophet and the early community of Mus-
lims in Medinah. The movement stands for
the revival and resurgence of Islam through
preaching. Its main characteristic is to
preach ‘what is righteous and what is forbid-
den’. The members of the Da’wat-i Islami are
so keen on following the s u n n a h that they al-
ways wear white clothes, a green turban and
a m i s w a k (a wooden stick used in place of a
toothbrush) in their pockets.
The Da’wat-i Islami advocates the univer-
sal brotherhood among the Muslims. The
Hanafi school of thought of the Da’wat-i Isla-
mi is the official school of the movement,
but followers of the other rites count among
its members. Since the primary objective is
to promote unity among the Muslims, theo-
logical and political controversies are dis-
couraged in the Da’wat-i Islami.
Expansion of the movement
During its early days, the Da’wat-i Islami
held its weekly meeting at the Gulzar-i-
Habib Mosque, Soldier Bazar, in Karachi ev-
ery Thursday after the evening prayer. After
recitation from the Qur’an and the salutation
of the Prophet, one of its preachers would
give a speech on a spiritual and moral topic,
followed by a speech of Mawlana Ilyas Qadi-
ri, who explained day to day problems in
terms of Islamic law. The following day, after
the Friday prayer, a small group of preach-
ers, under the leadership of Mawlana Qadiri,
visited other quarters of Karachi. They of-
fered the remaining prayers at the central
mosque of the area. In between prayers,
Mawlana Qadiri briefed local residents about
the basic teachings of Islam. The Da’wat-i Is-
lami expanded rapidly in Karachi; in one
year’s time these weekly meetings began to
be held in some 300 mosques. From Karachi,
the movement expanded quietly in the
Sindh and then throughout Pakistan. It then
became conspicuous and influential, and
started to spread over other parts of the
world, thus constituting a veritably transna-
tional t a b l i g h i m o v e m e n t .
There is no secretive nature of the Da’wat-
i Islami or any long-term/short-term strateg-
ic agenda. However, it struggles for the im-
plementation of the n i z a m - i M u s t a f a ( t h e
system of the Prophet) in Pakistan through
peaceful preaching so as to create an Islamic
society. In addition to the weekly meetings
in the various larger and smaller cities and
towns of Pakistan, it holds its annual meet-
ing in different metropolitan areas of Pakis-
tan. Thus far, it has held annual meetings in
Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore and Multan. The
Da’wat-i Islami established secretariats in
both Karachi and Lahore, naming them Faid-
an-i Medinah (Blessing of Medinah). 
In nearly every city of Pakistan, the Da’wat-
i Islami has established religious schools and
libraries. It has its own edifying literature, the
most important of which is Faidan-i Sunnat
(Blessing of the Sunnah), (Karachi: Maktabat-
ul Medinah, N.D.) compiled by Mawlana
Qadiri. In this voluminous work, Mawlana
Qadiri narrates the s u n n a h of the Prophet re-
garding affairs of daily life. Besides F a i d a n - i
S u n n a t, some booklets, lectures and speech-
es of Mawlana Qadiri recorded on audio cas-
sette are also regarded as sources of inspira-
tion for the members of the Da’wat-i Islami.
The Da’wat-i Islami also publishes works by
other Barelwi scholars, particularly works of
Mawlana Ahmad Rida Khan Qadiri Barelwi
( 1 8 5 6 - 1 9 2 1 ) .
The Da’wat-i Islami has a considerable
hold on its members. From the very begin-
ning, it was a centralized movement, revolv-
ing around the personality of Mawlana Ilyas
Qadiri. The centre in Karachi, authorized
a m i r (chiefs) of provinces, cities and towns to
work in accordance with the directions of
the centre. Local a m i r s come regularly to the
centre for training and guidance. So as to
have close contact with the different branch-
es of the Da’wat-i Islami, Mawlana Qadiri reg-
ularly travels all over Pakistan. The members
must show their commitment to the Islamic
way of life as is reflected compendiously in
his Faidan-i Sunnat. The centre discourages
the reading and discussing of anything oth-
er than the Faidan-i Sunnat in the weekly
meetings. In addition to male participants, it
has a considerable enrolment of Pakistani
w o m e n .
Although the Da’wat-i Islami is supported on
its aims to build character in its individual
members, particularly the young generation,
and to establish religious institutions, it nev-
ertheless attracts diverse criticism about
some of its practices. Its over-emphasis on
wearing the green turban not only irritates
common Muslims, but also scholars are re-
luctant to endorse it. They do not consider
wearing the green turban as compulsory
(sunnat-i mu’akkadah). In fact, they hold that
any type of cape, or white or black coloured
turban can be used to cover one’s head.
Leading Barelwi scholars also object to call-
ing Mawlana Ilyas Qadiri the amir-i ahl-i sun-
n a t. Da’wat-i Islami requires each of its mem-
bers to become a m u r i d (pupil) of Mawlana
Qadiri. The critics of the movement regard
this as a reflection of his desire to maintain
control over this entire rapidly expanding,
even perhaps transnational movement. ♦
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
N o t e
* Mawlana Qadiri was born in July 1950 in a Karachi-
based Memon family. He is a k h a l i f a h ( v i c e g e r e n t )
of Mawlana Muhammad Diya’ uddin Ahmad Qadiri
Madni (1877-1981), a Sialkot-born religious
scholar, who migrated to Medinah in 1910.
Mujeeb Ahmad is a lecturer in history at the F.G.
Quaid-i-Azam College, Pakistan. 
E-mail: matinkhalil@hotmail.com
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Dr Aparna Rao is a social anthropologist who has
been conducting research on Kashmir since 1980,
and has published extensively on the area.
So uth As ia
A P A R N A  RA O
This past year has witnessed India and Pakistan bat-
tling over an area that has known little peace since
1947. While the two states speak of ‘nationalism’,
‘secularism’ or ‘Muslim unity’, and various Islamist
organizations call for j e h a d, most Kashmiris speak of
‘self-determination’ and ‘Kashmiri identity’. The idea
of self-determination as independence was first for-
mulated in 1947 by the last Hindu Dogra Maharaja,
Hari Singh. The concept of a distinct Kashmiri identi-
ty (k a s h m i r i y a t) evolved in the 1930s with a move-
ment, explicitly involving both Muslim and Hindu in-
telligentsia, against feudal-cum-colonial rule. The
notion of a discrete Kashmiri citizenship goes back to
the 1920s, when Kashmiri Hindus, facing competi-
tion from Punjabi Hindus, pressed for a formal defi-
nition of ‘state subjects’.
S e l f - D e t e r m i n a t i o n
in Kashmir: 
Identity, Islam, and
the Search for Justice
With South Asian decolonization and the
creation of Pakistan and India in 1947, the
Kashmiri struggle attained international
proportions. While Hari Singh signed the
conditional accession of the state to the In-
dian Union, and India and Pakistan fought
their first war, the Jammu and Kashmir Lib-
eration Front (JKLF) was formed to free
Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. The
United Nations cease-fire declaration in
1949 split Jammu and Kashmir into roughly
65% (east and south of the cease-fire line)
and 35% (to the west and north) controlled
by India and Pakistan respectively. The Paki-
stani portion is inhabited mostly by non-
Kashmiri Sunni Muslims, with Shias in pock-
ets. The Indian portion consists of several
distinct areas, the Valley, inhabited over-
whelmingly by Kashmiris (largely Sunni,
with Shia, Hindu and Sikh minorities), being
the most problematic. 
Till 1953 efforts towards social justice con-
tinued: feudal rule was abolished, and land
and tax reforms were undertaken by the Na-
tional Conference (NC) government under
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Welcomed
especially by the unbelievably poor rural
Valley Muslims and lower-caste Hindus to
the south, they antagonized wealthy Mus-
lims and Hindus, notably the landed gentry,
who received no compensation. The NC’s
urban popularity continued, largely be-
cause of Abdullah´s adherence to k a s h m i r i-
y a t. While the Valley waited impatiently for
the promised plebiscite, to the south, citing
Indian nationalism, the communal and ob-
scurantist Praja Parishad – many of whose
members were adversely affected by the
land reforms – and the Rashtriya Swayamse-
vak Sangh incited fear among Hindu and
Sikh refugees from Pakistan about renewed
atrocities by Muslims, were a plebiscite to
take place. Against this background the
‘Delhi Agreement’ was signed in July 1952,
spelling out the mutual limits of authority of
the Kashmiri and Indian states and reneging
on the promised plebiscite. It denied the
ethos of k a s h m i r i y a t and was never accept-
ed by most Kashmiris. All vestiges of democ-
racy were shed in 1953 with Abdullah’s dis-
missal by the Indian government and his in-
carceration till 1968.
While crushing dissent, India now em-
barked on creating a consumer culture. The
Valley had a dense structure of ties cutting
across trade, bureaucracy, artisanship, cash
crop horticulture and politics. Both those
who wanted independence and those who
favoured accession to Pakistan – and these
included many among the Muslim landed
gentry and the mercantile class – were part
of these networks. Political opponents were
now co-opted into the system of economic
benefits, primarily through Indian subsidies.
Little moral opprobrium was attached to
the massive corruption that resulted, since
‘Indian money‘ was involved. A middle class
emerged which could ill afford to be openly
anti-India, while participating in a sullen op-
position to Indian rule. Economic gains per-
colated down to the villages, but migration
to towns continued and the number of un-
employed youth grew. With issues of social
justice neglected, muffled dissent and una-
bated Pakistani propaganda, the idea of
Kashmiri nationalist resistance also grew.
The Algerian struggle against France, the
Vietnam war and the Palestinian movement
all had their impact. Working-class Muslim
teenagers often demonstrated, many being
routinely arrested, manhandled, and humili-
ated. 
The emergence of religion
a s a factor
In 1972, following the third Indo-Pakistan
war and the formation of Bangladesh, India
and Pakistan signed the ‘Simla Accord’, ex-
plicitly ignoring the wishes of the Kashmiri
people. Also in 1972, while members of the
Plebiscite Front were debarred from con-
testing elections, the Indian Congress Party
ensured the Jama’at-e Islami (JI) a victory
against the NC in five seats. The notions of
k a s h m i r i y a t and self-determination ap-
peared more dangerous to Indian rule than
Islamic fundamentalism. Politically, the JI re-
mained weak and won only one seat in the
first and last fair elections in 1977, but it was
inculcating fundamentalism and inciting
hatred and contempt for non-Muslims in
schools in villages where state schools often
existed only nominally. Hindu fundamental-
ists now also began inculcating a brand of
Hinduism entirely alien to Kashmir. Between
1933 and 1986 the Valley witnessed no
communal riots, yet mutual mistrust and an
uneasy co-existence characterized Muslim-
Hindu relations. 
By the 1980s, facing increasing competi-
tion from Muslims and feeling discriminated
against by the Kashmir government, many
educated Hindus took up jobs in India. Si-
multaneously, increasing migration among
Muslim professionals to the Gulf and the
West and the resulting remittance economy
created a nouveau riche, whose opulent
lifestyle clashed with that of the conserva-
tive working and lower-middle classes.
While socio-economic disparities grew, mid-
dle and lower-middle-class Muslims aspired
to greater political power. With the NC re-
peatedly giving in to blackmail by the C o n-
gress, most Kashmiris looked for an alterna-
tive political party. Hoping to crush opposi-
tion, the Congress played the ‘religious’
card and harped on the differences be-
tween Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus; Paki-
stani propaganda echoed this theme. Politi-
cal and economic conflict was interpreted in
‘religious’ terms by all concerned, and in-
creasingly Kashmiris sought solace in ortho-
dox forms of their respective religions. The
Iranian revolution, the Soviet (‘India’s
friend’) defeat in Afghanistan, India’s cold
shouldering the Afghan resistance, the rise
of the Central Asian republics and the Sikh
movement for ‘Khalistan’ now encouraged
Kashmiri Muslims to conceive of their own
empowerment in terms of Islam. With Kash-
miri Hindus increasingly considered pro-
Congress, hence pro-India and thus anti-
Kashmir, Kashmiri identity became synony-
mous with Kashmiri Muslim identity.
Resorting to arms
Indian policy now changed from co-op-
tion to confrontation, and in 1987 the Mus-
lim United Front (MUF), a conglomeration of
opposition groups voted for by some 60%
Kashmiris, was declared defeated. Waves of
strikes, assassinations, bomb blasts, kidnap-
pings and arson swept the Valley, peaking in
1990. The components of the MUF formed
armed outfits (Al Barq, Al Fateh, Al Jehad,
etc.), and thousands took up arms supplied
by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI);
the first of these grew into the armed wing
of the JKLF. Coming from urban families
who had failed to penetrate the existing
economic networks, the militants were dan-
gerous to the Indian state, but also to the
Kashmiri ruling class. A violent movement
contesting the appropriation of resources
by a chosen few was imminent. Aspiring to
political power, expecting more direct help
from Pakistan and the West, and under-rat-
ing the Indian army, the middle class sup-
ported the militants, setting aside internal
socio-economic contradictions and averting
the dangers of f i t n a. With ISI training and
arms, the militants proclaimed j e h a d for po-
litical justice and k a s h m i r i y a t. This justified
extortion, kidnappings, and forcible entry
into wealthier Muslim homes; monetary
‘contributions’ were accepted in lieu of tak-
ing up arms. 
The attempt to combine radical Islam with
k a s h m i r i y a t failed, however. The call for j e-
h a d, coupled with the murder of some Kash-
miri Hindus, threats to many others, and the
Indian campaign to depict the issue as a
‘communal’ conflict terrified the vast major-
ity of Kashmiri Hindus into accepting Indian
help to flee the Valley. With their rapid de-
parture, the concept of k a s h m i r i y a t d i e d ;
but its demise was inevitable anyway: k a s h-
m i r i y a t meant little to Srinagar´s wealthy
Muslim Punjabis, who largely favour acces-
sion to Pakistan, rather than independence;
k a s h m i r i y a t was irrelevant for the ‘libera-
tion’ of areas outside the Valley; the mystic-
ally-oriented Islam typical for the Valley and
part and parcel of k a s h m i r i y a t was suspect-
ed by the funding agencies. Hence, k a s h m i r-
i y a t was discarded and replaced by more
militant Islamic concepts (e.g. jehad, muja-
hid, shahid, Nizam-e Mustafa). Though at-
tempts to enforce veiling, attendance at Fri-
day prayers and a ban smoking all failed,
women’s hair dressing salons and cinema
houses were forcibly closed, cosmetics and
alcohol were prohibited and bands of
armed youngsters combed the bye-lanes to
check on proper behaviour. Islamic guerrilla
groups – Allah Tigers, Al-Umar Mujahidin,
Hizbullah, Ikhwan-ul Mujahidin – multiplied,
with the mainly rurally recruited Hizb-ul Mu-
jahidin (HM), the JI’s armed wing, dominat-
ing from 1990 onwards. India responded
with about 400,000 soldiers and militia, who
battled the militants, but also shot many
suspects and resorted to extreme physical
and psychological repression. Soon count-
less families grieved over those killed, tor-
tured, or raped; thousands were arrested;
hundreds disappeared without a trace, and
hundreds are still in prison. 
With arms and money flowing in, factional
shoot-outs escalated. By 1993 several Af-
ghans, Sudanese, Palestinians and Yeme-
nites joined the battle; the JKLF no longer
received much Pakistani help and became a
prime target of the HM. To survive, it de-
clared a unilateral cease-fire in 1994 that led
to its further splitting and to many of its
men joining the Jama’at-ul Ulema-e Islami
(JUI)-linked Harkat-ul Ansar/Harkat-ul Muja-
hidin or the Markaz-ul Dawa-ul Irshad-
linked Lashkar-e Toiba (LT), demonstrating
that no discrete boundaries divide ‘funda-
mentalists’ from ‘non-fundamentalists’ –
simply shades of grey representing varying
ad hoc strategies based on different aspects
and degrees of faith and on attempts to ful-
fil personal commitments to principles of
specifically Islamic justice. These principles
are also instrumentalized by various organi-
zations – the JI, the JUI, the ISI – to fight their
own battles in Kashmir. 
To curb in-fighting, many militant organi-
zations, including the JKLF and the JI,
formed the All Parties Hurriyat Conference
(APHC) with the common objective of press-
ing for ‘self-determination‘ and the estab-
lishment of a society that is in keeping with
Islamic values. By spring 1999 there was rel-
ative peace in the Valley, with hundreds of
armed ex-militants from various groups em-
ployed by the Government to take suspects
and terrorize their kin. Like the Afghan Hizb-
e Islami and the Al-Badr Mujahidin, the
APHC supported the 1999 invasion by Pakis-
tan and the United Jehad Council (an apex
body of fourteen Islamic organizations) in
northern Kashmir; as the LT put it, this is ‘a
war between Islam and paganism‘. More
than ever before, the concepts of ‘self-de-
termination‘ and ‘Kashmiri identity‘ defy
d e f i n i t i o n .♦
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Mid dl e Ea st
N A Y E R E H  T O H I D I
The Islamist regime in Iran is in crisis, ideologically,
economically and politically. A more visible sign of
this crisis manifests itself in the factional conflict be-
tween the ruling conservatives who support an abso-
lutist theocracy, i.e. the supreme rule of the jurispru-
dence (velayat-e faqih), and the reformists who are
after a sort of Islamic pluralism, democracy and rule
of law. But a more subtle and profound dimension of
the present crisis is reflected in the growing disillu-
sionment and frustration among the Iranian youth




a New Era in Iran
Neither any opposition group, the eight-
year war with Iraq, nor the often-blamed
‘Great Satan’ has dealt as serious a blow to
the authority and legitimacy of the ruling Is-
lamists in Iran as have their own children.
Today, two decades after the 1979 Revolu-
tion that gave power to the Shi’a clerics in
Iran, the majority of the children born and
raised under the Islamist regime, do not
identify with its ideology and dictated be-
havioural codes. The failure of the Islamic
Republic in its cultural and ideological pro-
jects has recently manifested itself during
two exhibitions of defiance by the youth:
the spontaneous national jubilation over a
game between Iranian and American foot-
ball players in Lyon in June 1998, and the
massive nation-wide student demonstra-
tion against state-run repression in July
1999. 
Students have constituted one of the
most dynamic forces in the recent history of
Iran. They played a major role in the move-
ments that paved the way to the 1979 Revo-
lution and the downfall of the Shah. In the
establishment of the Islamic Republic (IR)
too, a large segment of the student body
played a key role by taking over the Ameri-
can Embassy in 1980 and creating the
‘hostage crisis’. The clerics then effectively
manipulated students’ passion and the
‘hostage crisis’ towards their own goals in
the struggle for the state power, eliminating
liberals, seculars and leftists from various or-
gans of power, and eventually consolidat-
ing a theocratic rule. In their ‘Cultural Revo-
lution’ campaign, the Islamist clerics pitted
Islamist students against other groups and
pursued violent suppression of any student
organization supportive of secular and Is-
lamic dissident trends on various campuses.
They carried out ideological cleansing of
faculty and administration and began
screening student admissions on the basis
of ideological and moral standards as neces-
sary steps towards the ‘Islamization’ of uni-
versities. When this campaign met with re-
sistance, the Revolutionary Council issued
an order to close universities for two years
beginning on 5 June 1980.      
The success in suppressing the indepen-
dent student movement and the subse-
quent co-optation of students and universi-
ties that lasted for over 15 years played a
crucial role in the consolidation of the cler-
ics’ rule. They have been keen on closely
linking traditional religious seminaries and
modern universities, turning for example,
the main quad of the Tehran University
campus into the site of weekly Friday
prayers led by conservative clerics.  
In line with its initial populist nature and
ongoing revolutionary rhetoric, the IR has
promoted mobilization of the youth and
students, especially during the war with
Iraq. But this politicization of the youth, like
that of women, has gradually turned into a
double-edged sword for the conservatives,
who have increasingly lost their influence
on the direction and nature of student ac-
tivism. Many Islamic Associations of Stu-
dents, originally supported and even found-
ed by these clerics, have taken on a life of
their own, becoming real players in the cur-
rent power struggle. One can witness a re-
birth of dissident student movement – this
time ironically among the very students
hand-picked by the ruling clerics them-
selves, for example, the two leaders of the
recent student uprising, Tabarzadi and Mo-
h a m m a d i .1
Several factors have contributed to this re-
birth of pro-democracy student activism.
For one, Khatami’s election in May 1997 in
which the massive participation and sup-
portive votes of the youth and women
played a crucial role, was a result of the pro-
found change in the political culture of Iran.
Students’ sense of victory about the surpris-
ing results of the presidential elections was
a turning point in the recognition of the sig-
nificance of their own political role. More-
over, a subsequent slow lift of the totalitari-
an hold on the cultural and intellectual do-
mains of society gave rise to new currents of
political and cultural expression among stu-
dents. 
During the past two years, a series of
peaceful student rallies was held around po-
litical and non-political grievances relating
to freedom of press, political prisoners,
housing issues, and quality of food in dormi-
tories. Such protests, however, have been
quickly dispersed or crushed by the police
and vigilantes (Ansar Hezbollah) that are
still under the control of the ruling conserv-
atives. Furthermore, Khatami’s reform ef-
forts have been sabotaged and interrupted
by totalitarian Islamists through various
means, including constant pressure on pro-
gressive press, intimidation, terror and the
assassination of a number of prominent op-
position leaders, writers and intellectuals. 
Another turning point resulting in further
erosion of legitimacy and sanctity of the
clerical rule in the eyes of the students was
the violent raid of student hostels by the po-
lice and plain-clothed security forces in July
1999. Instead of punishing the perpetuators
of violence, hundreds of students were ar-
rested and sentenced to long prison terms.
For instance, Ahmad Bateni, the student pic-
tured on the cover of the E c o n o m i s t m a g a-
zine (7-15-99), holding the bloody shirt of
another fellow student, was sentenced to 10
years in prison. Voicing its outrage, the pro-
reform K h o r d a d daily wrote: ‘Holding a
bloody T-shirt is a crime, but making a T-
shirt bloody is not a crime!’2
Demographic and social
c h a n g e
To better understand the significance of
the prospective trends in student activism,
it is necessary to account for certain struc-
tural and demographic transformations that
have turned the Iranian society of the late
1990s into one very different from that in-
herited by Khomeini in 1979. Recent drastic
demographic change, due in part to the
pro-natal policy of the state and its rein-
forcement of motherhood as the primary
role of women in the war-stricken years of
1980-1988, has shifted the character of the
population in Iran, the size of which dou-
bled between 1978 and 1996. Over 70% of
Iran’s 65 million people are now below 25
years of age. It is no surprise that the major-
ity of those arrested during the July crack-
down on students were under 20.
Along with demographic changes, there
have been both quantitative and qualitative
changes in the student body. Except for a
brief period of decline in the number of uni-
versity students – from 140,000 before the
revolution to 117,148 after the ‘Cultural Rev-
olution’ (1982-83 academic year) – there
was an annual growth rate of 13% for the
1980s and still a higher rate after the war
with Iraq. Prior to Khatami’s election there
were 1,150,000 students in universities and
higher education institutions.   
Since the revolution, the ethnic, class, and
gender composition of the student body in
universities has also changed in important
ways. After the 1979 Revolution, the num-
ber of rural and lower class students in state
universities increased tremendously. The
exodus of many upper and upper-middle
class students to universities in foreign
countries, purging of secular students, the
admission policy based on moral and ideo-
logical standards and also admission quotas
for war veteran family members, resulted in
an increase in the proportion of students
from traditional, poorer and provincial
backgrounds in state universities. Ten years
later, the gender composition of the stu-
dents began to change dramatically. In
1999, for the first time in the history of Iran-
ian higher education, the number of female
students in universities surpassed that of
male students by about 20,000 (4%).3 R e-
gardless of their background, these stu-
dents have now come to represent the aspi-
rations and orientations of a new urban
middle class, rather than those of the rural
or the bazaar subcultures. 
‘The futureless future-
m a k e r s ’
The recent shift in the state’s population
policy toward family-planning and the suc-
cessful decline in the fertility rate are too
late to address the huge demands of the
new generation of youth for education,
jobs, and leisure. By the late 1990s, facing
increasing unemployment, high inflation,
and bleak economic outlook, many students
lost hope in being able to secure a decent
future. Student activists sarcastically ask the
ruling clerics: ‘Why are you calling us “fu-
ture-makers” while you have left us with no
future (ayandeh-sazan-e bi-ayandeh) ? ’
Since Khatami’s presidency there has
been a decrease in the intrusion by Islamist
vigilantes into the private lives and personal
choices of the youth and women, and the
dress and behaviour codes have also been
less strictly monitored. Yet, the sense of de-
spair among many youngsters continues.
The recent crackdown has further intensi-
fied insecurity, resentment, and above all
the identity crisis among the youth.4 A n
alarming rate of depression among young
girls in certain parts of Iran, like Qum, has
been documented by official reports.5
The new student movement is still in flux,
inexperienced and loosely organized. So far,
students’ demands for freedom of thought,
of assembly, of press, and of political prison-
ers, as well as their demands for rule of law
and security, have been raised in a voice of
reason and in a non-violent manner. The
predominant discourses among student ac-
tivists are still very similar to those used by
the new reform movement reflective of the
‘new thinking’ among Islamic liberal and
leftist intellectuals as well as within secular
nationalist trends. While one hopes for a
peaceful and constructive evolutionary
process of reform, there is a continuous and
violent interruption in that process by the
retrogressive forces. The lack of profound
improvement in the legal system, civil and
human rights, and economic conditions
could result in a revolutionary explosion, es-
pecially among the increasingly restless and
outraged youth. ♦
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Mi ddl e Ea st
E U G E N E  R O G A N
Western missionaries are credited with introducing
many changes to Middle Eastern societies in the 19t h
century. Their influence on the Ottoman state is less
well known. Competing with Protestant and Catholic
missionaries for the minds, souls, and bodies of its
Arab subjects, the Ottomans adopted Christian mis-




The south-eastern corner of Ottoman Syria
lay beyond the reach of the government’s
authority until the second half of the 19t h
century. A thinly-populated contact zone
between the desert and the sown, the peas-
ants and Bedouin of Transjordan had more
in common with each other than they did
with the urban cultures of neighbouring Jer-
usalem, Nablus and Damascus. This was par-
ticularly true in terms of spiritual affairs. Far
from the centres of orthodoxy, the residents
of Transjordan had grown highly unortho-
dox in their religious practices. The large
Christian minority abstained from alcohol
and pork and some Christian men were
known to take a second wife when the first
failed to conceive. The Muslims, for their
part, imposed none of the restrictions on
Christians common in urban Syria or Pales-
tine. Christians were free to ride the same
size mount as Muslims, to wear any colour
of the rainbow, and to trade insults and
blows with Muslims as among equals when
they had a falling out. Indeed, it was even
reported that Muslims would take their in-
fants to be baptised by a Greek Orthodox
priest to protect them from harm.
An Open Door
Following the establishment of direct Ot-
toman rule in northern Transjordan in 1867,
Christian missionary societies were quick to
enter the field. British and German Protes-
tants of the Church Missionary Society
(CMS) and French and Italian Roman Cathol-
ics dispatched by the Latin Patriarch of Jeru-
salem were attracted by the high degree of
tolerance which they encountered in Trans-
jordan. Not only could they hope to win
over large numbers of Greek Orthodox
Christians, but they believed Transjordan to
be the one place in which they might win
Muslim converts – particularly among the
Bedouin tribes. 
The missionary societies provided a wide
range of social services hitherto neglected
by both the Ottoman religious authorities
and the state, such as education and medi-
cine. They embarked on ambitious building
projects to provide churches, schools and
clinics. Initially, they met with support and
even gratitude from the local Ottoman offi-
cials. By the 1880s, however, the Ottomans
moved to impose stricter limits on Christian
missionary activities in Greater Syria, and in
Transjordan in particular. The missionaries
responded by turning their attention to the
southern reaches of Transjordan, to the Kar-
ak district, which still lay beyond direct gov-
ernment rule.
In February 1888, CMS missionaries Henry
Sykes and Frederick Connor set out on a
tour of Madaba and Karak to assess the
prospects for mission work there. Connor
was most enthusiastic: ‘If the CMS avails it-
self of the present opportunity, it will gain
an undisputed footing in Kerak before the
Turkish authorities enter it.’ Here was a tol-
erant society reminiscent of the Transjordan
of the 1860s. ‘The people are only nominal
Moslems, and have not the same fanaticism
as Moslems of Palestine and Syria. The door
for evangelization in East and West Pales-
tine is practically closed; in the Kerak district
it is open.’
As it turned out, the CMS only opened its
mission in Karak after the Ottomans entered
the town in 1893. The Latins too re-estab-
lished their mission in Karak in 1894. The Ot-
toman state they confronted was deter-
mined not to allow agents of foreign powers
to disrupt their delicate work in Transjor-
dan’s newest frontier. The Ottoman govern-
ment had to provide the services which they
forbade missionaries to deliver. They recog-
nized the dubious religiosity of the tribes-
men at the Transjordan frontier. The prob-
lem was more aggravated the further one
moved south. Ottoman assessments of the
inhabitants of the Karak district did not dif-
fer from those of the missionaries. As the
governor in Damascus wrote in 1894:
’Although there are in excess of 50,000
Muslim tribesmen estimated to be living
within the region of Macan [i.e. southern
Transjordan, including Karak], they have
long been born into savagery and igno-
rance of Islamic religious duties and reg-
ulation of prayer. …One does not en-
counter one man in a thousand who
performs his prayers… Given the ab-
sence of mosques and prayer rooms it is
only natural that they should abandon
prayer, for even if they so desired there
are no places of worship to be found.’
The Ottoman response
To forestall missionary work among Mus-
lims, the Ottoman government sought to
build on the Muslim identity preserved
among those who observed none of the
outward practices of Islam. On entering Kar-
ak, the Ottoman government sought to en-
dow its new regional capital with a Friday
mosque. The governor of Syria petitioned
the Imperial Palace with the drawings and
costings for a new structure built on the site
of the ancient mosque ‘founded by Faruk
[i.e. the Caliph cUmar] at the time of the [7t h
century] conquest of Syria, destroyed five or
six centuries ago.’ The cost of constructing
the mosque, with a school attached, was es-
timated by army engineers in the region of
300,000 piasters. Over the next two dec-
ades, old mosques were restored and new
ones built along the length of the Transjor-
dan frontier, by local initiative and with gov-
ernment support.
The Ottomans were equally concerned to
counteract the proselytizing of Christian
missionaries among Muslims. The state con-
sistently sought to provide spiritual gui-
dance to Muslim communities within reach
of European missionaries. For example, to
counteract the work of Christian missionar-
ies in the Hawran in 1886, the provincial au-
thorities in Damascus dispatched Quranic
teachers to work with the tribes, ‘provided
with a tent and a camel to carry it when the
tribe removes from place to place.’ Similarly,
Sultan Abdülhamid II called for the posting
of ‘village preachers’ (köy imamlari) to every
village in those districts of rural Syria where
‘Muslim children are sent to schools opened
by foreigners.’ He also called for the provin-
cial printing presses to publish books and
treatises for distribution as a means of
reaching the literate.
These calls for Quranic teachers to work
among the tribes and for village preachers
became particularly acute after the Otto-
man entry into Karak, given the determina-
tion of the Latin and Protestant missionaries
to make inroads among the Muslims there.
In 1896, the CMS was represented by Fred-
erick Johnson, an accredited medical doc-
tor. The audacity of the British medical mis-
sionary was confirmed in April 1897 when
Dr Johnson travelled the short distance
from Karak to Qatrana to visit ‘the Hajj Pil-
grims on their outward journey with the
idea of discovering the existence or not of
opportunities for the Medical Missionary.’
He met with the ‘Pasha of the Hajj’ and oth-
er officials and, not surprisingly, was dealt a
warning six months later from the British
Consul in Damascus ‘enclosing a copy of a
Note Verbale received from the Sublime
Porte in which further complaint is made of
your action in the matter of proselytism
among Moslems.’
Muslim missionaries
Ottoman officials continued to follow the
work of European missionaries in the Karak
district very closely. The governor in Damas-
cus sent a telegram to the imperial palace in
December 1898 with the familiar refrain of
‘Latin and Protestant foreign missionaries
opening unlicensed schools and educating
wild and uncivilised Arab Muslim children
devoid of Islamic beliefs.’ However, his solu-
tion was to imitate the societies they sought
to suppress, and to dispatch Hanafi Muslim
‘missionaries’ (m i s y ö n e r l e r) to the Karak dis-
trict to work in pairs among the tribes on
state salaries of 150 piasters each. Similarly,
the office of the Sheyhülislam dispatched
salaried preachers to remedy the ignorance
of Islamic practice in Macan in July 1899.
The news of the Muslim missionaries was
received with alarm by the CMS, and dis-
missed with derision by the Latins. CMS mis-
sionary Henry Harding wrote to a British
supporter in 1899 asking him ‘to sympathize
with my feelings on learning that the Turks
are sending fourteen fully trained Moslem
missionaries to Kerak, and these are on their
way now.’ The Dominican priest Antonin
Jaussen claimed that the Muslim missionar-
ies made little impression on the natives of
the Karak region. Some results were ob-
tained in getting the Bedouin to observe
the fast of Ramadan, though respect for the
fast was localized: more fasting in the town,
less among the plateau lands of Karak, and
no observation at all among such independ-
ent tribes as the Bani Hamida, Bani Sakhr
and Huwaytat. 
The injunction to pray five times daily, he
claimed, was even less respected. According
to Jaussen, the Bedouin found the prostra-
tions of prayer dishonourable and dis-
missed the practice as ‘the prayers of the
e f e n d i s (officials)’. Once having learned to
pray, Jaussen claimed the knowledge was
only used out of political motives as part of
‘official life’ when visiting government offi-
ces in town. He cited as an example mem-
bers of the Huwaytat tribe who ‘had them-
selves initiated in the a r t of prayer and sub-
mitted to those practices only when they
went to the Saray (government offices).’
It is regrettable that our records provide
no local reactions to the Ottoman mission-
aries to balance the opinions expressed by
such interested parties as the Catholic and
Protestant observers. All that can be said of
the European accounts is that they confirm
the dispatch of Ottoman missionaries. In all
probability, the Hanafi missionaries met
with no more success than the Protestants
or Catholics in trying to impose new values
on the people of Transjordan. For when, in
1910, the people of Karak revolted against
the state’s centralizing initiatives, they
sacked the Friday mosque along with all the
other structures built by the Ottoman au-
thorities as another symbol of repressive
state rule. ♦
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Mid dl e Ea st
S A M I  A L - K H A Z E N D A R
The positions and beliefs adopted by the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) on aspects of the Palestinian issue,
particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, are of major in-
terest as they directed MB policies and enabled it to
mobilize opinion against Jordan’s foreign policy re-
garding Palestine. The framework of the Jordanian
Muslim Brotherhood’s views on Palestine was based
on the Islamization of the Palestinian question by the
prophetic claim that Jerusalem-Palestine is one ‘Is-
lamic land’ and by asserting the religious duty of Jor-
dan to play a strategic role in defending an Islamic
cause. Also, they believe that the conflict with Israel
is a religio-civilization conflict, not a political one,
between Islam and Judaism. 
The Jordanian
M u s l i m Brotherhood’s 
Perceptions of
t h e P a l e s t i n i a n
I s s ue1For the MB the Palestine problem is central.The liberation of all of Palestine (including
the land controlled by Israelis in 1948) is con-
sidered as both a religious and an Arab na-
tionalist duty, given the historic importance
of Jerusalem and Palestine as an ‘Islamic
land’. The MB was deeply concerned with
the Palestinian issue at an early stage and
shared the belief that Jordan had a special
role to play, based on its proximity to Israel
and its vulnerability to Israeli ambitions. The
MB also believed that the land of Jordan is, in
an eschatological sense, ‘the land of mobili-
zation and constancy’ (Ard al-Hashd wa al-
R i b a t ) for the whole Muslim world in its bat-
tle for the liberation of Palestine. This reli-
gious perspective is taken from the MB’s un-
derstanding of the meaning of a h a d i t h, in
which it was reported that the Prophet said
Muslims will fight and defeat the Jews one
day before the end of the world, and that the
place of Muslims will be on the east side of
the Jordan River, while the Jews will be on
the west side (i.e. the so-called East and West
Banks). Most h a d i t h compilations mention
that the Muslims will be victorious in the
fight against the Jews, but they do not indi-
cate the place of battle, excepting one fa-
mous h a d i t h transmitted by Nur al-Din ‘Ali
al-Haythami (d. AD 807) in his M a j m ac a l -
Zawa’id wa Manbac a l - F a w a ’ i d .2
The MB’s literature and interviews with its
leaders confirm that it continues to believe
in these prophecies. They have, in fact, be-
come a source of the MB’s philosophy and
ideology regarding the Palestinian issue. MB
leaders believe that the Muslims will liberate
the whole of Palestine and will gain a reli-
gious victory in their battle with the Jews, in
accordance with the Prophet’s promise. As it
was succinctly put by Yusef al -Azam, a lead-
ing MB figure and former minister of social
affairs: ‘The victory is inevitable but it needs
a long breath.’
The MB also believes that Israel was creat-
ed as a foreign ‘infection’ in the Islamic
world and that its expansion is motivated by
the ambition to divide the Arab and Islamic
world. The MB’s view of the Jews is based on
many Quranic verses and historical events.
The MB has described the Jews as ‘dishon-
est’, ‘defilers of the prophets’, ‘liars’, ‘God’s
adversaries’, and ‘corrupt’. The distinction
between Jews, Zionists, and Israelis is not
made clear by the MB, although it does
recognize Judaism and the Jews as a reli-
gious community, but essentially the MB be-
lieves that conflict with the Jews and Zion-
ism is a conflict between two opposing civil-
izations based on religion.
From the MB perspective, to give up Pales-
tinian, Arab, and Islamic rights in Palestine is
unacceptable as far as the Islamic Shari’ah
and faith are concerned. Not a single inch of
the land ‘blessed by Allah’, the first q i b l a h
(the Muslims’ prayer orientation) for Mus-
lims, nor the third most sacred shrine in Is-
lam can be given away. This land can never
be subjected to bargaining since it is a trust
whose preservation is the responsibility of
all Muslim generations until the Judgement
Day. Any concessions constitute an act of in-
justice to future generations and an arbitrary
measure that is rejected by the Islamic reli-
gion. The opinion of non-governmental
Muslim scholars and organizations has re-
mained unchanged in f a t w a s issued in 1937,
1947, 1956, 1968, and 1979. In a recent f a t w a
issued after the intifada began in December
1987, a group of Muslim scholars (including
MB leaders) stated the following:
‘By virtue of the covenant which Allah
put upon us in order to proclaim the
truth and explain it to the people, we
hereby declare that jihad is the sole
means to liberate Palestine, that it is not
permissible under any circumstance to
concede a single square inch of the Land
of Palestine to the Jews, and that no per-
son or organization has the right or the
authority to consent to the Jewish claims
in Palestine or concede any part of it to
the Jews or recognize their existence on
any part of its soil.’3
In the same statement they also called for Is-
lamization of the Palestinian issue. 
This view of the MB contrasts with that of
the Jordanian government, which recogniz-
es the Israeli state. The MB accepts the Jew-
ish minority, which was settled in Palestine
before 1918 (before the British colonized it),
as was expressed by Ibrahim Ghushah (for-
mer MB leader and the spokesman of Ha-
mas), but under Muslim majority rule. It fur-
ther accepts the establishment of a Palestin-
ian state in any part of liberated Palestinian
land, but only as a step toward full liberation.
The MB and the Palestinian
l e a d e r s h i p
Given this position of the MB, Palestinian
nationalist organizations were not consid-
ered important. In fact, as regards the MB’s
position and views vis-à-vis the PLO, in the
early and mid-1980s, the literature of the MB
generally did not view the PLO positively. At
the same time it did not declare directly that
the PLO was not the sole legitimate repre-
sentative of the Palestinians. The MB differed
from the Jordanian government in that it
was more concerned with the PLO’s ideolo-
gy and policy than with the issue of the
PLO’s representation of the Palestinian peo-
ple, whether inside or outside Jordan. The
MB in Jordan was far more hostile to the PLO
than were other branches of the Internation-
al Muslim Brotherhood (IMB), particularly in
Egypt. In the early 1980s, the attitude of the
MB towards the PLO appears to have been
more flexible than in the late 1980s after the
appearance of Hamas. There was an inner
feeling or common belief among some lead-
ers of the MB that the PLO was ‘a Palestinian
Front which represents “part” of the Pales-
tinian people.’ In a personal interview, Ziad
Abu Ghanimah, a former spokesman of the
MB said, ‘We are the ones representing the
[Palestinian] issue, not others such as the Ar-
ab Governments or the PLO.’
MB and the Palestinian
A u t h o r i t y
The MB’s position and views vis-à-vis t h e
Palestinian Authority (PA) came into exist-
ence following Oslo Accords (September
1993 ). To begin with, it should be clear that
the PA is almost a complete offshoot of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, which
was there before signing the aforemen-
tioned agreements. The MB has so far de-
clared no clear position regarding the recog-
nition of the PA as the sole and legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people. In
other words, the MB has adopted the same
view as Hamas; the PA, for them, is only one
part of the Palestinian people. Therefore,
they do not recognize the political legitima-
cy of the PA leadership of the Palestinian
people. This, however, does not mean that
the MB refuses to co-exist with the PA as a de
f a c t o leadership. On the other hand, the MB
takes Hamas as its Palestinian brother in Pal-
estine. It is not surprising that the two sides
share the same ideology and close policies.
The MB and Jordan’s relation
with the West Bank
With regard to Jordan’s relationship to the
West Bank, the MB expressed through its for-
mer spokesman in Parliament, Yusef al Azam,
the belief that ‘we are in the two Banks one
nation in blood and in family. We are one
people not two.’4 On this basis the MB tend-
ed to support the annexation of the West
Bank to Jordan after its liberation from the Is-
raeli occupation. It seemed that this support
was based on the MB’s principle of calling for
Islamic world unity, more than on its political
support for the Jordanian government’s poli-
cy towards the West Bank. The MB therefore
rejected the government’s decision to disen-
gage from the West Bank in July 1988.
The MB and the peace
i n i t i a t i v e s
The MB believed that all present peaceful
initiatives and agreements – be they Ameri-
can, Israeli, Arab, or Palestinian – should be
rejected because they surrender part of Pal-
estine. As for the stand of the MB concerning
the Palestinian-Israeli peace treaty (Oslo,
1993) and the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty
of 1994, the movement declared, through its
political and official statements and through
its deputies at the Jordanian Parliament, its
rejection of the above-mentioned treaties. In
fact, it had launched a number of peaceful
demonstrations as a means of protest. Fur-
thermore, the MB demanded that the Jorda-
nian-Israeli peace treaty be frozen as one of
its conditions to end its boycott of the 1997
Parliament elections.
It rejected all UN resolutions, in particular
Resolution(s) 181, 242, and 338, because
they were deemed inconsistent with stand-
ards of Islamic justice. The MB further assert-
ed that negotiation or conciliation with the
Zionist enemy, ‘the usurper of Muslim land’,
in a way which leads to the surrender of
Muslims’ rights and land, were opposed by
Islamic law.
The practical means of asserting Palestini-
an Islamic rights was j i h a d. The MB believed
that this was the sole means of liberating
Palestine from the Zionists and those who
are behind them. The starting points for j i-
h a d are the Muslim peoples, supporters of
the Palestinian Muslim people, and the Is-
lamic lands, in particular the lands of the
front-line states.5
Abdullah al-Akailah, former deputy leader
of the Islamic Action Party and MP, pointed
o u t :
‘If we do not own the means of jihad or
defence now, we demand of the Jordan-
ian and other Islamic governments and
people to prepare themselves. We do
not want to compel our government to
become involved in a military confronta-
tion with a powerful enemy in this stage
of weakness. Power is not everlasting
and weakness is not to continue for
e v e r . ’
The MB and the Palestinian-
Jordanians 
With regard to the Jordanians of Palestin-
ian origin, the MB expresses supreme loyal-
ty to Islamic precepts, and priority is given
to the promoting of an Islamic identity. As
a result of this, it refuses to admit any dis-
tinction between a Jordanian and Palestin-
ian identity. Both peoples, it insists, must
have equal rights in citizenship and in Pal-
estinian and Jordanian affairs, regardless of
their citizenship or origin. This does not
‘The political involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in
Jordan goes back to the establishment of the state. It was estab-
lished upon Jordanian Independence in 1946 with King Abdul-
lah’s approval. It formed many offices and branches in Palestin-
ian cities such as Jerusalem and in the West and East Banks. It
participated in the 1948 war against the Jews in Palestine, under
the first MB leader, Abd al-Latif Abu Qaurah. The MB joined with
other members of the IMB (International Muslim Brotherhood) in
mobilizing Arabs to participate in the war. They trained fighters,
collected money, bought weapons, cooperated with the other
popular Arab organizations and with the Arab League, and exert-
ed popular political pressure on the government to become
more effective in the struggle.’
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mean that the MB accepts the Israeli idea
of the ‘Jordanian option’ for the Palestini-
ans. It totally rejects it. Through Islamizing
the Palestinian issue, the distinction be-
tween Palestinians and Jordanians, and
that between Palestine and Jordan are dis-
solved. 
Summarizing these issues in a personal in-
terview, Dr Isaac Farhan, one of the leading
figures of the MB and the former Secretary-
General of the Islamic Action Front Party,
starkly expressed the contrasting view of the
MB of Palestine:
‘We consider the Palestinian issue a
basic and key issue for three reasons.
First, on the ideological side, the defence
of Palestine is defence of the Islamic ide-
ology. Second, on the national side
(umma), the Israeli existence inside the
nation’s body divides and destroys the
nation. Third, as homeland ( w a t a n ) ,
Palestine is an Arab and Islamic land and
the homeland must not be surrendered.’
The MB’s perceptions of the Palestinian is-
sue were based on an ideology deriving
from purely religious views, but as Jamil Abu
Bakir, MB spokesman, in a personal interview
pointed out, although the Palestinian issue
was a ‘holy cause’, the MB wanted to avoid
conflict with the Jordanian government,
even though it opposed the peace process
and possible consequences such as econom-
ic and cultural cooperation between Jordan
and Israel. 
It can be said that the MB, despite its ideo-
logical view, has always avoided collision
with the government, even with all the ‘U-
turns’ the government has chosen, in so far
as the Palestinian issue is concerned. This
clearly indicates the pragmatic nature of the
movement’s political behaviour, as well as
its ability to strike a balance between its ide-
ological stands on the one side and all varia-
bles on the regional and Jordanian political
arena on the other. ♦
The British Journal of Middle East Stud-
ies (BJMES), one of the leading academic
journals on the Middle East, is seeking ad-
ditional submissions. The new Editorial
team would like to increase the number of
manuscripts being proposed for inclusion
in his twice-yearly refereed journal. A full
range of Middle Eastern topics are cov-
ered in each issue. We are looking for sub-
missions on subjects from medieval Islam
to modern politics, political economy and
international relations. Literature, political
philosophy and theology submissions are
welcome. We have added a new section
called ‘Notes and Queries’ for short, 500-
1000 word discussions of particular points
or issues.
If you are looking for a site for your next
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Mid dl e Ea st
TI MO T H Y  F U R N I S H
Among scholars of Islam and some Muslims today, a
curious misperception dominates: that only the Shica
believe in the coming the awaited Mahdi. Sunni Arab
views of the Mahdi since the Six Days War of 1967
have reached heretofore unplumbed depths of es-
chatological belief and the vigorous debate among
the Arab intelligentsia concerning these beliefs, as
well as the degree to which they impact the Muslim
social and political realms, have followed suit. 
Mahdism 
in the Sunni Arab
World Today
Modern discourse, particularly in the Ameri-
can media, tends to distil Islamic ideological
categories into only two: ‘fundamentalists,’
who are portrayed negatively, and reform-
ers, who are depicted in a more positive
light. However, this reductionist paradigm
fails to take into account the eclectic views
of many Muslims, not least that group which
expects the imminent arrival of the Mahdi
and attempts not only to anchor eschatolo-
gy in current events but also to reconfigure




The term ‘al-Mahdi’, meaning ‘rightly-
guided’, surprisingly appears nowhere in
the Qur’an. Rather, the characteristics and
role of the eschatological Mahdi, as well as
the political context in which he will appear,
are described in a number of h a d i t h, or tra-
ditions. Three of the six major 9t h-century CE
compilers of hadith – Ibn Mâjah, Abu Dâ’ûd
and al-Tirmidhî – do mention the Mahdi.
However, the two most authoritative com-
pilers, al-Bukhârî and Muslim b. al-Hajjâj, es-
chewed such accounts. The source of Mah-
dist narratives plays into whether one ac-
cepts the idea as legitimate, as we shall see
b e l o w .
Just who is this Mahdi, according to the
traditions? He is one of the five major es-
chatological figures of Islam, along with Je-
sus, the Dajjâl or ‘Deceiver’ (Antichrist), the
Dâbbah or ‘Beast,’ and the collective entity
Yâjûj and Mâjûj, ‘Gog and Magog’. The par-
allels with Christian eschatology, m u t a t i s
m u t a n d i s, are obvious: all of these end-time
figures appear in the New Testament, espe-
cially its final book, Revelation. However, Je-
sus will reappear not as the Son of God and
Judge but as the Muslim prophet sent back
to assist the Mahdi in defeating the Dajjâl
and establishing socio-economic and politi-
cal justice on earth. The Dajjâl will be the
miracle-working leader of the unbelievers
and will be killed by Jesus. The enormous
Dâbbah will emerge from the earth and
mock unbelievers while the semi-human ar-
mies of Gog and Magog will escape from the
prison built for them by Alexander the Great
to pillage across the planet until destroyed
by God at Jesus’ behest. Other end-time
events include earthquakes, great fires, ap-
pearance of false prophets, speaking ani-
mals, increase in immorality, the sun rising
in the West, the striking of all words from
the pages of every Qur’an and the predomi-
nance of unbelief. Finally, at some point Je-
sus and the Mahdi will die natural deaths
and, in the eschatological denouement, the
angel Isrâfîl will blow his trumpet twice: at
the first all humans will die; at the second all
will be resurrected for the Judgement. 
Throughout Islamic history many religio-
political leaders have claimed Mahdi-hood.
Most rapidly faded back into obscurity.
Some gathered followers, however, and a
few took power. The most successful such
movements were the Abbasids in the 8t h-
century CE Islamic heartlands, the Fatimids
in 10t h-century CE Egypt, the Almohads in
1 2t h-century CE North Africa and, most re-
cently, Muhammad Ahmad’s followers in
the 1880s in Sudan. Several other Mahdist-
type movements in the last two centuries
succeeded by transforming into separate re-
ligions: the Baha’is of 19t h-century Iran, the
Ahmadis of 19t h-century India. In recent
years only two such movements have devel-
oped in the Middle East: that of a self-styled
Mahdi in Saudi Arabia in 1979, which met
with a violent end; and the sub rosa m o v e-
ment that accompanied the success of the
Ayatolloah Khomeini, in which whisperings
that he was the Mahdi (Hidden Imam to
S h icites) went undenied.
Mahdism today
The Muslim world today is devoid of Mah-
dist claimants – so far. However, an Arab de-
bate about the truth of Mahdism, and its
meaning today, has been gathering steam
and began boiling over after the Six Days
War of 1967. There are several reasons for
this. One is that millenarian movements
within the entire Judaeo-Christian-Islamic
milieu escalate sharply in a period of socie-
tal angst, which 1967 proved to be for the
A r a b s .1 Another is widespread frustration at
the failure of Arab economies to effectively
raise living standards, of Arab governments
to achieve unity and of the embarrassing
dependence upon the world’s lone super-
power, the United States. Finally, although
non-millenarian in the true sense of the
word – Latin m i l l e n i means 1000, a period of
time which holds no resonance for Muslims
– the Islamic world has been unable to im-
munize itself against the influence of the
world’s largest religion, Christianity, and its
de facto world calendar. Secular millennial
issues like the Y2K bug, in tandem with reli-
gious aspects like the second coming of
Christ, have fanned eschatological flames
within the Arab portion of the Muslim
w o r l d .
The slice of this debate examined here is
that taking place within the Arab print me-
dia – specifically books.2 The analysis can be
summed up in the following paradigm: 
Many opponents of Mahdism take their
cues from the brilliant Ibn Khaldûn (d. 1406
CE). This intellectual, considered by some
as the father of sociology, saw the Mahdi as
a pernicious Shici heresy which had crept
into Sunnism via the Sufism. This is the
view of two modern opponents of Mah-
dism, cAbd al-Karîm al-Khâtib in The Await-
ed Mahdi and Those Who Await Him ( C a i r o ,
1980) and cAbd al-Qâdir Ahmad Atâ in T h e
Awaited Mahdi between Truth and Supersti-
tion (Cairo, 1980). In fact both adduce Ibn
Khaldûn’s motive for rejecting Mahdism: it
is Sufi-transmitted Shicism. Al-Khâtib also
calls upon the u l e m a to abandon such fool-
ishness and turn their attention to renew-
ing Islam, while cAtâ maintains that the
true Mahdiyah will not come by means of a
supernatural individual but via renewing
and reforming Islam.
This Sunni scepticism about the Mahdi
has given way, in recent years, to positive
conviction about him. Muhammad Ibrâhîm
al-Jamal, in The Aggression and the Awaited
Mahdi (1980), says the Mahdi will come
amidst unmistakable signs, but that Khome-
ini is (was) not the one. Hamzah al-Faqîr in
Three Whom the World Awaits: the Expected
Mahdi, the False Messiah, Messiah Jesus ( A m-
man, 1995), is one of a growing number of
supporters of Mahdism who adduces Sayyid
Qutb (d. 1966), the Egyptian Muslim Broth-
erhood strategist. More than most writers,
however, al-Faqîr attempts to link current
events to those presaging the Mahdi’s ap-
pearance: particularly, he sees the ‘tyranni-
cal rule’ of the exploitative ‘petty states’ un-
der which most Muslims live as crying out
for redress by the Mahdi, who will also hum-
ble ‘Pharaoh,’ otherwise known as the Unit-
ed States. A more idiosyncratic view is that
of Kâmil Sacfân, The Twenty-Fifth Hour: the
False Messiah, the Mahdi, Gog and Magog
(Cairo, 1995), who manages to work the P r o-
tocols of the Elders of Zion, the Masonic
Lodge and Jeane Dixon (the American psy-
chic) into his philosophy of Mahdism. Amîn
Muhammad Jamâl al-Dîn, in The Life-span of
the Islamic Community and the Nearness of
the Appearance of the Mahdi (Cairo, 1996),
argues that the Mahdi’s coming is very close
and will be immediately preceded by a
world war – which he terms H a r m a g i d d u n
(Armageddon) – between al-Rûm, the West,
and either China, Russia and the communist
countries or Iran, Iraq and the Shica nations.
A more ‘ecumenical’, less polemical ap-
proach is that of Bâsim al-Hâshimî in T h e
Savior between Islam and Christianity: A
Study in the Cooperation between the Mahdi
and the Messiah (Beirut, 1996). He adduces
Qur’an, h a d i t h and New Testament to argue
that the Mahdi and Jesus will cooperate to
create a ‘united world state’. 
One final example of Mahdist believers is
Fahd Sâlim who, in his 1996 book, The Signs
of the Hour and the Attack of the West before
[the end of?] 1 9 9 9, maintains that the Mahdi
will be preceded by an Iranian – Shîcî – Daj-
jâl. Sâlim is one of several Arab authors who
conflate Francis Fukuyama’s idea of the ‘end
of history’ (the triumph of democratic capi-
talism) with Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of
civilizations’ (religio-cultural fault lines be-
tween cultures engendering conflict) into
an ancient plot by the West against Islam.
Sâlim also has an interesting way of explain-
ing the h a d i t h references to end-time war-
fare being fought with swords: after Americ-
a’s nuclear Armageddon against the Mus-
lims, those will be the only extant weapons.
Also, interestingly enough, he adduces Nos-
tradamus’ 16t h-century predictions in de-
fence of his arguments.
The non-Mahdist Muhammad Farîd Hijâb,
in The Awaited Mahdi between Religious Doc-
trine and Political Meaning (Algeria, 1984),
has the most philosophical deconstruction
of the Mahdist idea: that it is a conflation of
the motifs of the ancient Near Eastern deliv-
erer, Plato’s philosopher-king, and Machia-
velli’s strong man which survives today as a
useful oppositional paradigm to unjust re-
gimes. More prosaic is the criticism of Mah-
dism found in the anonymous work, T h e
Cutting Sword–The True Explication of the
Book ‘The Life-span of the Islamic Community
and the Nearness of the Appearance of the
M a h d i (Cairo, 1998), which critiques that
pro-Mahdist book for adopting irrelevant
Western concepts like ‘the end of history’
and for fostering the dangerous idea that
the Arabs must re-take Jerusalem before the
Mahdi can come.
As this brief survey of modern Arabic works
confirms, Mahdism, which has existed almost
as long as Islam, shows no signs of waning.
For although Muslims are a-millennial, they
do expect the coming of a m u j a d d i d, or ‘re-
newer,’ every 100 years – an idea which can
be easily fused with that of the Mahdi. And
since the next Muslim century begins in
2076, ‘eschatological ideas will continue to
play an important role in the Islamic world in-
to the twenty-first century.’3 ♦
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R E M C O  E N S E L
Ever since the early stages of Islamic conversion, the
Shurafa have been successful in sanctifiying their in-
dividual personae and collective presence in Moroc-
can society. Countervoices that questioned the legit-
imacy of their religious stature have, however, never
been fully silenced. In recent times, state formation
and the concurring processes of the spread of public
education and electronic media have given a new im-
petus to these resurgent voices. Anthropological re-
search shows how, for some of these modern reli-
gious contestants, protest against Sharifi authority is
part of a profound emancipatory struggle.
Resurgent Voices
Profanation of
t h e Shurafa in
M o d e r n Morocco 
Contesting Sharifi descent as the basis of so-
cial distinctions and marker of identity has a
long history in Morocco. Jacques Berque even
once suggested complementing Lévi-
Provençal’s Les historiens des Chorfa (Paris;
1922) with a repertory on Les opposants des
Chorfa.1 In the modern era, fundamental criti-
cism of the saint’s cult and descent-based so-
cial distinctions was particularly articulated in
connection with the growth of the Salafi re-
form movement. Originating in 19th-century
Egypt, this movement aimed to return to the
original prescriptions of the faith. Adherents
opted for a scripturalist Islam, in a later phase
objecting to hereditary sainthood and the no-
tion of Sharifi descent. The influence of this
modernist movement in Morocco at the gov-
ernmental level can be seen from a law, pro-
claimed as early as 1949, that made it obliga-
tory to hand over a notarial act when claiming
to be a Sharifi, in particular cAlawı̄, surname
and honorific. It remains to be said that an
ambivalent attitude characterized even the
severest critics. Thus, both the cult of saints
and ‘Sharifianism’ were never repudiated by
all Salafi adherents. Some took great pride in
their own Sharifi descent.2 Moreover, socio-
political criticism of the state was often trans-
lated into a dispute between Sharifi lineages,
i.e., Idrissı̄ criticism of the cAlawı̄ state. After
independence, Sharifi descent remained a
major point of discussion at the state level.
Sharifi privileges were severely restricted
when King Hassan II successfully blocked pos-
sible dynastic ambitions of alternative Sharifi
collectivities. More importantly, state policy
increasingly put pressure on the privileged
status of the Shurafa through monopolization
of education, arbitration and religious autho-
rization. The state thus deprived local special-
ists of their functions and appropriated reli-
gion as the ultimate source of legitimation.
Central in the religious debate on the
meaning of Sharifi descent has been the in-
congruity between the fundamental equality
of members of the Islamic community, as for-
mulated in the Quranic verse 49:13, and the
privileged position of the descendants of the
Prophet, as read from verse 33:33.3 One cru-
cial point of dispute was whether only con-
temporary members of the Prophet’s family
were entitled to public respect or also his de-
scendants. When applied to social reform, the
question was whether social equality is an
ideal to pursue on earth or rather something
attainable only in the afterlife.4 Induced by
the spread of education and electronic media
as well as by urban migration, elements of
these scriptural discussions are instilled at the
local level. 
Descent-based distinctions
i n d e b a t e
In the stringent social hierarchy of the oasis
societies in southern Morocco, the Haratin
population occupies the lowest level of the
social ladder. Haratin are people of humble
descent who have specialized in agriculture
and handicrafts. One form of everyday resis-
tance that some Haratin pursued against their
humble status was to protest against the
practice of taking descent as foremost criteri -
on of one’s personal identity. With respect to
the Shurafa they raised particular objections
to the use of honorifics. Thus when French
presence enabled them to migrate to
Casablanca, these Haratin, who ‘had been
taught to say sidi and lalla’ to the local Shu-
rafa back home, were no longer prepared to
do so when on leave from their urban jobs.
These youngsters, as was noted in a report in
1955, ‘scandalize the elders who have main-
tained their servile mentality and who refuse
to follow them on their revolutionary path.’5
It seems from research conducted in the
1990s that the struggle over the use of hon-
orifics has not yet been toned down. This
even appeared humorously in a joke told by a
Sharif: 
A Sharif and a Hartani are having a quar-
rel. At one point, the Hartani announces
that practices expressing differences
among human beings have to be abol-
ished: ‘Everybody is equal, so from this
day on everybody has to be addressed
with the honorific mulay’. So the Hartani
goes home, where he tells his relatives
about his decision, and they agree. The
next morning his young son wakes up
and asks his mother: ‘Mulay mama, where
is Mulay papa?’ His mother replies: ‘Mulay
son, Mulay papa has put the Mulay bas-
kets on the Mulay donkey, filled them
with the Mulay manure, and gone to the
Mulay field’.
Notwithstanding the obvious ridicule over
the Hartani’s inability to differentiate be-
tween the human and the natural world – a
fundamental quality of any civilized person –
the joke signals the ongoing emancipatory
struggle of Haratin against Sharifi authority. 
Everyday resistance
From talks with Ibrahim, a young migrant
living in a suburb of Casablanca, it appeared
that the aversion of Haratin to the use of hon-
orifics indeed stems from its connotation with
the persistent system of social distinctions
that had kept them in their humble position
for so long. Ibrahim had left his natal village
down south as a teenager, yet he still saw his
former villagers, some of whom were Shurafa.
Ibrahim told me of his involvement in a quar-
rel with a Sharifi migrant from his former vil-
lage. Once when they met in the public bath,
Ibrahim had refused to use the honorific
mulay. When the Sharif asked for an explana-
tion, Ibrahim’s answer was simple: ‘Did one
say mulay to the Prophet Muhammad? There
are only human beings, all equal before God.
It is impossible to pay respect to people, just
because they are born as members of a cer-
tain family. Only through his deeds can a per-
son earn respect, but then again, a human
does not know the hidden life of his fellow
men: Who knows about the secret behaviour
of a Sharif? Only God is able to judge human
beings.’ 
Ibrahim’s aversion to naming practices, which
he considered out-dated, was also apparent
in his then recent name-change. His parents
had named him Fatih, but once settled in
Casablanca, he had changed his name into
Ibrahim. Fatih was a name that was particular-
ly carried by cAbı̄d and Haratin. Ibrahim’s re-
birth, as symbolized in his name-change, can
be connected to his interest in religious ideas
that came to him through the texts of Ab-
dessalam Yassin, a large collection of cas-
settes and an illegal videotape of the Algerian
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Young Haratin
like Ibrahim are not afraid to contest well-ac-
cepted divisions of ethnicity, disputing ‘tradi-
tional ways’ of religious expression and in-
stead putting themselves forward as the ideal
model to follow. Arguing against rural prac-
tices and rules (qawnı̄ n) that keep the social
distinctions alive, they suggest that the uni-
versal Shariah should be superior to these
local ‘laws’. They furthermore protest against
the persistent practice of taking descent as
determinant of one’s identity. Showing their
national ID, they made clear that their birth-
place, instead of their descent, should be the
decisive marker of identity.
Ibrahim’s adversary in the quarrel was inter-
ested in the same issues as Ibrahim. This
Sharif acknowledged that it was necessary to
reflect upon some aspects of the Islamic faith.
But he suggested that people who, like
Ibrahim, argue in favour of practices regard-
ing dress, table manners and praying, that fol-
lowed the Prophet or his companions, should
instead follow the example of members of
‘the House of the Prophet’. 
It has become increasingly difficult in an
urban context to be acknowledged as de-
scendant of the Prophet. Sharifi descent still is
an important source of pride and public es-
teem in Morocco and continues to be a valu-
able asset in acquiring goods and favours. Yet
for lesser Shurafa, it is not always easy to ob-
tain acceptance of their descent as valid cur-
rency in these bargains. To avoid the inconve-
nience of one being unaware that he should
address the other as a descendant of the
Prophet, the Shurafa began paying civil ser-
vants to make them print mulay in front of the
first name on their ID. The Shurafa thus also
turned their ID into a symbol of their personal
identity. In 1985, however, the government
passed a law that put an end to this printing
practice. 
Fed by an emerging public domain in
which discussions on the current state of af-
fairs in and outside Morocco take place,
resurgent religious voices like those of
Ibrahim and other Haratin signal the seeds of
a process of individualization in Moroccan
society. It remains to be seen whether this
socio-cultural transformation leads to the
disappearance of the privileged stature of






c o u n t r y s i d e :
a Sharif poses
with the relics of
the 16t h- c e n t u r y
village saint.
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East  Af ri c a
J AN  A B B I N K
A perennial issue in the comparative study of Islam is
how, as a faith and a way of life, it deals with diversi-
ty: religious, ethnic, or socio-cultural. This issue is all
the more relevant in a world where globalizing dis-
courses redefine traditional identities, including
those of religious systems, both in their local (indige-
nous Asian and African) and universalist forms
(Christianity, Islam). In many areas, complex and, in a
way, exemplary patterns of mutual interaction and
tolerance have developed between religious-com-
munal groups. In Africa, such regions are found in
Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania, Nigeria, and also Ethio-
pia. The history and current situation of Islam in Ethi-
opia, especially the northern part of the country, pro-
vide an interesting case study. 
Ethiopian Islam 
and the Challenge 
of Diversity 
The situation of Islam in Ethiopia is remarka-
ble for a number of reasons. First, there is its
long history in the country (see Trimingham
1952; Hussein 1994). It is well-known that
since the beginning of the new faith, before
the Prophet Muhammad had even estab-
lished himself in Mecca, a number of his fol-
lowers were received in Ethiopia as religious
asylum-seekers at the court of Aksum (615
CE). On the authority of the Prophet, Ethio-
pia was not to be targeted for jihad. In the
subsequent period, Islam expanded in the
country largely through peaceful means,
and since the late 18t h century especially
through Sufi orders (Qadiriyya). This ancient
history plays a role in the self-definition of
Ethiopian Muslims. One historical episode is
an exception to this pattern: the violent
confrontation between the Christian empire
and the Islamic sultanates of Ifat and Adal in
the 16t h century (c. 1520-1550), where,
mainly as a result of Turkish assistance (e.g.,
fire-arms) and strong leadership, and zeal of
the self-declared imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim
of Harar, the Christian state and its religious
culture were almost annihilated in an un-
precedented jihad. 
Secondly, there is the complex relation-
ship between ethnicity and Islam. Ethiopia
knew virtually no Arab immigration, and
Ethiopian Muslims belonged to the indige-
nous peoples, retaining much of their spe-
cific ethno-cultural characteristics, so that
these often overshadowed ‘Islamic identity’
(This phenomenon is familiar from other
countries as well). Arabic was not a spoken
language among any group, and there were
no Arab traditions related to marriage, in-
heritance, and other related customs, im-
ported into Ethiopia. Shari’a law was always
very partially applied and combined with
the customary law of a region or of a domi-
nant ethnic group. 
Thirdly, Islam in Ethiopia always lived in
the shadow of an old and powerful Christian
kingdom (except in the violent period just
mentioned). Christianity was the core
world-view of the political elite and a defin-
ing element of the country’s historical na-
tionhood, and up to the demise of the mon-
archy in 1974, Muslims were excluded from
this. They hence held a secondary place in
the political and civic domains; there was a
politically relevant ‘boundary’ between the
two communities of faith. 
While effective in the collective sense, in
the realities of daily life this boundary was,
however, not immutable. It did not prohibit
social interaction in areas where Christians,
Muslims and others – though following
their own dietary and ritual rules – lived side
by side and intermingled. The boundary
could also be crossed by individuals chang-
ing allegiance and changing their identity. 
Ambiguous identities? 
It is this domain of boundary (crossing), in
a social and religious sense, which offers an
interesting entry to the study of Islamic lore
and practice in Ethiopia. Muslims and Chris-
tians live together in many places and know
each other intimately; they are masters of
adaptation and improvisation in a precari-
ous natural and political environment
where knowledge of, and personal relations
with, power-holders are crucial, but at the
same time volatile and subject to unpredict-
able changes. Especially in parts of Northern
Ethiopia where the numerical balance be-
tween Christians and Muslims was virtually
equal and where the social conditions (pov-
erty, land scarcity, lack of access to ‘political
resources’) were the same for both groups,
religious identity was made a strategic fac-
tor in the social careers of persons, related
to marriage, trade, migration to a city or an
area predominantly inhabited by members
adhering to the other religion, or ethnic or
political affiliation. People thus tended to
choose what communal identity in what
phase of their lives was best for them. In
Northern Ethiopia (e.g. Wällo) this has led to
long-standing patterns of conversion and
re-conversion between the two faiths and
explains the existence of extended families
that are half-Muslim and half-Christian.
Most importantly, people showed a tolerant
and forgiving attitude in accommodating
the variable identities and religious practi-
ces that others resort to and were not quick
to judge others. This pattern is maintained
until today. 
This phenomenon of what could be called
religious oscillation has not been studied
systematically but is nonetheless of great
interest. It shows not only the varied forms
that Islamic religious culture can take in an
African context, but also leads us to inquire
into the nature of (Islamic and Christian) re-
ligiosity and into conditions of co-existence
and non-exclusivist identification on the ba-
sis of religions usually held to be absolutist
and – in the case of Islam – ‘officially’ not tol-
erating conversion to another faith. 
The situation of co-existence and inter-
mingling is not unique in itself; in other are-
as both in Africa and Europe, members of
the two faiths worked out understandings
and shared in each others’ lives during festi-
vals and religious occasions, though observ-
ing certain minimal rules in the process, e.g.
not eating meat from animals slaughtered
by people of the other faith. 
Christians and Muslims:
tolerance and exchange 
It was often said by Ethiopian and other
observers that Muslims (and Christians) in
Northern Ethiopia only have a ‘superficial
adherence to their faith’ and that they are
not ‘true believers’ or are ‘opportunists’.
This may sometimes be the case, but in this
the people concerned are no different from
the countless others who do not shift their
religion: can these always be said to be ‘true
believers’? Neither does this reproach do
justice to the feelings of the people con-
cerned and to their own way of dealing with
religious values. It only holds when one ap-
plies an exclusivist interpretation of ‘religi-
osity’ and of Islam. The non-literate ‘folk Is-
lam’ in Northern Ethiopia with its veneration
of saints and shrines, its festivals or its spe-
cific prayer sessions perhaps goes against
the grain of strict Islamic ulema doctrine, es-
pecially when seen in its ritual aspects. But it
has been an identity based on other pre-
cepts of Islam, deemed more important by
the local people. Little research has been
done on how these practices of (re)conver-
sion and co-existence are being worked out
in daily practice and what the socio-political
implications are. What is clear from a few in-
teresting pioneer MA theses by Ethiopian
social science students at Addis Ababa Uni-
versity, who have looked into these matters
(e.g. Assefa 1992, Kalklachew 1997), is that
local Ethiopian society shows an active reli-
gious commitment on the part of its people,
based on a principled tolerance and mutual
understanding. When a Muslim man’s
daughter marries a Christian, she is not os-
tracized or condemned by him, and when a
Christian person’s brother converts to Islam
in order to facilitate his marriage to a Mus-
lim girl, contacts are not broken off. Mixed
Christian-Muslim participation in certain pil-
grimages and their joint veneration of saints
is not frowned upon. These practices make
up the unique pattern of life in Northern
Ethiopia, and as such form somewhat of a
model for inter-communal relations in a plu-
ral society. 
In recent years, especially after the 1991
change of government in Ethiopia, such
patterns of tolerance in Wällo and else-
where have come under stress. Revivalist
movements (e.g., of Wahhabite persuasion)
are emerging and are targeting traditional
folk Islamic practices in Northern Ethiopia.
As the anthropologist Kelklachew (1997: 99)
ironically noted, the representatives of this
movement (especially active in the towns)
‘… criticize everything that the Muslims of
the area perceive as Islamic practice’. During
fieldwork in the area I also heard some peo-
ple say that their village had been visited by
persons asking them to ‘reduce their con-
tacts and cooperation with the Christians’
and ‘reinforce the Muslim character’ of their
village. The villagers however did not see
the problem and refused the message. 
Hence, in the face of Islamic revivalism
based on strict scriptural interpretations,
the challenge of pluralism presents itself
anew in Ethiopia (There is no such move-
ment amongst Christians, who do not dis-
courage contacts with the Muslims). A moot
point is whether Islamic revivalism – and
perhaps a Christian response which may
eventually emerge – will articulate ‘bounda-
ries’ where there were none before, or upset
the balance and tolerance between com-
munal groups. From various recent exam-
ples in Africa and the Balkans, we know that
gruesome violence can be evoked in such a
situation. These questions are also raised in
Ethiopia. The answers given by most of the
local population in Wällo is that they have
worked out practical solutions to religious
and cultural diversity, and that an emphasis
on a strictly scriptural interpretation of the
faith at the expense of folk religion would
serve no purpose if the historical patterns of
tolerance and accommodation would be re-
versed. Their example shows that there are
more ways than one of being a good believ-
er.  ♦
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We st Af r i ca
E D  V A N  H O VE N
Medina Gounass is an isolated religious community
situated in a remote area of Senegal. Until the 1980s,
the leader of this branch of the Tijan t a r i q a r e f u s e d
all contact with the state authorities. The imperatives
of s h a r i ’ a were rigorously applied in nearly all as-
pects of social and religious life. But after the death
of the founder of the community, things changed
dramatically. Disputes between the heirs of the foun-
der’s legacy, struggles over agricultural resources,
and fierce competition between supporters of politi-
cal parties, made the intervention of the worldly au-
thorities inevitable. Today, the community of Medi-
na Gounass is, like so many Sufi orders in Senegal,
courted by the state elite.
Medina Gounass: 
the End of a Religious
I s o l a t e
Located some 85 km south of the regional
capital Tambacounda in eastern Senegal,
Medina Gounass is one of the largest com-
munities of the Haute Casamance region.
Its inhabitants, mainly of Hal Pular (Toucou-
leur) and Peul origin, live in the many quar-
ters of the community. A modern road sys-
tem, constructed at the beginning of the
1980s, just after the ascension of the first
caliph, is centred around the huge mosque.
Its impressive minaret can hardly be missed
upon entering the village by one of the
dusty bush roads.
Ahmed Tijan Ba, usually referred to as t h i-
e r n o, is the current caliph of the communi-
ty. He is the spiritual guide of the numerous
followers living in Medina Gounass as well
as abroad. His leadership extends to nearly
all domains of everyday life in the commu-
nity. He is both the politico-religious leader
and judge. People choose to live in the
community because they feel that his
‘closeness to God’ (w a l a y a) is beneficial.
Others, living elsewhere in Senegal or
abroad, pay visits from time to time to Med-
ina Gounass. Nowadays, the adepts have
photographs, sold in the local shops,
through which they experience the venera-
tion of the t h i e r n o. 
While walking the streets of Medina
Gounass, one notices immediately the ab-
sence of women. It is stated that women
should stay at home and rarely go out. If
they do, they should be veiled – even with-
in the confines of the compound. Women
often gather to listen to the words of Thier-
no Amadou Seydou Ba, the community’s
founder who died in 1980, recorded on
t a p e .
The foundation of the com-
m u n i t y
Thierno Amadou Seydou Ba founded
Medina Gounass in 1935. He was a Hal Pular
originally from the Fouta Tooro, a region lo-
cated in the middle valley of the Senegal
River. After several years of travel and study,
mainly in the southern Casamance region,
he finally settled in Medina Gounass with a
handful of disciples. He preached the Tijan
w i r d, a litany of prayers brought to Senegal
from Morocco in the 19t h century by the Hal
Pular militant El Hadji Omar Tall.
At the outset, Medina Gounass was not
more than a simple residential centre for fol-
lowers, connected to the private home of
the t h i e r n o. But it began to develop rapidly
when large crowds of followers, mostly flee-
ing the harsh manifestations of colonialism
or the dictatorial regimes in some parts of
the subregion (e.g. Sekou Toure’s Guinee-
Conakry), settled in the community. While
the circle of disciples expanded, the t h i e r n o
demonstrated an extraordinary b a r a k a. And
this to the extent that he was able to trans-
form a small group of adepts into a self-con-
scious religious community, with an elabo-
rated structure and a firm religious base in
the s h a r i ’ a. 
Under the guidance of the t h i e r n o, Medina
Gounass soon became a religious isolate.
Contacts with the French colonial state and
then, after 1960, the independent state of
Senegal, were limited to the paying of taxes
and the commercialization of cash crops. In
one of the few published articles on this re-
ligious community, the t h i e r n o stressed his
fight against innovations (b i d ’ a) and took a
firm line on the implementation of s h a r i ’ a.1
Unlike other rural communities, where the
state introduced its officials and the agricul-
tural cooperatives, Medina Gounass became
a new ‘Pakistan’, land of the pure, from
which all b i d a were excluded.
Thierno Amadou Seydou Ba’s stress on as-
ceticism and isolation was to some extent a
response to the luxury and corruption that
went with the implementation of the bu-
reaucratic state, but was also a perhaps un-
intended response to other Senegalese Sufi
orders, and the well-known m a r a b o u t - h o m-
me d’affaires in particular, who lived in luxu-
ry and closely cooperated with the worldly
powers. Even during its annual d a k a a, the
nine-day spiritual retreat in the nearby for-
est, none of the state authorities were invit-
ed. Some fervent militants even engaged in
violent protest against the icons of modern-
ity; the t h i e r n o’s adepts were accused of
having set fire to the Simenti tourist hotel in
the Niokolokoba national park. 
Outside interference
After the death of the community’s
founder, internal quarrels began to under-
mine the unity of this ‘mini-republic’. The
appointment of Ahmed Tijan Ba, the foun-
der’s son, as caliph was heatedly debated.
The Peul section of the community claimed
the leadership saying that they were the
first to have settled in Medina Gounass. In
1977, party-politics entered the community.
The Peul section voted massively for the op-
position’s Parti Démocratique Sénégalais
(PDS), while the t h i e r n o, by then seriously ill
and hardly capable of leading his followers,
supported the ruling Parti Socialiste (PS). Al-
ready in 1975, he had banned commercial
cotton cultivation, which was the main
source of income for the Peul population.
The leader told his followers that cotton cul-
tivation would lead to a serious reduction in
women’s fertility.2 But other more worldly
motives played a role as well. 
Like most Sufi orders in Senegal, the com-
munity leaders controlled peanut cultiva-
tion, which was an important source of in-
come. Cotton cultivation, however, by-
passed local agencies of control. Contracts
were signed with individual farmers, per-
sonally responsible for fulfilling the condi-
tions rigorously specified by the state-
owned cotton company SODEFITEX. Farm-
ers were now paid in cash, instead of the
bon d’achat, used in the case of peanut culti-
vation, which could easily be gathered by
the community’s leader. The effect on the
community’s cohesion was devastating:
fights broke out and several casualties were
reported. The Peul left Medina Gounass on a
massive scale to settle in nearby villages. For
the first time in the history of the communi-
ty, police forces intervened in their internal
a f f a i r s .3
These events, of course, changed the posi-
tion of the community v i s - à - v i s the national
state. Today many state officials court Medi-
na Gounass. During the latest d a k a a c e l e-
bration, regional as well as national state
representatives made their way to Medina
Gounass. President Abdou Diouf sent a del-
egation to ‘greet and encourage’ the t h i e r n o
and to wish him and the attendants success
and ‘a perfect spiritual communion’. Might
these and other events that have marked
the recent history of Medina Gounass, pre-
lude the end of the isolationist posture of
this Sufi order?
Beyond the State
It is true that with these developments, a
degree of ambiguity entered this religious
community. Notwithstanding the many in-
ternal problems, which continued during
the 1990s, Medina Gounass has not lost all
of its original appeal. It is still a large com-
munity – approximately 14,000 inhabitants
– guided by Ahmed Tijan Ba. So far, no offi-
cial state structures have been created in
the village. Religious and secular matters
are still dealt with by the t h i e r n o, who is ad-
mired and venerated by his many adepts.
Though agriculture forms the most impor-
tant source of income for the t h i e r n o ’ s f o l-
lowers, commercial activities are expanding
quite rapidly. Successful businessmen have
gone abroad, securing a steady flow of in-
come to the community and thus to its lead-
ers. International relations have always
been vital for the community; but today,
they seem to have become even more im-
portant. Many followers migrated to Europe
and America while important sums of mon-
ey found their way back to Medina Gounass.
This trend, which seems to be accelerating
in the last years, enabled the community to
reinforce its autonomy v i s - à - v i s the Senegal-
ese state. The financial resources pouring
into the community from abroad clearly by-
pass the state, in contrast to the income
generated by cash-crop cultivation which
had to be sold directly to the state-con-
trolled companies. 
The benefits of success, measured by the
impressive housing facilities some of the mi-
grants constructed in Medina Gounass, are
entirely attributed to the t h i e r n o. Considera-
ble sums of money are given to him in grat-
itude and in order to ensure further financial
success. In the eyes of the followers, their
material success is only intelligible in terms
of the t h i e r n o ’ s saintliness and his ability to
teach the ‘right path’. 
Medina Gounass has always been a major
centre of learning, attracting many students
from neighbouring communities and
abroad. Most children only attend the
Qur’an schools in the community, generally
run by the disciples of the t h i e r n o. They
learn to memorize portions of the Qur’an
and the basic ritual obligations. In this part
of the country, the traditional learning cen-
tres are not challenged by state institutions.
The a r r o n d i s s e m e n t of Medina Gounass tra-
ditionally has an extremely low degree of
modern education (4.23% in 1998). This
points not only to the difficulties of imple-
menting educational policies but also to the
importance people attach to Muslim educa-
t i o n .
Faced with a situation in which crowds of
unemployed (but often well-educated)
youth dwell the streets of nearby Tamba-
counda, parents feel that Qur’anic educa-
tion is much more effective for transmitting
Islamic knowledge and moral values to their
children. In this regard, the education pro-
vided by a Muslim community that acts as a
c o n t r e - s o c i é t é,4 is very much compatible
with the social and economic circumstances
of contemporary Senegalese society. ♦
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VL A D I M I R  C H U K OV Political Behaviour 
of the B u l g a r i a n
Muslim Community
The changes in the last decade for Muslims
in Bulgaria are all the more significant when
seen against the background of the situa-
tion prior: the regime of the last communist
president T. Jivkov carried out (like that of
Miloshevic in Yugoslavia) a kind of ethnic
cleansing by challenging the local Muslims
through changing their Turkic-Arab names
into Slavic ones. Also the emigration proc-
ess was indicative of the situation: in the
summer of 1989, 500,000 Bulgarian Muslims
left the country to settle in Turkey. Yet de-
spite the considerable reduction of the
community, the Muslim population in Bul-
garia is still quite large. According to the of-
ficial census in 1992, there were 1,110,295
Muslims registered (800,052 of which de-
clared themselves Turks, 313,396 Gypsies,
4,515 Tartars and other Muslim minorities).
Due to the deterioration of the economic
conditions, Bulgarian Muslims (especially
the Turks) massively migrated to Turkey.
This process is still going on up to the pre-
sent day and because of the illegal forms of
migration, the exact size of the Bulgarian
Muslim community is still unknown. 
After the installation of a competitive po-
litical system, the Bulgarian Muslim commu-
nity seems to be an attractive electoral area
for the newly established Bulgarian parties.
However, the community has made it clear
that it possesses its own electoral potation
for transforming itself from an object to a
subject in Bulgarian political life.
The Turks – leading Muslim
g r o u p
In June 1990, the Movement of Rights and
Freedoms (MRF) in Varna arose, officially de-
nying that it recruited its activist corpus on
an ethnic and religious principle. Political
reality proves, however, that the party has
become representative of the largest ethnic
group among the Muslims: 90% of its mem-
bership is comprised of Bulgarian Turks. 
Two general issues guaranteed the suc-
cess of this political formation. The charis-
matic leadership of Ahmed Dogan, former
activist against the ‘Revival Process’ and the
special elitism within the party shaped by
him. MRF elitism is strictly conservative, tak-
ing into consideration that the party’s oper-
ational leadership is entirely based on ‘eth-
nic and religious quota’. In the Central
Council (the operational party level) the
Turk domination is quite conspicuous with
about 80-85%; the Pomaks (Bulgarian Mus-
lims) are represented by 10-15% and ordi-
narily possesses one vice presidential seat. 
Bulgarian Christians are involved in the
leadership usually with ‘external quota’ and
realize their political presence through par-
ticipation in the electoral process. They are
deprived of efficacious party competence.
The MRF usually places between 14 and 24
deputies in Parliament (which numbers 240
in total), while the Christian quota is around
2 to 4 seats.
Concealed emphasis on ethnic (coupled
with religious) corporativism is actually the
immanent ideological approach to achiev-
ing the position of a main political group-
ing. It is in this way that the MRF’s ideologic-
al basis intertwined secular ethnical com-
mitment (adherence to Pan-Turkism, not in
its radical expression) with unconscious, in-
stinctively acquired Islamism (also as a cog-
nitive – reflexive behavioural system). Com-
bined, the above mentioned Pan-Turkism
and Islamism became the ideological tools
that MRF elaborated as operational criteria
for attracting new supporters. 
Meanwhile in the short history of post-
communist Bulgarian legislative elections,
Turk support is categorical and can be ex-
pressed by the following: in 1990 there were
540,000 votes for the MRF, approximately
95% of the Turk voters; in 1991 – 380 thou-
sand, approximately 80% of the Turk voters;
in 1994 – 340 thousand, approximately 90%
of the Turk voters; and in 1997 – 250 thou-
sand, approximately 90% of the Turk voters.
The attempts made to marginalize the MRF
– forbidding it by an act of the Constitution-
al Court in 1991, provoking schismatic disor-
der within the leadership – all remained un-
s u c c e s s f u l .
Schismatic movements
Attempts to remove the ethnic and reli-
gious appearance of the party characterize
MRF’s official fluctuations and its coalition
policy. Adem Kenan, former MRF deputy,
provoked the first schismatic movement. He
founded the Turkish Democratic Party,
which remains unacknowledged by the
state. His radicalism, based purely on secu-
lar Pan-Turkism, excludes Bulgarian Mus-
lims. The federalist state structure (Bulgari-
an and Turkish autonomy districts) pro-
posed by Kenan had to be considered as un-
dermining internal peace. The extremist
ethnic and religious tendencies had been
eliminated since they grew up at the bosom
of Bulgarian political thought.
Mehmet Hodja, another former party dep-
uty, initiated the second schismatic move-
ment derived from MRF. His Party for Demo-
cratic Changes (PDC) has to be considered
as a personal revolt against the authoritari-
an methods of Dogan. However, PDC ac-
quired a regional profile, strictly limited to
the district of Kardjali, the biggest South-
east Bulgarian town with considerable Mus-
lim (predominantly Turk) presence. In the
legislative elections in 1994, the PDC mobi-
lized 24,000 votes that represented approx-
imately 0,1% of the total votes or 4% of the
Turk voters. This electoral failure announced
its political death.
The next two attempts for dissipating MRF
political and electoral capabilities are relat-
ed with the aspirations of the biggest local
political parties – the Bulgarian Socialist Par-
ty (former Communist) and the Union of
Democratic Forces (UDF). The former cata-
pulted Nedim Gendjev, former m u f t i , by aid-
ing him to establish the Democratic Party of
Justice (DPJ). As a former cleric, his political
formation seemed to utilize religious rather
than ethnic slogans, emphasizing contact
with the Arab world. Paradoxically, this was
mixed with socialist egalitarian elements,
which shaped its utopian character and ulti-
mately resulted in failure. The DPJ also re-
mained a regionally represented party.
Gendjev organized bases predominantly in
northeastern Bulgaria, around the city of
Shoumen, ignoring the southeast and the
southwest, also populated by a Muslim
community. The DPJ logically shared the
destiny of the preceding schismatic parties.
It earned 24,000 and 27,000 in the 1994 and
1997 legislative elections, respectively, and
also has been marginalized. 
The last schismatic attempts have been
going on up to the present political disloca-
tions in the country. The UDF, as governing
party since 1997, makes great efforts to iso-
late the MRF leaders from their basic sup-
porters by involving them in different levels
of its political power. Ivan Kostov, UDF lead-
er and current Prime Minister personally of-
fered a few deputy chairs to the former MRF
activists, in opposition to Ahmed Dogan.
Mid-1997 saw the establishment of the
most important duplicate formation. It
adopted the name of National Movement of
Rights and Freedoms (NMRF), a very oppor-
tune electoral tactic, bearing in mind the
potential confusion with the MRF. Guner Ta-
hir, former MRF vice president and deputy,
headed the newly founded party. With UDF
assistance, he quickly constructed a wide
network almost covering the entire country.
However, according to the latest estima-
tions, the anti-MRF effects once more
proved mediocre because of the appeals of
UDF leaders to their MRF opponents to ap-
prove their coalition policy during the ap-
proaching municipal elections. Indeed, on
the eve of October 1999 the MRF conserved
its overwhelming superiority in 30 munici-
palities representing the Muslim communi-
ty and exerts influence in 65 municipalities,
out of 260 in total. 
The most successful political manoeuvre
of MRF leadership, and of Ahmed Dogan
personally, is the ideological juggling with
liberal ideas and slogans. He initiated the
Liberal Democratic Union with the former
president J. Jelev, vice president of Liberal
International. It seems that the contradic-
tion between the officially adopted individ-
ualist ideas and the traditional adjustment
of the Bulgarian Muslims to egalitarism and
social equality does not disturb MRF
founders. First, the liberal veil breaks up and
‘dissolves’ MRF into a Bulgarian political
multitude. Secondly, it places the party
among the family of European liberal par-
ties. Thirdly, it moves the MRF away from
the Socialist Party, which remains its true
electoral competitor.
The others
The community of Pomaks is estimated
between 170,000-200,000. Its political be-
haviour is different from that of the Turks. It
appears that its social and economic margi-
nality, due largely to its rural and especially
mountain-dwelling membership (approxi-
mately 100%), influences and encourages a
kind of ‘regionalization’ of political prefer-
ences. Usually its members adopt negative
attitudes towards the dominant regional
political tendencies. If they live alongside
Turks (as in the district of Kardjali) Bulgarian
Muslims generally support the BSP (except
in 1997 when their support was for the
UDF). On the contrary, in the southwest
(Bulgarian Macedonia) the Pomaks ordinari-
ly vote for the MRF, thus denying the UDF
and BSP dominance. 
Bulgarian Muslim Gypsies are electoral
objects whose comportment is categorically
unpredictable. Their extremely high level of
unemployment, lack of education, and
dominant rural status motivate political
passivity and disorientation. All attempts at
establishing a serious political ethnic forma-
tion corresponding to that of the Turkish
MRF have failed. However, in 1998 ‘Euro-
roma’ was founded, pretending to defend
the Gypsies interests. Its electoral capabili-
ties seem doubtful in as far as its activities
reached only electoral agreements with
MRF and the Bulgarian Euroleft party. 
Analysing the political behaviour of the
Bulgarian Muslim community is quite diffi-
cult. It risks running into inexactitudes due
to the empirical nature of the data. Consid-
ering the characteristic Balkan circumstan-
ces, Bulgarian politicians have to do their
best to promote the possibility of coexist-
ence between Muslim and Christian com-
munities in the country so as to avoid situa-
tions such as that in neighbouring Yugo-
slavia. ♦
Vladimir Chukov is associate professor at the faculty
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B u l g a r i a n
G y p s i e s
before the
election day
Since the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria in
1989, all Muslims in the country have come to experi-
ence a changed situation in which democratic conse-
quences are evident: possession of individual rights
and freedoms, intensification of contacts with the
Muslim world, and free political expression. Because
the political heritage of the dismantled communist
system is quite original in Bulgaria, in comparison
with a number of other Balkan countries, a specific
confessional model can be witnessed.
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The Muslim community in Poland is one of smallest
religious-ethnic groups in the country. The main Mus-
lim group comprises the Tatars, or more precisely
Poles of Tatar origin. They have been a part of Polish
history and its cultural and religious tradition since
the 14t h century. The case of the Polish Muslims pro-
vides a useful model of how Muslim communities can
relate to the wider national communities to which
they belong, for instance in Europe, and how, in doing
so, they retain their own culture and identity, and




There are substantial discrepancies in data
concerning practising Muslim believers in
Poland, but it is possible to gain reasonably
convincing insight into the numbers in-
volved from attendance of religious cere-
monies and membership in relevant reli-
gious, cultural and social organizations. On
the basis of this, one should conclude that
the most accurate figure of practising Polish
Muslims is probably around 5,000 – most of
whom belong to the Sunni tradition. The
overwhelming majority of Polish Muslims
are Tatars1 although the group also includes
a number of recent Polish converts to Islam. 
Soldiers and artisans
The Tatars arrived in the Lithuanian part
of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania in
the 14t h century. In the subsequent centu-
ries, many Tatars from the Volga area and, in
particular, Crimea followed earlier arrivals.
Some came as prisoners of war, but most
were recruited as mercenaries. Renowned
and experienced warriors, they served
mostly in special Tatar units with either the
royal forces or the local magnates’ own pri-
vate armies. Tatar nobleman legally enjoyed
the same privileges as the Polish nobility. In
return for their services to the crown they
acquired large estates and land titles. Those
of more humble origin established them-
selves in villages and small cities, becoming
known as excellent horse breeders, horse
traders, gardeners, horticulturists and arti-
sans. 
In 1569, the parliament (s e j m) of nobility
gave formal permission for the construction
of mosques and Tatar schools. The number
of Tatars in 1591 was estimated at between
60,000-70,000, and mosques counted 400.2
A 1631 census listed more than 100,000 Ta-
tars in Poland. 
The Tatars enjoyed religious tolerance
and maintained contacts with Islamic cen-
tres abroad. Many Tatar customs became
part of Polish tradition, especially among
the Polish nobility; their traditional long
robe (k o n t u s z), fur cap (k o l p a k) and curved
sword (k a r a b e l a) were imitations of the garb
worn by the Crimean Tatars.
The Tatars lost their language most likely
sometime in the 17t h century, and began us-
ing the local Polish or Byelorussian vernacu-
lar. Although most had lived in their ethnic
enclaves, they became Polonized through
inter-marriage and the slow adoption of val-
ues of the Polish majority. This process was
undoubtedly accelerated by the rising reli-
gious intolerance towards the end of the
1 7t h century and the prohibition on the con-
struction of mosques. In 1795, when the Pol-
ish state ceased to exist, the Tatars joined
the Poles in the fight for the country’s inde-
pendence. The Tatar fighters swore their al-
legiance to Poland on the Koran in the their
presence of their imams. They played an im-
portant role in Napoleon Bonaparte’s Rus-
sian campaign in 1812 and the two national
uprisings (1830 and 1863) against the Rus-
sians, for which they were to be bitterly per-
secuted by the Tsarist regime. 
When, in 1918, Poland regained its inde-
pendence and statehood, only a small num-
ber of Tatar enclaves in the northeastern
provinces remained within the Polish bor-
ders. The total population of Tatars in these
areas was little over 5,000. In 1925 the first
nation-wide congress of Muslims took place
in Vilnius, with Jakub Szynkiewicz being
elected the Chief Mufti of Poland. Also in
1925, the Socio-Cultural Association of Ta-
tars was formed with its headquarters in
Warsaw. The Association published R o c z n i k
Tatarski (Tatar Annals) and a periodical Z y c i e
Tatarskie (Tatar Life). By 1936, 19 Muslim
congregations and 17 mosques were under
the religious supervision of the Chief Mufti.
Each community was built around a parish
council with its imam and had, as a rule, its
own mosque and an appropriate religious
cemetery. 
During the Second World War, most of the
Tatar intelligentsia was exterminated by the
Nazis in retaliation for the gallant fight of
the Tatar detachment against the invading
German armies in September 1939. After
the war, only two Tatar villages (Bohoniki
and Kruszyniany) remained within the bor-
ders of Poland. Some Tatars from these for-
mer Polish territories were resettled in pre-
sent western and northwestern Poland. This
of course meant that a vital part of their reli-
gious and cultural heritage, including
mosques, cemeteries, and schools, was left
behind. 
Rebuilding the community
It was only in 1969 that steps were taken
towards rebuilding the organizational struc-
ture of the Muslims in Poland. That year, the
Polish government permitted the holding of
the first post-war Congress of Polish Mus-
lims, which created the Muslim Religious
Union of Poland. By 1971, the Office for Reli-
gious Denominations created a new legal
basis for religious work among the Muslims.
Since then, the mosques in the two oldest
Tatar areas, Bohoniki and Kruszyniany, have
been restored with grants from the Arab
Gulf states. In September of 1984, the foun-
dational stone was laid for the construction
of a new mosque in Gdansk-Oliwa. The com-
plex also has a library and facilities for the
teaching of Arabic, in addition to its normal
religious functions. The mosque is located
in the close proximity of a Roman Catholic
church. The sound of the imam’s call to
prayer often mixes with the ringing of
church bells, calling the faithful for the cele-
bration of the mass. 
Also during the 1980s, the Polish Muslims
began to establish closer contacts with the
Islamic world. In 1984 the Chief Mufti of Leb-
anon, Hasan Khaled, visited Poland for the
first time. His visit was followed by a delega-
tion from the Organisation of Islamic States,
headed by the IOS Deputy Secretary Gener-
al Sheikh Mohammed Naser Al-Abudi. The
delegation visited all the Muslim communi-
ties in Poland and apparently was most im-
pressed by the mosque in Bohoniki (see
photo). As a result of the visit, the first group
of Polish Muslims was able to take part in
the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Some
scholarships for Islamic studies in Saudi Ara-
bia were also made available. In August
1988 the Secretary General of the OIS, Dr
Abdulah Omar Nasif, visited Poland. Polish
Muslims have treated attempts by foreign
Muslims to court them with polite reserve.
There has always been a healthy theological
relationship with the nearest Muslim Acade-
my in Sarajevo, but visits by Middle Eastern
leaders have had only symbolic rather than
cultural significance.3
In 1992 the Union of Polish Tatars was re-
established. Its programmatic declaration
speaks of the long tradition of the Tatar
communities in Poland. It also offers inter-
esting insight into the ideology of the Polish
Tatars and their links with Poland. Accord-
ing to the document, the Union is re-consti-
tuted as a ‘commemoration and continua-
tion of the history of our Tatar and Muslim
ancestors who settled in the Republic six
centuries ago. She gave them land and no-
bility and assured them freedom of profes-
sion and all civil rights … she became our
motherland. Forever loyal to her, the Polish
Tatars dedicated their services to the aug-
mentation of her splendour not only in mili-
tary craft but in all spheres of national life,
including science, diplomatic service, agri-
culture and the arts. Loyal to the memory of
our fathers, their deeds of love for this land
we restore the Union of Polish Tatars.’4
Most Polish Muslims today live within six
congregations (parishes). The oldest include
Bohoniki, Kruszyniany, and Warsaw. New
congregations were formed in Gdansk-
Oliwa, Szczecin and Bialystok, the latter be-
ing the largest (Local sources maintain that
it has 3000 members). Many of the Muslims,
especially among the younger generation,
have migrated from the countryside to
towns. They, however, maintain their tradi-
tion and links with their original communi-
ties, returning to their villages at times of Is-
lamic festivals. The Polish Muslims have sev-
eral separate organizations. The oldest is
the Muslim Religious Union of Poland, with
its headquarters in Bialystok. Most of the
other organizations belong to the Shiite tra-
dition of Islam and its membership consists
of recent migrants from the Muslim world,
expatriates and converts. 
The survival and rejuvenation of the Mus-
lim community in a predominantly Roman
Catholic country, ruled for over forty years
by a polity whose ideology was avowedly
atheistic, is remarkable. The Polish Muslims
consider their position as very special within
the wider context of Muslim minorities in
East Central Europe. They contend that by
combining certain elements of Eastern and
Western culture they can contribute to the
moral revival of Europe and Islam. They
hope to become the mediator between Po-
land and the Islamic countries. According to
them, history shows that Polish relations
with Turkey and other Muslim nations have
always been good. Some of the Tatars em-
phasized that Poland ‘is the greatest Euro-
pean country not to be blemished by colo-
nialism’, a country that has ‘the glorious tra-
dition of religious tolerance’. ♦
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In August 1999, on the day that eight British Muslims
from Birmingham were convicted in Yemen for alleg-
edly planning a terrorist campaign, the BBC’s pres-
tigious news programme – ‘Newsnight’ – debated the
issues raised. The presenter spoke to four people in
the studio: a defence lawyer, a relative of one of the
accused, a journalist and the secretary general of the
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB).
Muslims in Britain: 
Entering 
the Mainstream?
The four guests on the programme were
Muslims. Three were confident, articulate
young men with regional British accents.
The MCB official located the problem in
terms of disproportionately high levels of
unemployment and educational under-
achievement among sections of the com-
munity; but was careful to leave open the
question of their guilt. The relative of one of
the accused (a PhD student) insisted on the
innocence of the men and rehearsed a fa-
miliar litany of government inactivity be-
cause of prejudice and ‘Islamophobia’. The
defence lawyer refused to present this as a
Muslim issue at all, but rather simply fo-
cused on the fact that young Britons had
been tortured to extract false confessions
thereby rendering the whole legal proce-
dure null and void. 
The journalist argued that whatever the
rights and wrongs of this particular case, it
pointed to a continuing failure of the reli-
gious leadership to connect with the world
of young British Muslims. This meant that a
not inconsiderable number were attracted
to the ranting of maverick militants such as
Abu Hamza al-Masri, the self-styled Egyp-
tian sheikh, whose son and godson were
among the accused Britons. Some vulnera-
ble youngsters could find themselves en-
trapped by the glamorized jihad rhetoric of
such radical groups.
‘Newsnight’ indicates how far Muslim
communities have come in the decade since
The Satanic Verses affair. Then, the commu-
nities felt marginalized from British civic and
public life with few articulate spokesmen
capable of translating anger into argument.
The BBC now had little difficulty in finding a
range of able British Muslim professionals to
debate the issues themselves. Further, with
the birth of the MCB in November 1997, the
Muslim communities have the best approxi-
mation yet to a representative body.
Seeking the common good
The MCB chose, for its inaugural conven-
tion and accompanying glossy literature,
the slogan Seeking the Common Good, which
deliberately echoed an influential docu-
ment published a year earlier by the Catho-
lic Bishops of England and Wales – The Com-
mon Good and the Catholic Church’s Social
T e a c h i n g – intended to influence the nation-
al debate in the run up to Britain’s 1997
General Election. The MCB has also learned
from the influential Jewish Board of Depu-
ties, the respected representative body for
Jewish affairs in Britain, the need to enlist
the support of as wide a range as possible of
Muslim organizations and individual profes-
sionals and academics. In its style, ethos,
and willingness to relate to government and
public bodies, the MCB has deliberately dis-
tanced itself from the controversial and pro-
vocative self-styled Muslim Parliament,
child of the late Kalim Siddiqui.
Reshaping public discourse
It was clear from the television discussion
that the term ‘Islamophobia’ has now en-
tered public discourse. The term was popu-
larized by an influential report – I s l a m o p h o-
bia, a Challenge to Us All – published in 1997
by the Runnymede Trust. Until this inquiry,
race relations in Britain had routinely ig-
nored ‘religion’ as an important component
in the identity and self-understanding of mi-
nority communities. The commission indi-
cated that for many in the minority commu-
nities to demean and vilify ‘Islam’ was as ex-
clusionary as racism and sapped their confi-
dence to engage confidently with wider so-
c i e t y .
The present government has responded
positively to many of its recommendations.
While Muslims have long been involved in
local politics with a handful appointed as
Lord Mayors, it was only in 1997 that the
first Muslim Member of Parliament (Labour)
was elected from the South Asian communi-
ties who comprise 75 % of Britain’s 1.4 mil-
lion Muslims. The government also appoint-
ed three Muslim peers to the House of
Lords; the ten year struggle to enjoy the
same right to state-funded schools as Chris-
tians and Jews was won in 1998; the govern-
ment agreed to include a religious affiliation
question in the 2001 census when it was
clear that Christian and Jewish organiza-
tions supported this Muslim demand. The
Home Office has latterly funded a research
project to determine the extent of religious
discrimination in Britain. While some of
these measures are more symbolic than
substantive, they cumulatively suggest that
British Muslims do not have to render invisi-
ble their Muslim identity if they are to par-
ticipate in public life. Finally, the Prime Min-
ister’s active advocacy of military interven-
tion to support the Kosovars has begun to
challenge the widely held Muslim view that
British foreign policy is necessarily anti-Mus-
lim. 
The search for religious
g u i d a n c e
A cursory reading of Muslim publications
in Britain indicates that the adequacy of the
training of imams remains a continuing
source of anxiety and debate. Many contin-
ue to be invited from South Asia and most
lack the linguistic and cultural skills to con-
nect with young British Muslims. However,
one South Asian tradition – the Deobandis –
now has a network of over a dozen m a d a r i s
in Britain.
Recently a group of imams from within
this tradition produced a series of pam-
phlets for Muslims in Bradford. These pam-
phlets offer an unvarnished, yet selective
picture of Muslim street culture: drug tak-
ing, ‘lavish wedding parties’ whereby ‘the
sunnah of the prophet-[is] replaced with ri-
diculous Hindu and other k a f i r t r a d i t i o n s ’ ;
neglect and abuse of wives; indifference to
Islamic education of children; an increase in
divorce; and a penchant for playing loud
music from ‘obscene films’, even when pass-
ing mosques. What is significant is that the
imams realize that to challenge such behav-
iour they have got to communicate in Eng-
lish and that it is not enough to simply re-
hearse Islamic prohibitions, but that reasons
have to be given (e.g., the pamphlet criticiz-
ing gambling cites material produced by
the organization Gamblers Anonymous). 
Further, because the products of such m a-
d a r i s are too numerous to provide jobs in lo-
cal mosques, there is the beginning of a ten-
tative engagement with mainstream educa-
tional institutions. In 1998 the first group of
such imams joined a BA course for primary
teachers in Birmingham. If such a venture
proves successful this could have a major
impact on the ethos and curriculum of the
m a d a r i s themselves bridging the chasm
that now exists between school and
mosque. 
Three other developments are worthy of
mention. The Islamic Foundation in Leices-
ter has an Inter-Faith Unit which produces
the informative Encounters, Journal of Inter-
Cultural Perspectives. One of its staff has
spent two years in Rome with the Dominic-
ans studying Catholic theology before stud-
ying Protestant theology at a British univer-
sity, where he is now working on a PhD in
which he is developing a Qur’anic herme-
neutics in dialogue with Christian herme-
neutic developments. Here, then, a Muslim
institute is laying the foundations for an Is-
lamically serious encounter with religious
p l u r a l i s m .
Islamic studies are beginning to multiply
in British universities with Muslims begin-
ning to contribute to all branches of Islamic
scholarship. As I write this I have in front of
me an introductory work on the Qur’an writ-
ten for British Muslims and non-Muslims,
another scholarly work on the origins of Is-
lamic law, some splendid translations of
works by al-Ghazzali, an innovative article
‘Women’s Human Rights in Islam: towards a
theoretical framework’ and an insightful
study of the radical movement Hizb al-Tah-
rir. While all of these scholars are working in
Britain, their origins are from across the
Muslim world, whether Egypt, Palestine,
Pakistan, or Britain.
Because Britain is home to Muslims from
all over the world, something of the intellec-
tual excitement generated by this diversity
and debate can be overheard in the English-
speaking Muslim press which has also
emerged in the last ten years, notably Q -
N e w s. Further, since English is now the sec-
ond language of the u m m a , innovative de-
velopments in Islamic thought developed in
Britain could have an impact on debates
across the Muslim world. 
Managing multiple identities
So far, the focus of this report has been –
self-consciously – Islamic groups in Britain.
However, the mass of Muslim youth in the
larger urban conurbations, whether East
London, Birmingham or Bradford, have min-
imal involvement with such groups. Mus-
lims usually guess that no more than 10 %
are involved, whether in local cities or on
university campuses. 
A recent publication ‘Community flash-
points and young British Muslims’ (1999),
edited by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, rehearsed
the findings of three seminars organized by
the prestigious Institute for Public Policy Re-
search (IPPR). The seminars’ findings make
for sober reading: sections of ‘Asian’ youth,
excluded from wider society and by internal
community patriarchies, often dissipated
their energies in inter-group hatreds and
prejudices. Black fighting Asian, Sikh youth
fighting Muslims or radical Hindu groups,
one Muslim sect fighting another. While
there is a confident and informed Islamic
identity emerging among some British Mus-
lims, there is also a reactive and strident ‘Is-
lamic’ identity emerging among many
young Muslims in inner city areas, where
most continue to live. The research of Dr Yu-
nas Samad suggests that this had more to
do with identity politics than with Islam. 
Clearly, an understanding of develop-
ments within Britain’s Muslim communities
requires us to be alert to the specificities of
the national and local situations, the ethos
within the proliferation of transnational
groups, whether rejectionist, isolationist or
engaged, as well as the extent to which geo-
political rivalries – national, ideological and
sectarian – impact on the British scene.
What is clear from the British experience is
that Muslims are beginning a serious dia-
logue with Christians and Jews. 
Zygmunt Bauman has coined the useful
term ‘glocalization’ which reminds us that
globalization can often reinforce local and
particular, as well as transnational identities.
Across Britain in Muslim communities origi-
nally from Pakistan, local elections are in-
creasingly contested by rival Kashmiri b r a-
daris (clans). One conclusion is clear: those
involved in researching and debating these
issues will increasingly include British Mus-
lims themselves. ♦
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Scene from a
p l a y at the
Theater Cosmic,
A m s t e r d a m ,
t h e theme of
which concerned
freedom of
p a r t n e r - c h o i c e
and mother-
d a u g h t e r
c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
The actrices are
all of Moroccan
d e s c e n t .
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Young men and women of Moroccan descent in the
Netherlands live in a world of many different social
groups. Brought up by their parents to be ‘good’ Mo-
roccans and Muslims, many have – well into their
teens – lived with the expectation that their family
would some day return to Morocco. From their peers
in school and at work, they have learned about Dutch
culture, which has also become part of them. Togeth-
er with Moroccan and other Muslim friends, they
seek ways to live in Dutch society with their particu-
lar cultural heritage. In the past, these ‘second-gen-
eration migrants’ have often been described as living
‘between two cultures’. Analysis of the life stories of
highly educated women of Moroccan descent, howe-
ver, demonstrates that these women are able to crea-
tively construct and combine their multiple social
identifications, although their drawing upon multi-
cultural capital to create new strategies of living is
not without constraints.
Narratives on
P a r t n e r - C h o i c e
Nezha is a 35 year-old woman of Moroccan
descent living in the Netherlands. For the
last ten years, she has been happily married
to a man of her own choice. Had it been up
to her parents, however, she would have
married a candidate proposed by them. This
is Nezha’s story:
‘When your parents say yes [to a mar-
riage candidate, mb], that’s final. You try
to sail around it, but you can’t say no. So
I made inquiries about the police-
school. I was invited for an interview
and had to pass some exam. That went
fine, so I was accepted. What I figured
was that if the candidate would keep
turning up and I would be about to
marry, then I’d be off to Leusden [name
of the city where the police-school is lo-
cated, mb]. So I phoned him: “Listen, I’ve
got a boyfriend, you should stop seeing
me”. Haven’t heard of him since! I was so
relieved! But my family felt that their ho-
nour had been damaged. You know:
first he drops in all the time, and then
he’s disappeared all of a sudden. It
makes them wonder: ”What is wrong
with her?” That‘s the first thing that
comes to their mind, you know: “She’s
lost her virginity”.’
Once ‘the candidate’ has given up, Nezha
no longer needs the police-school as an es-
cape from marriage and decides not to go
there after all. In the meantime, she has met
another Muslim man with whom she enters
into a relationship. After a while the couple
decides to ask permission from Nezha’s
family to marry. Since her boyfriend does
not have any relatives in the Netherlands,
he decides to contact Nezha’s family per-
s o n a l l y :
‘If somebody wants to ask your hand, his
whole family should ask. But that was
impossible in his case. So he acted alone
and bought flowers, like a Dutchman
would. And because the first candidate
had never called again, my family
thought: “Well, fine. Just go”.’
The fact that her husband came to ask her
‘like a Dutchman would’, is not the only ex-
ample of how he and Nezha improvise on
family traditions. Nezha relates with pride
how she organized her wedding in such a
way that she could comply with the wishes
of both her family and herself:
‘I organized everything myself. That is
so odd, it’s really not done, a Moroccan
woman who takes care of all that her-
self. But I phoned the registry myself.
I refused to marry according to the Mo-
roccan law, because I had heard all sorts
of stories about how impossible it is to
get a divorce and so on. But to make it
look nice I went to the mosque. So that
it looked Islamic, you know, with an
imam to read a sura from the Quran for
you. Well, the wedding was very nice.’
Representation of social
identity in life stories 
Nezha is one of the women who were pre-
pared to tell me their life stories for my re-
search project on young women of Moroc-
can descent who have university degrees
and/or hold positions in which such qualifi-
cations are required. I am specifically inter-
ested in the representations of various di-
mensions of social identity by these women.
The research focuses on the question of
how these ‘second-generation migrant’
women construct a more or less coherent
self-identity out of their shifting, multiple
social identifications. I focus more particu-
larly on the representations in their life sto-
ries of ethnic, religious and gender identifi-
cations. In analysing the relations between
the narrations produced in the interviews, I
hope to gain more insight into the question
of how these representations of historical
events, social relationships and individual
action come together to construct social
identifications, and how such identifications
are transmitted, maintained and trans-
f o r m e d .
Construction of multiple
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s
Here, I restrict myself to the question of
what the narratives on partner-choice can
tell us about the ways in which the 14 wom-
en with whom the interviews have so far
been completed construct, maintain, and
combine their various social identifications.
In the above quotations, we get the impres-
sion of Nezha as a woman who, in arranging
her own marriage, is creatively drawing up-
on different cultural resources. She challen-
ges the views of her family, but makes sure
not to loose touch with them. This kind of
negotiating can be recognized in the stories
of all interviewees. Their biographical narra-
tions contain numerous episodes in which
they improvise upon and shift the meanings
of Moroccan core-values like virginity and
obedience to one’s parents. They do so in
such ways that their identification with cer-
tain values that are treasured within the Mo-
roccan community can be combined with,
for example, the value of autonomy, which
is highly valued within the community of
Dutch peers with whom they also identify.
Their stories demonstrate once more the in-
adequacy of the ‘between-two-cultures’
model of second-generation migrant identi-
ty, which suggests too static a conception of
cultures as fixed, homogeneous units with
clear-cut boundaries, and neglects the open
and contestable nature of cultural notions
and practices. It also implies a view of these
young people as passive victims of their cir-
cumstances rather than as actors with a
multiple cultural competence.
Instead, the life stories abound with illus-
trations of the fact that identification does
not imply an ‘all-or-nothing’ attitude to-
wards the groups to which one belongs.
People always know more culture than they
use, and different group members lay stress
on different things. Nezha, for example,
identifies with Islam as a source of guidance
in her life, but does not agree with the inter-
pretations of Islamic precepts in the Moroc-
can code of personal law. Also, sharing sym-
bols does not necessarily entail sharing in-
terpretations. The views of the interviewees
on the symbolic complex of virginity is a
case in point. Although very few women
question the value of the symbol of virginity
as such, their participation in Dutch peer
groups – as well as their holiday experiences
in present-day Morocco – have led them to
stretch the corresponding rules of what is
considered chaste behaviour. Furthermore,
they no longer see virginity as a concern of
the whole community, but perceive it as a
personal responsibility and claim the right
of individual privacy over such matters. Un-
like her parents, Nezha, for instance, did not
think it inappropriate to have a boyfriend as
long as she safeguarded her virginity. Also,
she was furious about her family’s interfer-
ence with her love life and maintained that
whatever she and her boyfriend agreed up-
on doing or not doing before marriage was
nobody else’s business.
Constraints on using different
cultural resources
Of course, drawing upon ‘multicultural
capital’ to create new strategies of living is
not without constraints. Time and again, the
life stories contain evidence of the fact that
the interviewees have internalized norms
transmitted to them by their parents to such
an extent that they entertain ambivalent
feelings concerning their associations with
men and their experiences of sexuality and
falling in love. Such narrations illustrate that
one is neither completely free in choosing
one’s identifications, nor in improvising up-
on the meanings attached to a particular
group identity. Although Nezha, for exam-
ple, emphasizes that she has a clear con-
science, it hurts her to know that the false
rumours about her premarital behaviour
have damaged the reputation of her family
and herself. She also dreads the day her two
daughters will begin to take an interest in
boys and acknowledges that she is not sure
that she will allow them the same freedom
of movement that she claimed for herself.
The individual’s freedom to construct
multiple identifications is also constrained
by the fact that the emphasis on certain ele-
ments from a cultural repertoire implies the
neglect of others. Not all the women inter-
viewed are as happily married as Nezha. In
fact, only four are presently married. The
others are either still single or divorced. The
price that these Moroccan pioneers with
Dutch university degrees and attractive jobs
appear to have to pay for the degree of au-
tonomy that in Moroccan circles is, as yet,
unusual for women, is that they have an
even harder time than their Dutch counter-
parts in finding a suitable partner who ap-
preciates the merits of a wife with a career.
Due to the open and dynamic character of
cultural notions and practices, it is, howe-
ver, not unlikely that what these women are
struggling with will prove to be a transition-
al problem that will decline as more highly
educated women of Moroccan descent en-
ter the Dutch labour market. ♦
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Similar to the overall situation in Western Europe,
the Muslim youth of Turkish background in Germa-
n y1 are quite different to the generation of their par-
ents. Far from homogeneity, being a Muslim is nowa-
days made up of differentiation, cultural complexity,
and mobility at an individual level even if communal
features remain relevant. The following aims at brief-
ly reviewing these trends while underlining the op-




of Turkish OriginThe first element to keep in mind concern-ing Turkish Islam in Germany is its transna-
tional dimension. Being located ‘in be-
tween’ at least two national contexts, name-
ly home- and host-countries, Islamic groups
– mainly organized into associations – and
individuals develop original and particular
social practices and discourses which deal
with multiple national settings. This rele-
vance of transnationalism is directly linked
to the specific national background of Turk-
ish Muslims. The transplantation of political
religious trends from Turkish to German ter-
ritory from the 1960s onwards mainly
helped to increase the potential of these
groups because Germany offered opportu-
nities – stability, freedom, autonomy and in-
dependence – which Turkey, a Republic
that, having interpreted l a i c i t é as state con-
trol of religion, did not and still does not
provide. The transnationalization of the so-
cial space produced by Islamic-Turkish ac-
tors in Germany grows also on the basis of a
‘long distance nationalism’ referring to the
extension of the ‘traditional’ audience
among migrants through the media, main-
taining the presence of some political per-
sonalities and debates in the daily life of
Turks living in Germany.2 The situation of
Turkish migrants in Germany composes
then a permanent interplay of social posi-
tions neither systematically, nor clearly at-
tached to stable forms of social capital in
both countries. 
Muslims of Turkish origin in Germany can
also benefit from their particular location in
a country of which they are not systemati-
cally citizens. Associations can be viewed as
providing alternative modes of action to
that which is provided by the exclusive ref-
erence to the welfare state as a form of in-
corporation that is deeply embedded in ter-
ritorial and national definitions of member-
ship. This emergence of a transnational
space in which Islamic mobilization has
been organized lies at the cross-roads be-
tween the legal management of religion
and the externalization of Islam as a ‘for-
eigners’ cultural issue’. It is a pure product of
the complex articulation of rights, rules, and
institutions, independent of the usual focus
on debates about political participation and
jus sanguinis. 
The German political management of Is-
lam is mainly diplomatic. In relation to the
political agenda, Islam is treated as a For-
eign Affairs issue, and more recently as a ‘se-
curity linked’ problematic. From its symbolic
to material aspects, many indicators justify
the assessment of Islam as not being a so-
cial-cultural policy matter. As the very sym-
bol of the Kemalist definition of l a ï c i t é, the
management of several aspects of religious
life by the Diyanet Isleri Türk-Islam Birligi
(DITIB, Office of Religious Affairs) introduces
the Turkish state as one of the actors of the
Islamic scene reconstructed in Germany. At
the same time, the German authorities’ des-
ignation of the DITIB as the ‘most favoured
lord’ among the plausible partners stimu-
lates competition between associations
such as the Islamische Gesellschaft Milli Gö-
rüs (IGMG, Islamic Society National Vision)
or the Verband der Islamischen Kulturzen-
tren (VIKZ, Union of Cultural Islamic Centres)
in the field of education, the opening of
mosques or the ‘importation’ of imams from
Turkey to Germany. Several means have
been organized between Turkey and Ger-
many to avoid a DITIB monopoly on these
affairs. In the 1990s, for example, the VIKZ
opened a centre for the education of h o c a s
in Cologne, giving them the possibility to
recruit persons with experience in living in
Germany and German-language capacity to
teach in their mosques. Significantly, those
rivalries and competition between the main
actors are not submitted to direct interven-
tion and repression of the Turkish state. 
Indeed, one of the first opportunities for
Islamic Turkish associations in Germany
arose from the distance from the Turkish
state, in spite of its maintained sovereignty
in Germany, especially through taxation and
conscription. Escaping from Turkey without
really leaving it, Turkish Islam in Germany
cannot be dissociated from this permanent
and complex interaction of the two national
settings referring to different sets of oppor-
tunities. 
The opportunities
The first elementary opportunities used
by transplanted Turkish networks are legal –
open to all non-German citizens who are al-
lowed to organize eingetragene Vereine ( e . V )
associations. Thus, the Islamic associative
network, which initially developed in Ger-
many, corresponded to the juridical restora-
tion of religious tendencies that exist in Tur-
key yet had found in Germany the possibili-
ty to act freely. This appears to be the first
step of the installation of Islamic associative
networks in Germany.
A second stable set of opportunities is
provided by the rules concerning the posi-
tion of religion in the public sphere. The
German tradition separates religion and
state without considering religion as a non-
legitimate actor in the public sphere, such
as is the case within the constitutional inter-
pretation of l a ï c i t é in France or Turkey. One
elementary resource the associations can
thus mobilize stems from the status of cor-
poration of public law (Körperschaft des öf-
fentlichen Rechts), given to religious com-
munities (Religionsgemeinschaft) which
rule and administer their business in an au-
tonomous way: raising taxes (K i r c h e n s t e u e r) ,
deciding the composition of religious in-
struction, opening religious places, and be-
ing represented in public institutions such
as hospitals, the army, prisons, and the me-
dia. Islamic Turkish associations could gain
immediate benefits from this recognition in
terms of authority, legitimacy and inde-
pendence in their functioning. It could be
argued that the dynamism of the associa-
tive network among Muslims in Germany is
a result of institutionalization in the quest
for recognition. De facto, the claim for offi-
cial recognition began in 1997 with an offi-
cial demand made by the Turkish VIKZ – a
demand rapidly followed by other requests.
This is a real difference compared to other
countries where the claim for institutionali-
zation appears to be a late indicator of ‘visi-
bility’. 
The third set of opportunities derives from
the fact that given that the majority of Mus-
lims living in Germany are not German citi-
zens, the issue of Islam is not compelling for
national politicians as an electoral argu-
ment. The lack of incentive is exacerbated
by the collectively shared illusion of Germa-
ny as not being a country of immigration.
The lexical stigmatization of foreigners is
another part of a political intention to keep
foreigners’ issues (among them Islam) out of
the domestic public sphere. But at the same
time, being kept outside of domestic issues
and even ignored by politicians and aca-
demics gave the opportunity to Islamic as-
sociations to organize their own social sites
dealing with a double-sided ‘changing face
of religion’3: on the one hand is a need for
new types of communal activities, and on
the other, the transformation of tie binding
the individual to his community of belong-
i n g s .
A secular change?
This ‘changing face’ appears to be a cen-
tral issue for the Islamic Turkish associations
as well as for their audience. The urban
landmarks they provide, and the identity
references and discourses they mobilize,
have been adapted to the change of clien-
tele – passing from parents to children or
grandchildren. Islam remains firstly defined
as an origin and a praxis (respect of the five
pillars), but being born Muslim is not a guar-
antee of orthopraxy. For instance, the rela-
tionship to religious belonging and praxis is
not directly inherited from the family but is
transformed and reinvented by younger
generations, while the associative network
maintains the collective reference such as
the moral code and educational needs. The
multiplication of the contacts and modes of
participation in the host society gives new
opportunities to young generations of Mus-
lims who no longer need to stay exclusively
in an assigned group or community. The
b r i c o l a g e of reference appears to be the key
concept underpinning these new forms of
dealing with religious belonging: people
produce their own ways of being a Muslim. 
At an individual level, this change gives
relevance to the category of ‘personhood’
which mixes choice, faith and duty, without
feeling under ‘social’ pressure in European
societies. Different socialization dynamics
meet and interact, the associative, familial
or religious aspect being one part of it. It al-
so represents an ethic for life which medi-
ates familial relations, respect for the h a l a l
milieu, while also opening new spaces and
guaranteeing the freedom of others. In this
sense, ‘personhood’ represents a re-inter-
pretation of tradition based on experience.
It is about becoming a Muslim, not about
‘re-Islamization’. It is rather an ‘Islamization’
based on real knowledge of heritage, ethics
and codes. The headscarf, for example, is in-
creasingly becoming a non-cohesive argu-
ment between mother and daughter – an
argument of technical interpretations
against traditional ones. The daughter
teaches her mother how to wear it. 
The main demands remain, however, the
same: easier access to German nationality,
the right to double-citizenship, and acquir-
ing for Islam a status equal to that of other
religions. 
So the public and communal dimension of
Islam in Germany still asks for recognition
and visibility in the urban milieu. But a
strong differentiation is growing between
‘belonging’ and ‘believing’. While the dis-
tance from the ‘legitimate authorities’ is
growing, the religious practices are a matter
of personal and individual choice and pri-
vate conscience. This process is similar to
that of transnationalism: multiplication of
the identity references, mobility, invisibility,
and avoiding state control and authority.
This idea of multiple identities and complex-
ity induces the idea of culture playing as a
reference on both individual and collective
levels, providing codes, symbols, repertoires
and symbolic places in which people occa-
sionally live. It also provides an ideological
apparatus, practices and a symbolic reper-
toire by which the individual/collective con-
sciousness as part of a believer’s life is built,
educated and controlled. In a kind of ‘secu-
lar’ perspective, the identification as Muslim
is no more the exclusive producer of referen-
ces and meanings. It rather figures one of
the possible options, but certainly not the
dissolution of religious affiliation. ♦
N o t e s
1 . According to statistics there are approximately 
2.8 million Muslims living in Germany, 
79% are from Turkish origin/nationality.
2 . Benedict Anderson, (1991), Imagined Communities. 
(2nd ed), London, Verso.
3 . James A. Beckford, Thomas Luckmann (ed.), (1989), 
The Changing Face of Religion. Sage 
(Studies in International Sociology, vol. 37).
Valérie Amiraux is a research fellow and coordinator
of the Mediterranean Programme, 
European University Institute, Florence, Italy.
E-mail: amiraux@datacomm.iue.it 
For information on the Mediterranean Programme: 
h t t p : / / w w w . i u e . i t / R S C / R e s e a r c h R S C - 3 a 1 . h t m
ResearchI S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  4 / 9 9 31
N o t e s
1 . Hodgkin, Elizabeth (1990), Islam et Sociétés 
au Sud du Sahara, pp. 73-130.
2 . Nigerian reviews of the book based on my PhD
dissertation were particularly critical of my
representations of Islam: Brenner, Louis (1973), 
The Shehus of Kukawa: a History of the al-Kanemi
Dynasty of Borno. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
3 . Sanankoua, Bintou et Brenner, Louis, eds. (1991),
L’enseignement islamique au Mali. Bamako: Editions
J a m a n a .
4 . Hodgkin, (1990), p. 105.
5 . Last, Murray, (1967), The Sokoto Caliphate.
London: Longmans.
6 . Sulaiman, Ibraheem (1986), A Revolution in History.
London: Mansell Publishing.
Dr Louis Brenner is Professor of the History 
of Religion in Africa, School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London, UK.
E-mail: LB2@soas.ac.uk
A p p r o a c h e s
L O U I S  B R E N N E R
The academic study of Islam and of Muslim societies
in sub-Saharan Africa has developed during the past
thirty years more as part of African studies than of Is-
lamic studies. Islamic studies in Africa has therefore
not been so deeply influenced by the orientalist her-
itage of Western scholarship that prevailed among
those who studied Islam in the central Muslim re-
gions. On the other hand, the global resurgence of Is-
lam that has taken place during the same period, in
all its social, political, religious and indeed academic
forms, has had a profound influence on African Is-
lamic studies.
The Study of Islam in
S u b - S a h a r a n
A f r i c a
In the 1960s, some scholars were confident-
ly predicting that the political role of reli-
gion, and specifically of Islam, would shrink
under the growing dominance of secularist
political ideologies. Quite the contrary,
however, has occurred. Throughout Africa,
the religious is inextricably entwined with
the political, often to the extent that it is vir-
tually impossible to disentangle the two
strands, even for analytical purposes. Inter-
national politics have reflected a similar
trend. Political developments in the Middle
East since the 1960s, the economics of the
oil boom in the 1970s, and the widespread
political ramifications of the Muslim Revolu-
tion in Iran in 1979, have all contributed to
giving ‘Islam’ a salience in the conscious-
ness of non-Muslim Westerners that is prob-
ably unparalleled since the days of the cru-
sades! 
What Samuel B. Huntington describes as a
‘clash of civilizations’ certainly resonates of
a contemporary replay of medieval Chris-
tian-Muslim confrontation. These develop-
ments have profoundly affected the aca-
demic study of Islam and of Muslim socie-
ties in numerous ways, not least in the
amount of money that is being attracted to
support such research and most notably in
the recent appearance of numerous new
centres of Islamic studies in academic estab-
lishments in Europe and the United States. A
pertinent example of this process is the re-
cent establishment of the ISIM, which pub-
lishes this Newsletter. Nonetheless, the ex-
plosion in Islamic studies in African coun-
tries with sizeable Muslim populations has
been much more spectacular than in Europe
or America. 
Islamism and Islamic
r e s e a r c h in Africa
Elizabeth Hodgkin’s article published in
1990, entitled ‘Islamism and Islamic Re-
search in Africa’,1 remains the most inclusive
and systematic treatment of these trends in
print, despite its somewhat limited geo-
graphical scope, focusing primarily on Su-
dan, Nigeria and Senegal. The article traces
both institutional profiles as well as the ide-
ological tensions in Islamic studies in Africa.
As the title of her article suggests, Hodgkin’s
concern was primarily to explore Islamist
trends in Africa and their impact on research
and on the university environment. Her ana-
lytical point of departure was to distinguish
Muslim ‘modernists’ (whom she defined as
those who wish to modernize Islam) from
the Islamists who seek to ‘Islamize’ modern-
ity, and in particular in the university con-
text, to Islamize contemporary knowledge.
The thrust of her article was to highlight the
many contradictions that this situation has
produced, primarily amongst Islamists
themselves. For example, she argued that
Islamist scholars fell into two categories on
the basis of academic background: those
who had received Western-style disciplinary
training and those who had received Arabist
and Islamic studies training. In addition to
the fact that these two groups tend to pro-
duce very different kinds of publications,
Hodgkin noted that many Western trained
Islamist scholars seemed to know relatively
little about Islam, whereas the Islamically-
trained scholars tended to write uncritically
in highly normative terms.
Indeed, it is this uncritical and idealized
presentation of Islam that causes concern
amongst most non-Muslim, Western trained
scholars who tend to dismiss this kind of
writing as non-academic and to ignore it, or
perhaps to try to turn it into an object of re-
search. However, it is my view that this kind
of writing is reflective of a much more com-
plex and significant process which is taking
place in the development of Islamic studies:
the emergence of a Muslim African voice in
academia. One of the most significant re-
sults of this change is that non-Muslim
scholars no longer enjoy a monopoly in the
field and must learn to engage with this
new voice. The process can be painful for us
non-Muslims, less, I think, because of the
analytical or critical issues involved than be-
cause of the fact that the ‘object’ of our re-
search is no longer silent.
The emergence of a Muslim voice in Afri-
can Islamic studies is largely a postcolonial
phenomenon, but then, so is African Islamic
studies itself. Certainly, my own work has al-
ways been subject to criticism from an ‘Is-
lamic’ perspective, from my earliest publica-
tions based on my PhD research in northern
Nigeria in the mid-1960s,2 to more recent
research in Mali. The publication of a small
collective book on Muslim schooling, co-ed-
ited with a Muslim Malian colleague, was
greeted with considerable anger by one or
two Malians.3 The anger was focused pre-
cisely on the fact that certain contributors
to the book took a critical view of various is-
sues that in turn resulted in an accusation
that the book was ‘against Islam’. The per-
son who made this accusation, the director
of one of Mali’s more prestigious m a d r a s a
schools, had cooperated with me in my re-
search on the history of the m a d r a s a
schools. However, he clearly expected a
non-critical, normative account of Muslim
schooling in Mali and was perhaps particu-
larly upset by the fact that the one patently
critical essay in the book was authored by
the only contributor who had actually at-
tended a m a d r a s a school. Apparently, this
process of change can be painful for every-
one concerned.
The ‘secularizing of Islam’?
This incident illustrates one of the most
intriguing contradictions that Hodgkin
notes at the end of her article, where she
observes that for all its advocacy of a deeper
religious life, Islamism ‘may be said to be
secularising Islam’.4 This is because, in her
view, those who wish to Islamize modern
life must at the same time come to terms
with it; such a process of change is interac-
tive and necessarily works in both direc-
tions. Criticism of the m a d r a s a schools by its
own products is something that arose in this
case from the actual experience of ques-
tioning the relationship of m a d r a s a s c h o o l-
ing to the social, economic and political
constraints of contemporary urban life in
Mali. Open critical assessment of schooling
in Mali seems essential to the development
of the educational sector in a country where
almost 80 % of the population remains illit-
erate. Nor can the m a d r a s as be exempted
from such criticism, even in the name of ‘Is-
lam’, since they account for an important
proportion of schooling provision in the
country. Thus, by offering a ‘modernized’
and ‘relevant’ form of Muslim schooling, the
m a d r a s a constituencies necessarily draw ‘Is-
lam’ into a national debate about education
that is informed by predominantly secularist
p r i n c i p l e s .
Even if one would not agree with Eliza-
beth Hodgkin that this process contributes
to a secularization of Islam, the Malian ex-
ample certainly illustrates the extent to
which the contemporary study of Islam and
of Muslim societies is a highly politicized do-
main. In the same way that the m a d r a s as
cannot exempt themselves from criticism as
a part of the educational sector, scholars
who engage in research on the m a d r a s as
cannot expect that their findings will be ex-
empt from critical response from those who
have invested their lives in m a d r a s a s c h o o l-
ing. 
Another example that illustrates the kinds
of tensions that affect the study of Islam in
Africa can be found in research into the j i-
h a d of cUthman dan Fodio and of the Mus-
lim state that he established at the begin-
ning of the 19t h century in what is now
northern Nigeria. In 1967, Murray Last pub-
lished The Sokoto Caliphate, a revised ver-
sion of his PhD dissertation.5 This book is a
history of the j i h a d and the administration
of the Caliphate based on meticulous study
of the vast Arabic documentation then
available. It was the first major study of the
subject which used such sources, and in
many ways has remained the most authori-
tative, perhaps primarily because most Ni-
gerian scholars are reticent to touch the
subject due to the profound symbolic role
the Caliphate continues to play in Nigerian
Muslim politics. Indeed, the only extensive
treatment of the j i h a d by a Nigerian is Ibrah-
eem Sulaiman’s A Revolution in History,6
which was viewed by some critics more as a
programmatic text for the future than a seri-
ous historical treatment of the past. 
Creative tensions?
These two examples, which could be mul-
tiplied many times over, raise numerous
complex questions for the scholarly com-
munity. Is critical scholarship a ‘secular’ phe-
nomenon that is inherently incompatible
with Muslim religious sensibilities? Or is it
possible that such scholarship can better as-
sist committed Muslims in understanding
their past and present and to build their fu-
ture? Can the tensions that span these two
extreme positions act as a creative impetus
for scholarship? One prospect for such a de-
velopment is the increasing number of Afri-
can Muslim scholars active in the field of
Muslim studies whose work is of the highest
academic standard. These include Muslim
scholars – Islamist as well as ‘secularist’ –
whose competence in their disciplines is
combined with a palpable sensitivity to
things Islamic. At the same time, much of
the scholarship of us non-Muslims nowa-
days also reflects a greater empathy with Is-
lam and Muslim societies than it did thirty
years ago. And the real challenge that faces
us scholars today is to nurture these seeds
of sensitivity and empathy, without which
no fruitful development of our field can en-
sue despite the money that has been flow-
ing into all the new institutes. ♦
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State of  the a r t
VL A D I M I R  B O B R O VN I K O V
Research on pre-modern and modern Islam conduct-
ed in post-Soviet Russia, has been, and still is, very
poorly known to scholars from abroad – both in the
West and in the Muslim world. Despite the fall of the
‘iron curtain’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
there is still an informational barrier separating post-
Soviet and non-Soviet researchers. Many questions
arise concerning what has happened in Islamic stud-
ies after the cease of religious persecution during the
‘perestroika’ years: What was the impact of the so-
called ‘Islamic revival’ on research on Islam? Which
academic schools training specialists in Islamic stud-
ies have survived since the pre-Soviet and Soviet
times? To what extent do post-Soviet scholars know





N e w A p p r o a c h e s
Islamic studies have benefited from the fall
of the Soviet rule, which saw the return of Is-
lam to the public sphere. Islam was recog-
nized by Yeltsin’s government as the sec-
ond main religion in Russia. The state does
not suppress research on Islam. Re-estab-
lished mosque collections and even the se-
cret archives of the CPSU and KGB were
opened for scholars from Russia and abroad.
On the other hand, the already negative
view of Islam in the Russian public opinion
further deteriorated from 1994–1999. Esca-
lating violence prevents researchers from
carrying out archival research and fieldwork
in some regions of the Caucasus and Central
Asia. Large collections of Muslim manu-
scripts in Chechnya and Abkhazia were
burnt due to shelling during civil wars. Fur-
thermore, the state funding of universities
and academic institutes was considerably
r e d u c e d .
The all-Union network of research insti-
tutes affiliated to the Academy of Sciences
was dissolved as soon as the USSR broke
down. But centres of Islamic studies estab-
lished under the Soviet or pre-Soviet rule
have survived in St. Petersburg, Moscow,
Kazan, Makhachkala and Ufa. They still con-
centrate on traditional scholarship of Islam
including Arabic and Iranian philology,
studies of the Qur’an, h a d i t h and other Mus-
lim texts. They, however, also include re-
search on Sufism, history and social anthro-
pology of Muslim societies and communi-
ties. Outside Russia, similar centres exist in
Tashkent, other capitals of the former Soviet
Central Asia and Baku as well. The best Is-
lamicists still graduate from the Oriental De-
partment of the St. Petersburg State Univer-
sity (OD SPSU). The most qualified anthro-
pologists are trained at the Department of
History of the Moscow State University (DH
MSU) and the Institute of Ethnology and An-
thropology (IEA). Recently, departments of
sociology have been established in the MSU
and the SPSU and at the universities of Ka-
zan and Ufa. They train specialists in mod-
ern political and social developments of the
post-Soviet Muslim regions. The main re-
search centres are the St. Petersburg and
Moscow branches of the IOS, the IOS of Uz-
bekistan in Tashkent and the Dagestani Re-
search Centre (DRC) in Makhachkala. All of
them house large collections of Muslim
manuscripts and rare printed material in Ar-
abic, Iranian and Turkic languages.
Post-Soviet Islamic studies are in the proc-
ess of flux and change. Russian Islamicists
attempt to rethink the scholarly legacy of
the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods, without
dogmatically rejecting their contributions in
traditional disciplines. Their work on collect-
ing and translating Arabic manuscripts, in-
terrupted in the late Soviet period, is being
re-established. Growing interest of the gen-
eral public in the religion resulted in an ex-
plosion of publications related to Islam. The
Kazan and Tashkent editions of the Arabic
text of the Qur’an and its Russian translation
prepared in the 1920s by the prominent So-
viet scholar I.Yu. Krachkovsky (1883–1951)
as well as another one published in 1878 by
the Orthodox missionary G.S. Sablukov
(1804–1880) were reproduced by the mil-
lions. They were best sellers and regularly
appeared even in such periodicals as P h y s i c-
al Culture and Sport. In 1995 in St. Peters-
burg the first Russian translation of the
Qur’an by General D.N. Boguslavsky, com-
pleted in 1871, was prepared for printing by
Dr E.A. Rezvan (IOS). In the same year, Prof.
M.G. Osmanov (DRC) published in Moscow a
new Russian translation based on the Mus-
lim tradition. From 1989-1991 the Qur’an
was translated into Azeri (by I. Agaev) and
Kazakh (by Zh.M. Istaev), and later into oth-
er Turkic and Caucasian languages. Dr Rez-
van is currently preparing a database of
Qur’anic manuscripts kept in St. Petersburg.
In the field of history there was a blossom-
ing of Islamic studies at the turn of the
1980s and 1990s. This mostly dealt with the
earlier periods of Islam, for instance, Prof.
O.G. Bolshakov’s (IOS) History of the Khalifat
in 6 volumes (three of which were published
in Moscow between 1989–1995). These
works were informed by an enormous range
of scholarship. His work is the best Russian
study available on the early Muslim state in
Arabia and the subsequent Arabic con-
quests. Russian Muslims bought up almost
all available copies of the first volume with
Muhammad’s biography, thus making it a
rarity. Mention should also be made of the
History of Dagestan, edited in Makhachkala
in 1996, in which Prof. A.R. Shixsaidov (DRC)
re-thought the Islamization that lasted in
the North Caucasus from the 7t h to the late
1 5t h century. 
The study of ’Russian’ Islam
In the last years, Russian scholars have be-
gun to turn their attention to ‘Russian’ Is-
lam, as it emerged from close ties and the
intense relationship between Russia and the
Muslim peoples of the Volga River region,
Siberia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Is-
lamic studies become more interdisciplinary
in their approaches. In addition to written
sources, Islamicists examine current insti-
tutes and practices of post-Soviet Muslims.
Within this context, the world of modern
holy men and Sufi sheikhs has been studied
by Dr B.M. Babadzhanov and Dr A.K. Mumi-
nov from Tashkent (IOS). On the basis of his
archival research and fieldwork, Dr Babadz-
hanov prepared a series of writings on the
developments of the Naqshbandiya and
other Sufi orders in Central Asia in the 18t h-
2 0t h centuries. Some of these works have
been published in German and French
scholarly periodicals (Islamkundliche Unter-
s u c h u n g e n, 1996, 1998, Bd. 1, 2; Cahiers d’A-
sie Centrale, 1998, 5–6). An excellent insight
into the world of the m e d r e s e and Muslim
libraries in medieval and contemporary Da-
gestan was presented by Prof. Shixsaidov in
his publications (Islamkundliche Untersu-
c h u n g e n, 1996, 1998, Bd. 200, 216), resulting
from comparative research of more than
200 private collections of Arabic manu-
scripts revealed in highland Dagestan by a
joint expedition of the DRC and the Oriental
Department of the Dagestani State Univer-
sity (OD DSU) from 1996–1999.
In the 1990s, many social and political sci-
entists, in whose research Islam is not cen-
tral, turned to the study of modern Muslim
societies and communities in the post-Sovi-
et regions. Their work, however, is not al-
ways accurate from the methodological
point of view. Many of them share corrupt-
ed positivist and orientalist concepts and re-
search methods which need to be criticized.
Post-Soviet Islam is often interpreted as a
‘revival’ of unchanged ‘local traditions’, able
to resist any Soviet innovation. The most
eminent advocates of this concept include:
Prof. Alexander Bennigsen (deceased), spe-
cialist in Soviet studies; his daughter Dr M.
Bennigsen-Broxup; and Prof. S.P. Polyakov
(DH MSU), the author of Traditionalism in the
Modern Central Asian Society, published in
Russian in 1989 and soon published in Eng-
lish in the USA. Some authors ignore prima-
ry sources including numerous field and ar-
chival data, while basing themselves on in-
correct official materials. Both of these
faults can be found even in accurate writ-
ings of contemporary political scientists
such as Islam in the History of Russia, by Prof.
R.G. Landa (IOS, 1995) and the Muslim World
of the CIS Countries by Dr A.V. Malashenko
(the Moscow branch of Carnegie Endow-
ment, 1996).
Much more fruitful seem to be the ap-
proaches of Russian historians and anthro-
pologists exploring the fate of Muslim socie-
ties and communities under Russian and So-
viet reforms. For instance, Dr S.N. Abashin
(IEA) studies forms of popular Islam in Soviet
and modern Central Asia by proposing to
look not so much at Muslim traditions sur-
viving under the state, but at those consti-
tuted through state reforms. Dr A.A.Yarlyka-
pov from the school of the late Prof. V.N. Bas-
ilov (IEA) argued in his doctoral dissertation
on ‘Islam among the Steppe Nogays in the
2 0t h century’, defended in June 1999, that
the Soviet reforms caused the formation of
opposed ethno-religious groups including
so-called ‘Wahhabis’. Works on ‘Russian Is-
lam’ presented by the above-mentioned
scholars were integrated with the Islamicists’
studies in the lexicon Islam on the Territory of
the Former Russian Empire, initiated by Prof.
Prozorov from St. Petersburg in 1998. This is
a fascinating project that is to bring together
different specialists in Islamic studies in an
attempt to understand Islamic civilization in
Russia and its relationship to the Muslim
world. The lexicon follows research princi-
ples of the encyclopaedic lexicon, I s l a m,
published in Moscow in 1991. It will include
three or more issues, two of which have just
been published and the following fascicle
will be compiled in 2000.
It is difficult to know how Islamic studies will
develop in post-Soviet Russia in the future.
But it is clear that a new era has begun,
which is characterized by the expansion of
the existing work and the development of
new interdisciplinary programmes. New re-
search bodies such as the Centre for Arabic
studies (CAS), headed by Prof. V.V. Naumkin,
and the Centre for Civilizational and Region-
al Studies (CCRS), under the direction of Dr
I.V. Sledzevski, were founded within the
Academy of Sciences in Moscow. While the
CCRS concentrates on political studies in
modern post-Soviet areas, the CAS has
three main purposes: publication and trans-
lation of Arabic manuscripts, research on
pre-modern Islam and Sufism, and studies
in urgent political issues in the other post-
Soviet Muslim areas. The CAS cooperates in
its research missions with colleagues in St.
Petersburg and Moscow. Its recent works,
such as a case study by Dr D. Makarov on the
introduction of Sharia court in a Dagestani
Wahhabi community (see: ISIM Newsletter,
1/1998), contribute significantly to a deeper
understanding of the various forms of post-
Soviet Islam. ♦
This article is an adopted version of a paper given at
the Summer Academy of the Working Group
Modernity and Islam. (See page 4).
Dr Vladimir Bobrovnikov is a senior research fellow 
at the Institute for Oriental Studies, Moscow, 
and a teacher of Arabic and anthropology at the
Russian State University of Humanities in Moscow. 
E-mail: depcis@orientalia.ac.ru 
Islam on the territory of the former Russian empire,
lexicon. The 1s t issue edited in Russian 
by Prof. S.M. Prozorov. Moscow, V o s t o c h n a y a
L i t e r a t u r a, 1998.
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D M G
A N G E L I K A  N E U W I R T H
The Orient Institute, with its centre in Beirut and a
branch in Istanbul, is the only German research insti-
tution in the field of Near Eastern and Islamic Stud-
ies situated in the Middle East. Its aim is to under-
take, initiate and support research in all fields of Ori-
ental studies, particularly those focusing on its host
countries, Lebanon and Turkey. Its objectives have
always been broad, ranging from linguistic studies
on Arab regional dialects via historico-philologic re-
search on Muslim theology and Classical Arabic, Per-
sian and Ottoman/Turkish literatures up to develop-
ments in contemporary thought and intellectual
movements. In recent years the study of the dynam-
ics conditioning contemporary Near Eastern socie-
ties, particularly the rebuilding process in Lebanon
and the challenge of Turkey’s integration into Eu-
rope, have occupied a central position within the In-
stitute’s research projects. 
The Orient Institute
in Beirut and Istanbul
The initial task of the Institute at the time of
its foundation was to promote basic re-
search in the fields of Arabic, Turkish, and
Semitic language studies, Islamic studies,
and the study of the Christian Orient. Since
then Oriental scholarly work on the region
has shifted in focus and expanded signifi-
cantly in contents and method. Besides tra-
ditional philological and historical work,
which is continued, the Institute today also
hosts scientific activities ranging from social
anthropology, political and social sciences
to methodologies of modern literary criti-
cism. 
The Orient Institute pursues diverse re-
search projects supervised by the director
and by fellows of the Institute. In addition, it
provides visiting researchers and students
with scientific, documentary, administrative
and accommodation services. Research re-
sults are regularly presented in public lec-
tures given in English, French or Arabic as
well as in the framework of conferences and
symposia which are organized by the Insti-
tute in order to enhance the scientific com-
munication between Lebanese and Turkish
colleagues and their counterparts abroad.
They are also presented summarily in the In-
stitute’s yearbooks, the Beiruter Blaetter a n d
the Istanbuler Almanach.
History and Locations
The Institute, established in 1961 in Beirut
by the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesell-
schaft (DMG), was to serve as a regional
base for Oriental studies. Its founding direc-
tor, Prof. Dr Hans R. Roemer, in choosing
Beirut as the location, was led by the convic-
tion that ‘the experiences which have been
made in previously founded institutions,
and the flourishing of Oriental Studies at
German universities in the past years, have
made it imperative to establish a permanent
“embassy” in one of the cultural capitals of
the Orient.’ His choice proved to be wisely
taken; the Institute was to flourish during
the following fifteen years, until the
Lebanese Civil War made work in the city
more and more difficult and eventually im-
possible. 
The Institute continued to function even
during the Civil War until in 1987 its German
staff was forced to leave the town due to the
beginning hostage crisis. Leaving a number
of faithful Lebanese staff members behind
in Beirut, the German researchers moved to
Istanbul. Here they established themselves
in an apartment in the quarter of Cihangir,
which was initially meant to be no more
than a temporary refuge. However, since
the war continued the provisional refuge in
the course of time consolidated itself, devel-
oping into an active branch for Turkish, Ot-
toman and Central Asian studies. When in
1994, finally, the Beirut centre was re-
opened and part of the German scientific
staff returned to Lebanon, the Istanbul
branch proved vital enough to subsist. It
subsequently gained standing in its acade-
mic environment through long-term re-
search projects initiated together with Euro-
pean and Turkish partners as well as inter-
national symposia on various topics. In view
of these structural achievements and in
view of the dimensions of its library – highly
estimated by local and foreign researchers
specialized in Ottoman and Turkish Studies
– the German Government in 1998 decided
to establish the Istanbul centre as a perma-
nent branch of the Orient Institute.
The Beirut branch of the Institute is situat-
ed in a mid-19t h-century mansion erected by
a prominent Beiruti family on a vast garden
plot in Zokak al-Blat, which was then one of
the emerging suburban quarters of Beirut.
Today this quarter has become a traditional
S h ici residential area right next to the newly
rebuilt city centre of the Lebanese capital. In
Istanbul, the Institute occupies four stories in
an apartment building in Cihangir, not far
from Taksim square and overlooking the
B o s p h o r u s .
Current Status and Library
The Institute has always aimed at present-
ing the achievements of German and inter-
national scholarship to Arab colleagues and
academic institutions and thus to enhance
the relations between German and European
scholars and their Arab counterparts. Today
this task has been widened to encompass
similar work in Turkey.
Apart from the director and the library
staff, four research fellows are working at the
Institute in Beirut and three others in Istan-
bul. A number of cooperators, whose work is
financed by the European Community and
various scientific foundations, have joined
them so as to make interdisciplinary work
and long-term research projects possible.
The Institute grants three annual scholar-
ships for PhD students to continue their stud-
ies at the Institute and benefit from its infra-
structure. The Institute also offers internships
for young graduate students (e.g. in library
work, publication projects and research).
The most important asset of the Institute is
its library, which contains approximately
120,000 volumes in Beirut and 25,000 in Is-
tanbul. Since the foundation of the Institute
in 1961, the most important books and peri-
odicals published in Beirut and in other cen-
tres of the Arab world (as well as later in
Turkey) have been accessioned. Although
the Institute does not have a manuscript col-
lection, it has had the opportunity to buy a
number of private libraries and collections so
that the library stock may include a great
number of volumes published well before
the 60s. The Arabic and Turkish collections
are complemented by literature in European
languages on the fundamental topics of ori-
entalist research. 
Both libraries in Beirut and Istanbul are
open to the public and attract a great num-
ber of local readers. The Institute is currently
computerizing its collection and planning to
make the catalogue accessible on the Inter-
n e t .
P r o j e c t s
Projects carried out at the Institute and/or
pursued by members of the Institute in co-
operation with partner institutions are as
f o l l o w s :
– ’Vie commune – mémoire partagée – Le
Liban laboratoire de la Méditerranée’
( o n collective memory; in cooperation
w i t h CERMOC, Beirut);
– ‘Le nationalisme turc face á l’Europe’
( o n culturalist movements and the
problem of Turkey’s integration into
Europe; in cooperation with IFEA,
I s t a n b u l ) ;
– ‘Cultural Self-assertion of the Palestinians:
Survey of Modern Palestinian Poetry’;
– (In preparation): ‘Zokak al-Blat – a Beiruti
quarter – its urban structure and its
h i s t o r y ’ ;
– ‘The Beginning of Book Printing in the
Arab Near East’ (in cooperation with
various Lebanese libraries, archives and
Monasteries); and
– (In preparation): ‘Levant as a paradigm.
T h e co-existence of cultures in the
Eastern Mediterranean’ (in cooperation
with various German and Lebanese
u n i v e r s i t i e s ) .
P u b l i c a t i o n s
The two main publication series of the
Orient Institute are the Bibliotheca Islamica
a n d Beiruter Texte und Studien. The B i b l i o-
theca Islamica (BI) was established as early
as 1926 by Helmut Ritter in Istanbul to facil-
itate the printing of Arabic text editions
prepared by German scholars. The series in-
cludes important texts such as al-A s hca r i ’ s
Maqalat al-islamiyin and encyclopaedias
like al-Safadi’s al-Wafi bi-l-wafayat. Today
editions are prepared by both European
and Arab editors. Beiruter Texte und Studien
(BTS) was established in the early 60s im-
mediately after the foundation of the Ori-
ent Institute in Beirut meant to provide a
forum for studies in linguistics, history, Is-
lamic theology and Arabic literature au-
thored mainly by the members and fellows
of the Institute. Together both series come
up to more than 100 published volumes in
four languages. By now, three sub-series
have been established: Türkische Welten,
Iranische Welten in Istanbul and C h r i s t l i c h -
orientalische Welten in Beirut.
The Institute produces an annual periodi-
cal, the Beiruter Blätter, presenting short aca-
demic and journalistic articles in German
and English on social and intellectual devel-
opments in Beirut and Lebanon and giving
an overview of the Institute’s annual activi-
ties. An analogous yearbook is published
under the title Istanbuler Almanach by the Is-
tanbul branch of the Institute. A number of
lectures given at the Orient Institute appear
as booklets in the Zokak el-Blat(t) series of
occasional papers published in Beirut and
P e r a - B l ä t t e r, published in Istanbul. Recent
book publications of the Orient Institute in-
clude, amongst others:
– BTS 75 Türkische Welten 5: Tobias
Heinzelmann, Die Balkankrise in der
osmanischen Karikatur. 1999, 290pp.
– BTS 72: Stephan Guth, Priska Furrer, 
J. Christoph Bürgel (eds), C o n s c i o u s
Voices. Concepts of Writing in the Middle
E a s t. 1999. XXI, 332pp. 
– BTS 69: Thomas Scheffler, Hélène Sader,
Angelika Neuwirth (eds), Baalbek: Image
and Monument, 1898-1998. 1998. XIV,
3 4 8 p p .
– BTS 67 Türkische Welten 3: Günther
Seufert, Politischer Islam in der Türkei.
Islamismus als symbolische Repräsentation
einer sich modernisierenden muslimischen
G e s e l l s c h a f t. 1997. 600pp.
– BTS 61: Barbara Finster, Christa Fragner,
Herta Hafenrichter (eds), Rezeption in der
islamischen Kunst. 1999. 332pp.
Forthcoming publications include,
amongst others:
– BTS 64: Angelika Neuwirth, Sebastian
Guenther, Birgit Embalo, Maher Jarrar
(eds), Myths, Historical Archetypes and
Symbolic Figures in Classical and Modern
Arabic Literature. 
– BTS 74: Carsten Walbiner, Bernhard
Heyberger, Albrecht Fuess (eds), L e s
Européens vus par les Libanais à l’époche
o t t o m a n e .
– BTS 76: Thomas Scheffler (ed), R e l i g i o n
Between Violence and Reconciliation.
– BTS 77: Angelika Neuwirth, Andreas
Pflitsch (eds), Crisis and Memory in Islamic
S o c i e t i e s.
– BTS 79: Patrick Franke, Begegnungen mit
Khidr. Quellenstudien zum Imaginären im
I s l a m.
– BTS 82 Türkische Welten 6: Günther
Seufert, Jacques Waardenburg (eds),
Turkish Islam and Europe. ♦
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C E R M O C
E L I Z A B E T H  P I C AR D
The Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Moyen-
Orient Contemporain (CERMOC) is among the young-
est of several French research centres devoted to the
Middle East and the Arab world, from Teheran to
Rabat. It is based in Beirut with a research unit in
Amman. First founded in 1977, CERMOC was closed
in 1985 following the kidnapping of its researcher
Michel Seurat in Beirut and was reopened after the
Lebanese war in 1990.
Social Sciences
R e s e a r c h
on the Arab Mashrek
CERMOC is dedicated to conducting social
sciences research (from urban studies to an-
thropology, including sociology, political
science, geography, economy and even
contemporary history) on five Mashrek
countries: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine
and Syria.
Production of a thorough
k n o w l e d g e
With a rather light set up – a team of about
a dozen permanent researchers, a library of
20,000 volumes and an editor working with a
local printing house – CERMOC has published
since its reopening in 1990 some thirty books,
while its researchers and associate research-
ers have published four to five times more ar-
ticles. The Centre thus consistently contrib-
utes to the scientific knowledge of the Middle
East, particularly of the three countries where
its researchers are based – Lebanon, Jordan
and Palestine.
In Lebanon, in spite of the Arabization and
Anglicization processes, CERMOC has suc-
ceeded in being present on the editorial
stage. In 1999 only, four new books presented
four types of research developed by the Cen-
tre:
– The proceedings of the Euro-Arab confer-
ence held at CERMOC in June 1997 under
the direction of Jean Hannoyer: Guerres
civiles. Economies de la violence, dimensions
de la civilité, Karthala – CERMOC;
– A thorough study of urbanist questions in
post-war Beirut by a CERMOC researcher,
Elie El-Achkar: Réglementation et formes ur-
baines. Le cas de Beyrouth;
– The translation of a German geography
classic written by Helmut Ruppert under
the title, Beyrouth, une ville d’Orient marquée
par l’Occident; and
– The results of collective research conducted
by CERMOC in 1997-1998 within the frame-
work of a French-German programme fi-
nanced by the European Union: Reconstruc-
tion et Réconciliation au Liban. Négociations,
lieux publics et renouement du lien social.
In Jordan, before the opening of CERMOC’s
research unit, French publication on this
country within the social sciences was hardly
developed. The book Amman, ville et société
directed by Jean Hannoyer and Seteney
Shami (1996) came as a momentous event.
In 1999, three new books have been pub-
lished (or are forthcoming):
– Issue 5-6 of the journal Jordanies, dedicated
to the Jordanian election of 1997;
– The proceedings of a conference held at the
Institut du Monde Arabe (Paris) in June
1997, edited by Tareq Tell, State and Politics
in Jordan, 1946-1996; and
– A book directed by Riccardo Bocco, Le Roy-
aume hachémite de Jordanie: identités so-
ciales, politiques de développement et con-
struction étatique, 1946-1996, based on sem-
inars held at the CERMOC.
In Palestine, the editorial production of CER-
MOC’s team hosted by the Law Institute of Bir
Zeit University confirms the new role of the
Centre:
– Maghreb-Machrek #162 (Paris), edited by
Bernard Botiveau, which contains a dozen
articles by Palestinian and European schol-
ars who studied at Bir Zeit and is entirely
dedicated to Palestine;
– The book written by Bernard Botiveau him-
self, L’Etat palestinien, Paris: Sciences Po;
and
– The Cahier du CERMOC #22, by Jean-
François Legrain: Les Palestines du quotidien,
which deals with the Palestinian legislative
elections of 1996.
With the participation of CERMOC researchers
in workshops and conferences abroad and
the output of documentary notes (about 10 in
the past three years) and expertise reports,
the Centre has become a legitimate member
of the local scientific community. Through
public conferences, it is known to a broader
public – as evidenced by various briefs in the
local press as well as by the results of the poll
carried out in Beirut in 1998.
Training for research
CERMOC carries out specific functions in re-
lation with other French teaching and re-
search institutions devoted to the Middle East
such as the Groupe de Recherches et d’Etudes
sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain (GREM-
MO) in Lyon, the Institut de Recherches et d’E-
tudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman in Aix-
en-Provence, and URBAMA in Tours.
Social science training in the field of Middle
East studies requires a long-term stay in the
region and the learning of Arabic – add to this
the difficulties related to the international sit-
uation and the nature of several political sys-
tems in the region.
CERMOC’s role is to offer an opportunity to
make this intellectual investment in a produc-
tive manner, thanks to contacts with local re-
search, research seminars and the supervision
of senior researchers. CERMOC provides a few
research allocations, and supports applica-
tions which fall within its collective pro-
grammes. In 1998, many scholarships were
granted: 5 Lavoisier, 1 from the city of Lyon, 1
Michel Seurat scholarship, 1 from the Flor-
ence European Institute and 4 scholarships
from the French Ministry of National Educa-
tion. Also, in Beirut, Amman and Bir Zeit, doz-
ens of European and Arab students receive
each year accommodation and academic
support from the Centre. 
In October 1998, CERMOC organized, to-
gether with the Maison Méditerranéenne des
Sciences de l’Homme in Aix-en-Provence, a
doctorate school in Beirut for 18 PhD stu-
dents from Europe and the Arab world. The
Centre is planning another session in cooper-
ation with the Lebanese University.
When investigating the ensuing careers of
CERMOC researchers, one finds a majority
holding responsibilities in the Middle East or
in institutions related to the region: research,
diplomacy, and civil service. 
Cooperation amongst French,
European, and Arab
r e s e a r c h e r s
CERMOC is not just a stimulating institu-
tion for students; the list of scholars who
have been hosted by the Centre shows that
beyond the use of equipment and lodging
(3 rooms in Amman, 5 in Beirut) academics
rightfully consider CERMOC as a support
and a mediator on behalf of the local scien-
tific community. It is a place where scholars
from various universities and disciplines
converge for seminars and conferences as
well as library research, as affiliation to the
CERMOC is considered a pledge of scientific
requirement and freedom.
Two formulas have been privileged by
CERMOC in order to institutionalize and pro-
mote cooperation between French and Eu-
ropean researchers and local researchers:
cooperation agreements, on the one hand,
and bilateral or multilateral research pro-
jects, on the other.
Cooperation agreements
This policy came into being with the sig-
nature of a cooperation convention with
the University of Provence (France). It in-
cludes the hosting of Aix-en-Provence stu-
dents at CERMOC and of Arab students in
Aix, the organization of the 1998 joint doc-
torate school and of a conference on ‘Les
représentations de la Méditerranée’ in Beir-
ut, and other future projects.
A general convention with the University
of Bir Zeit, acting on behalf of the Law Insti-
tute, was signed in October 1998. As part of
this convention, a senior researcher be-
longing to the Centre National de la Re-
cherche Scientifique (CNRS, France) heads a
research seminar in French and Arabic and
supervises several French speaking PhD
students in Bir Zeit. There will be exchange
students from and at both institutions. A
first round of negotiation with the Presi-
dent of Aleppo University showed willing-
ness to cooperate with CERMOC in the near
f u t u r e .
Bilateral and multilateral
research projects
Being a French academic institution
based in the Middle East, CERMOC plays a
central part in several cooperation projects
between scientists from both sides of the
Mediterranean. Various formulas are adopt-
ed to meet administrative and legal require-
ments. 
– CERMOC may cooperate with a local re-
search unit. That is the case with the Cen-
tre de Recherches en Sciences Sociales at
the Lebanese University, in the framework
of CERMOC’s project on ‘Municipalités et
pouvoirs locaux au Liban’; or it may coop-
erate with the Institute for Palestine Stud-
ies in the framework of its research project
‘L’UNRWA, une histoire dans l’Histoire’.
– CERMOC has developed a joint research
project with the GREMMO in Lyon, the In-
stitut des Sciences Sociales at the Leba-
nese University, and Cairo University on
‘Nouveaux médias et le marché de l’image
dans l’Orient arabe’.
– CERMOC is coordinator of a project pre-
pared with professors from the University
of Balamand and the Lebanese University
on ‘Usages et méthodes de l’Histoire orale
au Liban’ with a final conference planned
in fall 2000.
A regional dimension
Most of the current research at CERMOC is
devoted to local or domestic questions and
conducted by highly specialized scholars.
However, scientific concerns as well as social
and political realities require a broader view.
The understanding of societies, lands and
powers must be sought at the regional level
according to a pervasive cultural and historic-
al heritage: Lebanon is not a self-contained,
detached land, but rather the ‘laboratory’ of
the Mediterranean Near East. Jordan stands
as the witness of regional changes and Pales -
tine is at the heart of regional recompositions.
Thus, in view of CERMOC’s limited means, the
Centre works constantly under tension be-
tween local specific and regional thematic re-
search.
To keep the coherence of the team, the re-
search programme ‘UNRWA, une histoire
dans l’Histoire’ has been confined to Jordan
and Palestine, which means that a compara-
tive work on Syria and Lebanon as well as a re-
gional synthesis remain to be done. In the
programme ‘Municipalités et pouvoirs lo-
caux’, the CERMOC elected to start research
on the case of Lebanon. A comparative di-
mension is introduced by a case study on Pal-
estinian municipalities. Nevertheless, this
programme is conceived on the regional
scale, research in Syria and in Jordan both be-
ing possible and desirable in order to produce
a documented study on local politics in the
four countries of the Arab Eastern Mediterra-
nean. The multilateral research project ‘Nou-
veaux médias et marché de l’image dans l’Ori-
ent arabe’ has been conceived with the par-
ticipation of international partners, and has
been devised in a regional perspective from
the very start, for the project is to attempt to
grasp the material and immaterial flows
which permeate the region and link it to the
rest of the world. ♦
Current information about CERMOC facilities,
collective and individual research programmes, 
and publications can be found at:
w w w . l b . r e f e r . o r g / c e r m o c
Elizabeth Picard is director of CERMOC.
E-mail: cermocd@lb.refer.org
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For more information please contact:
The Institute of Ismaili Studies
42-44 Grosvenor Gardens
London SW1W 0EB, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 207 881 6000
Fax: +44 207 881 6040
Professor Azim Nanji is director of the IIS, London, UK.
E-mail: pa_director@iis.ac.uk
For more information please visit our website:
w w w . c m c u . n e t
The Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding,
Georgetown University
37 & O Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20057
Tel: +1 202-687-8375 
Fax: +1 202-687-8376 
E-mail: cmcu0001@gunet.georgetown.edu
John L. Esposito is director of the Center for Muslim-
Christian Understanding and professor of Religion




A ZI M  N A N J I
The Institute of Ismaili Studies (IIS) aims at promot-
ing scholarship and learning on Islam in the context
of civilizational studies in general. Utilizing all rele-
vant modern disciplines, it encourages research into
Islamic history, with particular reference to its signif-
icance for the Muslim societies in contemporary
times. While the IIS’ interests encompass the Muslim
world as a whole, it pays particular attention to
Shi’ism and to Ismailism due to the relative neglect
of these fields in modern Islamic scholarship.
The Institute of Ismaili  Studies
Founded in 1977 by His Highness Prince
Karim Aga Khan, who also serves as the
Chairman of its Board of Governors, the IIS
has grown from an educational establish-
ment to a recognized academic centre of
learning on Shi’ism and Ismailism.
The Institute’s programmes and activities
are informed by the full range of diversity
within Islam and explore the relationship of
religious ideas to broader dimensions of so-
ciety and culture. Particular attention is giv-
en to issues of modernity and ethics that
arise as Muslims seek to relate their herit-
age to contemporary circumstances.
The Institute’s diverse constituencies in-
clude scholars and students of Islam and Is-
mailism, universities and educational es-
tablishments, as well as the Ismaili Commu-
nity. Reflecting these diverse constituen-
cies, the IIS collaborates with several prom-
inent institutions of learning in the West
and in the Muslim world. It also maintains
close affiliation with the Aga Khan Develop-
ment Network.
The Department of Academic Research
and Publications (DARP) facilitates original
research and publications of works by its
faculty as well as scholars from outside the
Institute. These fall into several different
categories such as occasional papers, mon-
ographs, editions, translations, conference
proceedings, bibliographical works and Is-
maili studies. 
Recent publications include:
– Nasir al-Din Tusi’s spiritual autobiography,
Contemplation and Action (edited and
translated by S.J. Badakhshani, 1998); 
– Farhad Daftary’s A Short History of the Is-
mailis: Traditions of a Muslim Community
(Edinburgh University Press, 1998); and 
– Aziz Esmail’s occasional paper on The Po-
etics of Religious Experience: the Islamic
Context (1998). 
The IIS Graduate Programme in Islamic
Studies and Humanities involves teaching
by an international faculty of distinguished
scholars, including members of DARP. At-
tracting students from diverse backgrounds
and regions – from Central Asia to North
America – the programme prepares individ-
uals for important roles in academic, public
and community life. Former students have
gone on to obtain Master’s and PhD degrees
from the Universities of Oxford and Cam-
bridge, the School of Oriental and African
Studies and the University of Edinburgh,
among others. In addition, the Institute of-
fers scholarships for post-graduate studies
in pertinent fields and organizes seminars
and conferences on themes of contempora-
ry relevance.
The Department of Education produces
teaching and learning materials on Islamic
education. It is guided by a two-fold objec-
tive. On the one hand, it aims to make the
religious, cultural and historical traditions of
Islam available to young Muslims. On the
other, it draws upon modern principles of
education and technology to make religious
learning a creative and appealing process
for the young mind, commensurate with ad-
vances in other branches of learning. In so
doing, it faces the challenges of how to un-
derstand and present Islamic culture in a
way that narrows and overcomes the gap
between secular and religious learning; how
to relate modern principles of child-centred
and experiential learning with allegiance to
a given historical and religious tradition;
how to reconcile the development of the in-
dividual with moral responsibility to society;
and how to bridge intellectual development
with spiritual life and ethics. The depart-
ment’s materials are produced in eight dif-
ferent languages (English, French, Arabic,
Persian, Tajiki, Urdu, Gujarati and Portu-
guese) and aim to meet a diversity of cultur-
al contexts.
Supporting all these programmes is the IIS
Library, which has one of the most valuable
and comprehensive collections in the West-
ern world of manuscripts, books and audio-
visual materials relating to Ismaili studies in
particular. This collection serves as a major
resource centre for scholars and students,
and aspires to become the most significant
central archive of Ismaili materials in the
w o r l d . ♦
C M C U
J O H N  L .  E S P O S I T O
The Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding: His-
tory and International Affairs (CMCU) was estab-
lished in 1993 by Georgetown University and the
Fondation pour l’Entente entre Chrétiens et Musul-
mans, Geneva, to foster the study of Muslim-Chris-
tian relations and to promote dialogue between the
two great religions. The Center focuses on the histor-
ical, theological, political and cultural encounter of
Islam and Christianity, the Muslim world and the
West. Located in the Edmund A. Walsh School of For-
eign Service at Georgetown University, the Center
combines teaching at the undergraduate and gradu-
ate levels, research and public affairs activities.
The Center for Muslim-Christian
U n d e r s t a n d i n g :
History and International Affairs
The establishment of the Center for Muslim-
Christian Understanding reflects the role of
religion in the contemporary international
system. Both Georgetown’s Catholic-Jesuit
heritage and its location in Washington have
shaped the University’s abiding interest in
the study of religion and international rela-
tions. The global presence and impact of Is-
lam is a fact of international life. Understand-
ing this fact, relating it to other dimensions
of world affairs and to the role of Christianity
in the world is a central concern of the Cen-
ter’s programmes.
Certificate and MA
P r o g r a m m e
Courses on Islam and the history of Mus-
lim-Christian relations are offered for un-
dergraduate and graduate students at the
University. The undergraduate ‘Certificate
in Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations’
places emphasis on the study of Islam as a
complement to the study of Western and
Christian traditions involved in core curric-
ulum requirements. The Master’s Degree in
Liberal Studies, with a specialization in ‘Is-
lam and Muslim-Christian Relations’ was
created to foster a better understanding of
Islam and Muslim-Christian relations. Stu-
dents focus on the present conditions un-
der which Muslims and Christians interact
on a global scale and in societies like the
United States. The MA also offers coverage
of the broader historical experiences of the
Muslim and Christian communities as they
developed and interacted in the past four-
teen centuries.
Muslims in the American
Public Sphere
CMCU is currently undertaking a major re-
search project, funded by the Pew Charita-
ble Trusts, to examine the role and contribu-
tion of the Muslim community in American
public life. This three-year project intends
to: publish a volume on the participation,
contribution and role of the Muslim com-
munity in the American civic life; produce
two major reference books; implement a
two-stage national survey of Muslim com-
munities; and disseminate research findings
through workshops, regional seminars, a
national conference, newsletters and other
media. It will also develop a comprehensive
website as a search engine, research (sur-
vey) tool and resource, and organize an in-
tra-community dialogue with the nationally
recognized religious leadership. The princi-
ple investigators are: Zahid Bukhari and Su-
layman Nyang; and the coordinator is John
L. Esposito.
Research and Public Affairs
The Center’s research and public affairs ac-
tivities seek to interpret Islam and the Mus-
lim world for the diverse communities in
Washington involved in international rela-
tions and the Muslim world. The focus of the
Center’s activities, both national and inter-
national in scope, is achieved through lec-
tures, symposia, international conferences
and extensive media coverage and publica-
tions (books, occasional papers, and mono-
graphs). The Center has sponsored or co-
sponsored more than 16 major conferences,
117 seminars, and 373 presentations in more
than 20 countries in Africa, Europe, the Mid-
dle East, Asia and the United States. Alto-
gether, the Center’s core faculty has pub-
lished more than 50 books and 200 articles,
including such works as: The Oxford Encyclo-
pedia of the Modern Islamic World (4 vols.);
The Oxford History of Islam (forthcoming, Jan-
uary 2000); Islam, Gender and Social Change;
Muslims on the Americanization Path; I s l a m :
Continuity and Change in the Modern World;
a n d Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in
Islamic History. CMCU is co-publisher of the
journal Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations,
along with the Centre for the Study of Islam
and Christian-Muslim Relations, Birmingham
University, United Kingdom.
Recent and Upcoming Events
– ‘To be a European Muslim: Muslim
Identity in a non-Islamic Environment’ 
Guest Speaker: Tariq Ramadan, College of
Geneva and University of Fribourg
Georgetown University / 27 October 1999
– ‘The Message of Islam for Pluralist
S o c i e t i e s ’
Guest Speaker: Farid Esack, University
o f the Western Cape, South Africa
Georgetown University / 16 Nov. 1999
– ‘Religion and Secularism’
Co-sponsored with the Imam Khomeini
Education and Research Institute,
Q o m , Iran / Georgetown University
2–3 December 1999
– ‘Islam and the West’
Co-sponsored with the United Association
for Studies and Research, Inc.
Georgetown University
26–27 January 2000
– ‘International Workshop on Asian Islam in
the 21s t Century’ 
Co-sponsored with College of Islamic
Studies, Prince of Songkla University
Bangkok, Thailand
23–24 February 2000
– ‘Becoming American: Immigration and
Religious Life in the United States’
Co-sponsored with Hartford Seminary
Georgetown University
11–12 May 2000
CMCU’s faculty include: John L. Esposito, Di-
rector; John O. Voll, Deputy Director; Yvonne
Y. Haddad; and Amira El-Azhary Sonbol. The
Center has an endowed chair, the Malaysia
Chair of Islam in Southeast Asia. In addition,
the Center has had research associates and
fellows from countries around the world, in-
cluding Tajikistan, China, Bangladesh, Belar-
us, Lebanon, Egypt, Malaysia, United Arab
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, India and Sudan. ♦
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Univ er s i ty o f  Mal a ya
MO H D H A Z I M  S H A H  
The Second International Malaysian Studies Confer-
ence was held at the University of Malaya from 2-4
August 1999. It was attended by local participants
from Malaysia, as well as many from such countries
as the UK, Germany, Denmark, Japan, and the US.
The papers addressed issues relating to Malaysia,
particularly with regard to economics, politics, edu-
cation, culture, technology, and religion, especially
Islam. The following pertains to the sessions which
made most reference to Islam. The Conference as a
whole, however, was not confined to Islam.
Second International Malaysian
Studies Conference
C o m m u n i t i e s
Khoo Salma Nasution @ Khoo Su Nin, ‘Co-
lonial Intervention & Transformation of
Muslim Waqf Settlements in Urban Penang:
Case Study of Capitan Kling Mosque &
Acheen Street Mosque Waqf’, dealt with
waqf lands, endowments of the early mi-
grant Muslim communities in Penang. It was
expected that the descendents of the Mus-
lim leaders would continue to manage the
endowments. However, when British inter-
vention in the administration of these lands
began in the early 20t h century, contradic-
tions between Islamic laws on w a q f and the
British laws resulted in years of legal dis-
putes. 
Abdur-Razzaq Lubis, in his paper on ‘The
Mandailing Role in Malaysian History’ dis-
cussed ethnic Mandailing, a minority group
in both Malaysian and Indonesian history,
and examined the question of ‘who the
Mandailing are’ on a historical basis.
Timo Kortteinen, in his paper on ‘Social Hi-
erarchies in Flux: Change of Social Organiza-
tion in Kuala Selangor’, studied the develop-
ment and social changes in a small town-
ship – Kuala Selangor, which in a way re-
flects social change in Malaysia as a whole.
Research in Islam
This presentation session began with
Maznah Mohammad’s summary of her pa-
per on ‘Democratization and Islamic Family
Law Reform in Malaysia’. According to Maz-
nah, the Islamization in Malaysia includes Is-
lamic Family Law, which is debated on by
two parties, modernist UMNO and the con-
servative PAS. In the context of women’s is-
sues, UMNO promotes human and gender
rights. PAS did so also but did not empha-
size the gender rights as UMNO had done. In
her opinion, women’s issues will be promot-
ed by both parties in the coming elections,
an important determinant of the design of
future Islamization.
Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan presented a
paper on ‘Surau and The Urban Ummat: The
Case of Bandar Baru Bangi’. She began by
listing factors that influenced the revival of
the s u r a u in urban areas in the 1970s. Her fo-
cus was on the activities of some s u r a us in
Bandar Baru Bangi, notably Surau An-Nur,
which was led by Dr Harun Din, Professor of
Islamic Law at UKM. Surau An-Nur was in-
volved in various activities, such as Islamic
education, welfare, prayer and donations.
The conclusion was that a s u r a u can be
transformed into an institution of learning
and preaching, depending on its resources
and management. 
Patricia A. Martinez, chairwoman of this
session, then presented a paper on ‘The
Possibilities in Tafsir and Istifsar for Islamic
Discourse in Malaysia’. She explored classic-
al t a f s i r methodology, giving her opinion on
its development in Malaysian society. She
held that i s t i f s a r contributes to the study of
t a f s i r in certain contexts. Therefore, ‘Malay-
sian T a f s i r ’ should emphasize both. She con-
cluded that the study of the Quran in Mus-
lim society, especially Malaysia, should not
reject the Western perspective totally since
much could be learned.
Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan also read As-
ma Lafir Beatrix’s paper entitled ‘Behind the
Veil: Islam in Malaysia and Tunisia’. 
Islam and Politics
This session, chaired by Prof Osman Bakar,
began with Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid’s pa-
per on ‘Political Dimension of Religious Con-
flict in Malaysia: State Response to an Islam-
ic Movement in the 1990s’. He focused on
the Darul Arqam movement, which was
banned by the government in 1994. He
claimed that the main reason for the ban
was political rather than religious, suggest-
ing that Darul Arqam challenged the gov-
ernment’s brand of Islamization.
Farish Noor presented a paper on ‘Forma-
tion of Political Frontiers between the gov-
ernment and Islamic Opposition during the
1998-1999 Political Crisis of Malaysia’. He
gave a chronology of the current situation
in Malaysian politics, which he feels is relat-
ed to past occurrences between the gov-
ernment and Islamic opposition. His main
focus was on the importance of political
idealism rather than r e a l p o l i t i k in the shap-
ing of Malaysian politics in the years to
come. 
Kikue Hamayotsu discussed the impact of
the Islamic reformist movement on the
process of nation-building in Malaysia. From
her point of view, the development of Islam-
ization in Malaysia was influenced by mod-
ernist leadership in UMNO as a ruling party. 
Wan Shawaluddin Hassan made a brief
summary of the Bosnian issues from the per-
spective of Malaysian government policy in
his paper entitled ‘Krisis Bosnia dan Dasar
Luar Malaysia’. In his opinion, the Malaysian
government involved itself in the Bosnian
Crisis based on several factors, the most im-
portant being to demonstrate to the world
the potential of Malaysia as a newly industri-
alized country. However, he did not deny
that the Islamic cause was a major reason
for Malaysia’s involvement in the crisis. ♦
The full original conference report was compiled 
by Mohd Hazim Shah (Chief Editor), Rogayah
Shariman, Wan Sharina, Chai Choon Lee, Badhrol
Ghulam Malik, Zuhdi Marsuki, and Liew Chin Tong.
See: www.malaysiakini.com/pssm
Dr Mohd Hazim Shah is associate professor 
at the Faculty of Sciences, University of Malaya.
E-mail: j8hazim@umcsd.um.edu.my
Susse x C entr e f o r Mi gr a t i on R ese ar c h
N A DJ E  A L - A L I
The literature on transnational migration has so far
mainly emerged in the context of labour migration to
the United States. The question arises if, and in how
far, existing theories and models revolving around
transnationalism can be applied to different historic-
al, cultural and political contexts, such as migration
within or to Europe, for example. The attempt to ap-
ply, critically examine and challenge existing notions
about transnational migration constituted an under-
lying goal in the first annual conference of the ESRC
Transnational Communities Programme. A specific
focus on the relationship between ‘migrant/refugee
communities’ and ‘home’ created the framework in
which to analyse the meaning and significance of
transnational practices and fields. 
New Approaches to Migration:
Transnational Communities and
t h e Transformation of Home
A focus on ‘transnational communities’ has
been widely heralded as an important new
approach to international migration. More
traditional approaches have tended to con-
ceive international migrants as exceptions to
the norm. Attention has been divided broad-
ly between the process of migration – em-
phasizing the importance of geographical
movement across international borders, and
the product of migration – emphasizing the
impacts of migrants on societies in which
they settle. In contrast, the transnational
communities approach conceives of interna-
tional migrants not as anomalies, but rather
as representative of an increasingly global-
ized world. It has refocused attention on the
utilization by international migrants of
modes of telecommunication and transport;
their pooling of resources and successful ex-
ploitation of global markets, and their associ-
ation with new social forms, political challen-
ges and cultural resources generated by link-
ages across several geographical locations.
The transnational communities conference
was hosted by the Sussex Centre for Migra-
tion Research, at the University of Sussex,
between 21-22 September. It was attended
by about 50 participants from an interna-
tional audience, 16 of whom presented pa-
pers. The conference was opened by Profes-
sor Robin Cohen (University of Warwick),
who located the conference theme in the
context of a century of migration studies.
The keynote speaker was Professor Michael
Smith (University of California, Davis), who
provided a critical overview of the relations
between globalization and transnational ur-
banism, paying particular attention to the
ways in which transnational networks and
circuits of social interaction intersect in par-
ticular places and in particular times. Smith
stressed the need to rethink the binary of lo-
cal stasis vs. global dynamics, thereby devel-
oping the notion of the ‘trans-local’ as a via-
ble alternative.
The remaining papers covered a wide
range of disciplines (anthropology, geogra-
phy, international relations, sociology and
political science), as well as case studies from
various geographical areas, i.e. Turkish and
Kurdish refugees in Germany, Moroccan mi-
grant women in Italy, Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon, Sudanese refugees in Cairo, Eritre-
an refugees in Germany and the UK, and Bos-
nian refugees in the Netherlands and the UK. 
The various papers were organized ac-
cording to three broad themes: 
– ‘Transnational communities and the
meaning of “home”’, which explored the
way that the concept of home is repro-
duced or transformed within the context
of emerging transnational practices; 
– ‘The implications of transforming homes
for transnational communities’ examined
the extent to which transformations in the
country of origin, i. e. war, economic crises,
peace, can impact upon the formation,
maintenance and even decline of transna-
tional communities; and
– ‘Transnational communities and the trans-
formation of home’ explored the capaci-
ties of migrant and refugee communities
in influencing or effecting transformations
in their countries of origin. 
The role of Islam in forging and maintaining
transnational networks and ties was high-
lighted in several conference papers. Nina-
Clara Tiesler (Department for Religious
Studies, University of Hannover, Germany)
explored theological conceptions of ‘home’
among elite European Muslims, thereby
shedding light on the cognitive relationship
between European Muslims and the ‘Islamic
world’. Other papers were more sociological
and anthropological in approach and gave
evidence to the ways in which the sense of
being a Muslim does not only transcend na-
tional boundaries but could also give birth
to transnational affiliations. This became
particularly apparent in Ruba Salih’s paper
about Moroccan migrant women in Italy
and Nadje Al-Ali’s paper about Bosnian refu-
gees in the UK and the Netherlands (both
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK).
Overall, the conference provided new and
interesting material derived from in-depth
case studies and provided a timely contribu-
tion to debates on transnational migration
by scholars working outside of North Amer-
ica. Many papers challenged the common
perception that transnational practices are
counter-hegemonic in nature and also took
issue with an oversimplified political eco-
nomic approach. Furthermore, the role of
the state in shaping, creating and hindering
transnational ties became apparent in dif-
ferent case studies. ♦
An edited collection of many of the papers presented
is currently being prepared for publication.
Dr Nadje Al-Ali is a research fellow at the Sussex
Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex,
Brighton, UK. E-mail: N.Al-Ali@sussex.ac.uk
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N o t e
* E.P. Wieringa, Catalogue of Malay and
Minangkabau Manuscripts in the Library of Leiden
University and other collections in the Netherlands;
Volume One comprising the acquisitions of Malay
manuscripts in Leiden University Library up to the
year 1896, edited by Joan de Lijster-Streef and Jan
Just Witkam, Leiden 1998.
Dr Nico J.G. Kaptein is coordinator of the Indonesian-
Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies, and
secretary of the Islamic Studies Programme at Leiden
University, the Netherlands.
E-mail: Nkaptein@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
B oo k pr esenta t i o n
N I C O J . G .  K A P T E I N  
For the study of Islam in the Malayo-Indonesian
world it is of the utmost importance to know what
kind of texts have been and are in circulation. As far
as printed Malay (and Arabic) texts are concerned, in
the last decade great progress has been made
through the publications of, among others, Virginia
Matheson and M.B. Hooker on Jawi Literature in Pat-
ani; Martin van Bruinessen on Kitab Kuning; and Ian
Proudfoot on early Malay printed books up to 1920.
In addition to knowledge of the availability and cir-
culation of printed texts, that of manuscripts is of
equal interest. Very important in this respect is the
recently published work by Teuku Iskandar, C a t a-
logue of Malay, Minangkabau, and South Sumatran




This brand-new catalogue by Teuku Iskan-
dar describes all Malay, Minangkabau, and
South Sumatran manuscripts (in r e n c o n g
and Lampung scripts) in the Netherlands,
and in sum comprises 2028 different items.
It consists of 1095 pages which are divided
over two separate volumes. Volume One
(in 748 pages) lists the holdings of the Lei-
den University Library (in sum 1571 items),
while Volume Two describes almost 500
other items, categorized according to the
institutions where they are kept, like the
Royal Institute for Anthropology and Lin-
guistics, Leiden; Royal Tropical Institute,
Amsterdam; Royal Household Archives,
The Hague; and eleven other institutions.
Moreover, this volume contains the bibli-
ography (pp. 957-985). Nine different in-
dexes of, amongst others, Titles, Authors,
Copyists, Geographical Names, and Water-
marks, conclude this voluminous work
( p p . 9 8 7 - 1 0 9 5 ) .
It is striking that a minor part of the items
described in the catalogue (pp. 1-106, to wit
259 items of the collection of the Leiden
University Library) was published by E.P.
Wieringa under the auspices of the Leiden
University Library in 1998. Although a me-
ticulous comparison between these two
catalogues is good for philologists, a num-
ber of differences and similarities are obvi-
ous. On the whole, the catalogue which was
published under the auspices of the Leiden
University Library is far more ambitious,
which is quite understandable from the per-
spective of the library. The biggest differ-
ence between both catalogues is the de-
scription of the collections of letters, which
Wieringa has described in detail, while Is-
kandar roughly indicates them (e.g. in order
to describe Cod. Or. 2229 – Cod. Or. 2242,
Wieringa takes almost 150 pp., whereas Is-
kandar limits himself to 5 pages only). Fur-
thermore, Wieringa gives more extensive
descriptions of the other items, and adds
more elaborate and up-to-date bibliograph-
ical references. A final obvious difference is
that the 1998 catalogue contains many
beautiful facsimile illustrations, while Iskan-
dar’s has none. On the other hand, Teuku Is-
kandar has followed a more humble cata-
loguing strategy: he has limited himself to
the basic data of each item which are, of
course, the same as in the corresponding
descriptions of Wieringa. This different
strategy has resulted in an easily managea-
ble and orderly catalogue, despite the enor-
mous amount of materials it opens up.
When browsing through Iskandar’s work,
one notices that the bulk of the described
items in one way or another is relevant to
the study of Islam: there are devotional trea-
tises; f i q h works; sermons; prayers; mystical
texts; s i l s i l as; narratives about the Prophets,
including the Prophet Muhammad; legal
contracts; theosophical treatises; religious
instruction literature; Malay adaptations of
Arabic originals; theological treatises; and
so forth. In other words, the work makes
abundantly clear what infinite variety there
has been (and still is) in Malay Islamic liter-
ary culture. In this respect, the catalogue of
Iskandar forms an important addition to
overviews of Malay literature, which usually
focus more on b e l l e s - l e t t r e s and tend to pay
less attention to Islamic literature. There has
always been a stream within the Western
tradition of Malay studies which regarded
much of the Malay Islamic writings as mere-
ly derivative of Middle Eastern originals, as
well as linguistically inferior as compared to
‘classical’ texts. As a result of this, many Mal-
ay religious writings were not considered
worthy of serious study, and consequently
did not figure in ‘comprehensive’ overviews
of Malay literature. With the help of the cat-
alogue of Teuku Iskandar, a more complete
picture can be drawn up of the entire Malay
literary production.
All in all, this work forms a most welcome
addition to the existing research tools for
the study of Malay religious literary culture.
Teuku Iskandar is merited with compiling a
valuable source which in a practical form
gives access to all Malay manuscripts in the
Netherlands. ♦
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Tel: +31 20 638 69 09 
Fax: +31 20 622 66 49
E-mail: mail@nieuwekerk.nl 
16 December 1999 – 24 April 2000
• Earthly splendour, celestial art.
Treasures from Islam. Persian
carpets, Indian miniatures and
jewellery are shown against a
background of ponds, fountains,
flowers and an aviary, recalling
Paradise as it is described in the
Qur’an. The exhibition is organized in
cooperation with the State
Hermitage St. Petersburg.
Dutch Centre for
E m b r o i d e r y
Spinveld 13a
4815 HR Breda
Tel: +31 76 520 1001
Tuesdays through Saturdays
1 October 1999 –
12 February 2000
• Oman: Textiles from the desert.
Den Haag
G e m e e n t e m u s e u m
Stadhouderslaan 41
2517 HV The Hague
Tel: +31 70 338 11 11
Continuing exhibition 
• Islamic crafts. A renewed exhibition
from its own collection, in particular
ceramics. Other objects illustrating
Islamic art.
T h e r m e n m u s e u m
Coriovallumstraat 9
6411 CA Heerlen
Tel: +31 45 560 45 81
3 October 1998 –
31 December 1999
• The Bathhouse. Bath culture in East





Tel: +31 58 212 30 01
10 April 1999 – 1 April 2000
• Veils and shawls, about clothing and
i d e n t i t y .
Rijksmuseum of
A n t i q u i t i e s
Rapenburg 28
2311 EW Leiden
Tel: +31 71 516 31 63
19 November 1999 –
19 March 2000
• Ritual and Splendour. A precious
collection, mainly of silver and
golden artefacts from ancient Egypt,
the Classical World and the Near
East. Collected by Ms. Mihoko
Koyama, the founder of the MIHO
MUSEUM (Shiga, Japan). 
Rotterdam Museum
o f E t h n o l o g y
Willemskade 25
3016 DM Rotterdam
Tel: +31 10 270 71 72 
Fax: +31 10 270 71 82 
E-mail: mediatheek@wereld-
m u s e u m . r o t t e r d a m . n l
• Due to renovations the Museum will
be closed until 26 November 2000.
I t will re-open with a permanent
exhibition of Islamic art from its




Tel/Fax: +31 53 3413788





Tel: +31 20 626 44 32
Fax: +31 20 626 44 33
• Contemporary art exhibitions by
artists from the Islamic world. 
L e c t u r e s / S o c i e t i e s
N e d e r l a n d s - A r a b i s c h e
K r i n g
S e c r e t a r i a t :
H. Zwaardecroonstraat 17




Tel: +31 30 231 95 53
E-mail: raz@casema.net 
• Organizes lectures and other
activities in five regional branches:
Amsterdam, The Hague, Groningen,
Nijmegen, and Utrecht. 
El Hizjra
Centre for Art and Culture
of the Arabian World
Singel 300A 
1016 AD Amsterdam
Tel: +31 20 420 05 68
15 October 1999 – 2 January 2000
• Literary Contest for everybody from
Moroccan or Arab origin. For further
inquiries ring or write to El Hizjra.
F R A N C E
E x h i b i t i o n s
Musée du Louvre
75058 Paris
Tel: +33 1 40 20 50 50
Fax: +33 1 40 20 54 42
E-mail: info@louvre.fr 
17 March – 29 May 2000
• Ottoman Calligraphy’s Collections of
the Sakip Sabanci Museum.
T h e exhibition presents around 70
works belonging to the collection
o f the Sapik Sabanci University in
Istanbul. They are all works by the
most famous calligraphers of the
period between the 15t h and early
2 0t h c e n t u r i e s .
Institut du Monde Arabe
1, Rue des Fosses St-Bernard
75236 Paris
Tel: +33 1 40 51 39 60/ 33 1 0 
19 October 1999 – 
27 February 2000
• Morocco, a way of life. Evoking the
magic of the places, discovering the
architecture of private houses, the
refined mosaics, the exhibition
resorts to the past without neglecting
certain aspects of the more
contemporary urban life. Music, films
and poetry try to recreate the specific
spheres of the vie citadine in
M o r o c c o .
18 October 1999 – 30 January
2 0 0 0
• Matisse in Morocco. Exhibition.
19 October 1999 – 
16 January 2000
• Les Ecrivains et ‘l’appel du Maroc’.
Source of inspiration for the
imagination and the literature of the
2 0t h century, Morocco has attracted
numerous writers such as Pierre Loti,
Henri de Montherlant, Paul Morand,
Paul Bowles, Juan Goytisolo, Elias
Canetti. Manuscripts, photographs,
documents, first editions, and
paintings testify to the continuing
role Morocco can play and serve as
sources of inspiration for the
imagination and the literature of our
t i m e .
G E R M A N Y
E x h i b i t i o n s
Vorderasiatisches Museum
Entrée Pergamonmuseum
M u s e u m i n s e l
Am Kupfergraben
B e r l i n - M i t t e
Tel: +49 30 2090 5401
7 May 1999 – 31 December 1999 
• 100 years Vorderasiatisches Museum.
An exhibition on the history of the
collection which includes world
famous works of art from the
Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian and
North Syria-East Anatolian regions.
15 May 2001 – 30 September 2001 
• Agatha Christie and the Orient
Museum of Islamic Art
M u s e u m i n s e l
Berlin – Mitte
Tel: +49 30 2090 5401
C o n t i n u i n g
• The continuing exhibition is dedicated
to the art of Islamic peoples from the
8t hto the 19t h centuries. The works of
art originate from an area stretching




Tel: +49 8301 438
9 June 1999 – 30 January 2000
• Al inssan – People of the desert in
Tunisia. Photographs by Claudia




Tel: +49 2166 9289 00 
Fax: +49 2166 9289 49
31 October – 31 December
• The Searose carpet, 21 yellow-
ground Konya rugs. The Caucasian
Alpan and the Elibelinde-Kelim are
shown from the Orient-Star





Tel: +49 7 1122 25 173
Fax: +497 1122 25 194
http://www.ifa.de 
C o n t i n u i n g
• Exhibitions and contemporary art
from the Middle East.
I R A N
E x h i b i t i o n s
Islamic Period Museum
T e h r a n
C o n t i n u i n g
• Continuing exhibition of e.g. Koranic
manuscripts, ceramics, metalwork
and textiles.
K U W A I T
E x h i b i t i o n s
Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah
M a h b o u l a
K u w a i t
Tel: +965 565 3006
C o n t i n u i n g
• Al-Sabah Collection of Islamic art.
R U S S I A
E x h i b i t i o n s
The State Hermitage
M u s e u m
St Petersburg
Tel: +812 110 9079 / 96 25 
Fax: +812 312 1550
w w w . h e r m i t a g e . r u
C o n t i n u i n g
• Art of the Near East is represented in
the Museum by an excellent
collection covering the 7t h t o 1 9t h
centuries which includes several
exquisite masterpieces.
T U R K E Y
E x h i b i t i o n s
The Museum of Turkish
and Islamic Art 
I s t a n b u l
C o n t i n u i n g
• Exhibition of Ottoman and Islamic
Art, Folk Art and Folk Life.
S I N G A P O R E
E x h i b i t i o n s
Asian Civilisations




• Calligraphy from the Tareq Rajab
Museum Kuwait. The Qur’an, Holy
Book for Muslims, was central to the
development of the art of beautiful
writing. In this exhibition is explored
the various scripts that developed
over the centuries and also
calligraphy as a decorative motif on
various media, such as ceramics and
m e t a l w o r k .
U N I T E D  K I N G D O M





Tel: +44 171 412 71 11
Fax: 44 171 3238614/8480
8 July 1999 – 14 February 2000
• Later Persian Paintings and Lacquer.
10 July 1999 – January 2000
• Cracking Codes: The Rosetta Stone
and Decipherment. This exhibition
about the decipherment of scripts
celebrates the bicentenary of the
discovery of the Rosetta Stone, the
‘most valuable relic of Antiquity’. The
Rosetta Stone constitutes the
remains of a stela inscribed with a
priestly decree for Ptolemy V (196BC)
in three scripts: hieroglyphic, a
cursive form of ancient Egyptian, and
ancient Greek.
7 September 1999 – 
30 January 2000
• Life & Ceremony in Urban Algeria.
This exhibition showing textiles,
clothes, jewellery and household
items is the result of a unique
collaboration between the Museum
of Art and Popular Tradition in
Algiers, the National Museum of
Ahmed Zabana in Oran and the
British Museum.
28 September 1999 – 
16 January 2000
• Bukhara and Beyond: Artefacts of
Uzbekistan and Photographs of
Edgar Knobloch. The photographs
and artefacts of Uzbekistan
concentrate on the Islamic history of
the region from the 8t h to the 19t h
centuries. The artefacts from the
museum’s permanent collection
include a striking jade cup inscribed
with the name of Ulugh Beg. Several
1 6t h-century Bukhara school
paintings are shown.
C o n t i n u i n g
• Continuing exhibition of the Oriental
collection. Its Islamic pottery is
considered the best outside the
Islamic world. 
Victoria and Albert
M u s e u m
Cromwell Road
London SW7 2RL
Tel: +44 171 938 8500 
http://www.vam.ac.uk 
C o n t i n u i n g
• The collection includes a rich
collection of Islamic metalwork. 
Egee Art Gallery
9 Chelsea manor studios
Flood Street
London SW3 5SR
Tel: +44 171 351 68 18
Fax: +44 171 376 85 10
www.egeeart.com 
C o n t i n u i n g
• Contemporary and antique Middle
Eastern Art.
Sony Gallery
25 Connaught Street Marble Arch
London W2
Tel/fax: +44 171 262 9101
www.sonigallery.com 
C o n t i n u i n g
• International contemporary art
especially from the Indo-Pak
subcontinent and the Arab World.
Ashmolean Museum
Beaumont Street
Oxford OX1 2PH UK
Tel: +44 1865 278000
Fax: +44 1865 278018
3 February – 2 April 2000
• Golden Pages: Qurans and Prayer
books from the H.E. Shaikh Ghasan I.
Shaker collection. 
U N I T E D  S T A T E S
E x h i b i t i o n s
Museum of Fine Arts
465 Huntington Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02115
Tel: +1 617 267 9300
14 November – 6 February 2000
• Pharaohs of the Sun: Akhenaten,
Nefertiti, Tutankhamen, captures the
revolutionary epoch known as the
Amarna Age (1353 to 1336 BC) when
the Pharaoh Akhenaten assumed the
throne of Egypt at its peak of
imperial glory. One of the most
important international
presentations of Egyptian art and
culture in recent decades.
The Art Museum,
Princeton University
P r i n c e t o n
New Jersey 08544-1018





1000 Fifth Avenue at 82n d Street 
New York, New York 10028 
Tel: +1 212 535 7710
16 September 1999 – 
2 January 2000
• The Nature of Islamic Ornament, Part
IV: Figural Representation. The fourth
in a four-part series on Islamic
ornament dating from the 9t h to the
1 8t h centuries. Some 25 objects are
drawn from the Metropolitan
Museum’s own collection to examine
the incorrect perception that figural
representation was never permitted
to appear in Islamic art.
16 September 1999 – 
9 January 2000
• Egyptian art in the Age of the
Pyramids. The exhibition spans the
3r d through the 6t h dynasties, the first
truly great era of Egyptian art. Some
200 works, from reliefs to furniture
and monumental sculpture, have
been assembled from museums in
the US and Europe.
From 19 October 1999 
• New Galleries for Ancient Near
Eastern Art. Newly renovated and
reinstalled, with natural light now
illuminating the Assyrian reliefs
within, these galleries house the
Museum’s outstanding collection of
Ancient Near Eastern art, including
sculpture, metalwork, ivories, seals,
and other objects dating from 8000
BC to AD 700 from ancient
Mesopotamia, Iran, and their
neighbours. 
14 September 1999 – 
23 January 2000
• Farouk Hosny/Adam Henein:
Contemporary Egyptian Artists and
Heirs to an Ancient Tradition.
Sculptures by Adam Henein and
paintings by Farouk Hosny – both
prominent artists working in
contemporary Egypt.
16 November 1999 – 
27 February 2000
• ’Only the Best’: Masterpieces of the
Calouste Gulbenkian Museum,
Lisbon. Born in Istanbul of Armenian
parentage, Calouste Sarkis
Gulbenkian (1869-1955) became a
pioneer in the international oil
industry, a philanthropist, and a
widely respected art collector. His
vast collection – which totalled some
5,000 works – included European
paintings ranging from the
Renaissance to Impressionism,
Egyptian sculpture, Roman medals,
Islamic ceramics and textiles,
illuminated manuscripts, 18t h-
century French furniture and silver,




Arthur M. Sackler Gallery 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
Tel: +1 617 495 9400
9 October 1999 – 2 January 2000 
• Letters in Gold: Ottoman Calligraphy
from the Sakip Sabanci Collection,
Istanbul. Calligraphy – the art of
beautiful writing – is the
quintessential visual art form of the
Islamic world. This exhibition features
approximately 70 exceptional works
of Islamic calligraphy, dating from
the 15t h through the early 20t h
centuries of Ottoman Turkey. 
9 October 1999 
through 2 January 2000 
• A Grand Legacy: Arts of the Ottoman
Empire. As a complement to Letters
in Gold, this exhibition examines the
grand legacy of Ottoman painting,
ceramics, textiles and metalwork,
using works from the permanent
collection at the Art Museums.
C o n t i n u i n g
• Harvard’s collection of Islamic and
later Indian art is small but magnifi-
cent. It comprises a broad range of
works, from Samanid pottery and
Mamluk calligraphy to Qajar lac-
quers and Ottoman textiles. Its mas-
terpieces include a group of minia-
tures from the extraordinary 14t h-
century Great Mongol (‘Demotte’)
Shahnama, the Safavid master Mir
Sayyid-’Ali’s Night-time in a Palace,
and the miniatures of the ‘pocket-
size’ Divan of Anvari produced for the
Mughal emperor Akbar. The depart-
ment also has one of the most impor-
tant representations of Rajasthani
painting in the world.
The Arthur M. Sackler




Tel: +1 202 357 2700 (voice)
357 1729
17 October 1999 – 
17 January 2000
• Treasures from the Royal Tombs of
Ur. More than 250 extraordinary
objects revealing traditions of royal
life and death – jewellery, musical
instruments, games, furniture, seals
and vessels – found in the tomb of a
woman who died between 2600 and
2500 BC.
17 November 1999 – 7 May 2000
• Imaging the Word: Selections of
Calligraphy from the Islamic World
presents some of the principal
calligraphic styles that have evolved
in the Islamic world from the 9t h t o
the 20t h centuries as they appear in
different media, from silk to agate
and parchment to steel. The selection
includes a folio from a minute, 9t h-
century Koran, a 15t h-century royal
wine cup from Iran, and
contemporary works exploring the
power of Arabic letters.
21 November 1999 – 28 May 2000
• Antoin Sevruguin (late 1830s–1933)
and the Persian Image includes 50
images of rulers, courtiers, and
commoners, and scenes of daily life
in Iran from the late 1870s to the
1 9 3 0 s .
21 November 1999 – 
28 February 2000
• Constructing Identities: Recent Works
by the Iraqi artist Jananne al-Ani
(b.1966). The exhibition presenting
Islamic life in photographs, looks at
some of the themes that also inspired
Sevruguin’s work – studio
portraiture, images of ‘exotic’ people,
and the construction of identities
through appearance. Two pairs of al-
Ani’s large-format photographs, five
pairs of transparencies, and a slide
show make up the gallery’s first one-
person exhibition by a contemporary
artist from the Islamic world. Her
evocative prints address a topical
issue – ‘orientalism’, and in particular
the ‘orientalist’ representation of
w o m e n .
C o n t i n u i n g
• Arts of the Islamic World. Some 60
works – Koran pages, metalwork,
ceramics, glass, paintings, and
calligraphy – from the 9t h to 17t h
centuries explore Islamic artistic
traditions. Themes include the forms
and functions of the works of art, the
role of calligraphy, the use of
figurative decoration, and the
meaning of abstract designs.
U N I T E D  N A T I O N S







• Museum International, No. 203 (Vol.
51, No. 3, 1999), features a number of
interesting articles on the various
approaches to Islamic art adopted by
museums today, with a guest
editorial on ‘Exhibiting the art of the
Muslim World’, by Oleg Grabar, one
of the foremost specialists on the
subject of Islamic art.
Art & Culture Agenda
The Agenda is produced by
t h e Centre of Islamic Culture
in Rotterdam, The Nether-
lands. Please send all
information with regard to
activities related to culture
and art in the Islamic World
t o :
The Centre of Islamic Culture
P.O. Box 361
3 0 0 0 AJ Rotterdam
T h eN e t h e r l a n d s
Fax: +31 10 270 71 82
E-mail: mediatheek@wereld
m u s e u m . r o t t e r d a m . n l
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Labour in Pakistan
Date: 26-29 December 1999
Venue: K a r a c h i
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Yunas Samad,
Department of Social and
Economic Studies, University of
Bradford, West Yorkshire, 
BD7 1DP, UK
a.y.samad@bradford.ac.uk 
tel +44 1274 234802,
fax +44 1274 385295 
Dr Kamran Asad Ali, Department of
Anthropology, 
University of Rochester, USA
knar@uhura.cc.rochester.edu 
tel +1 716 2758614
Karamat Ali
k a r a m a t @ p i l e r . k h i . s d n p k . u n d p . o r g
tel +92 21 4557009
fax +92 21 45557009
The Centrality of the
Qur’an in Islamic and
Middle Eastern Culture
Date: 10-11 January 2000
Information: A. Jones or R. Nettler, 
The Oriental Institute, Pusey Lane,
Oxford, OX1 2LE, UK
URL: h t t p : / / u s e r s . o x . a c . u k / ~ n e a r e a s t /
q u r ’ a n i n . h t m
Crossing Borders:
Cultural, National and
Islamic Identities in Asia
Panel at the 2000 Association of Asian
Studies Annual Meeting 
D a t e : 9-12 March 2000
Venue: Town and Country Resort &
Convention Center, San Diego,
California, USA
I n f o r m a t i o n : Ron Lukens-Bull,
University of North Florida
R l u k e n s b u l @ a o l . c o m
First Mediterranean Social
and Political Research
M e e t i n g
D a t e : 22-26 March 2000
V e n u e : Robert Schuman Centre at
t h e European University Institute,
Via dei Roccettini, 9, 50016 San
Domenico di Fiesole, Italy
I n f o r m a t i o n :
Ann-Charlotte Svantesson 
tel +39 055 4685785
s v a n t e s s @ i u e . i t
Imco Brouwer
tel +39 055 4685783 or 426
b r o u w e r @ i u e . i t
Iran 2000: The Challenges
ahead. 18t h Annual CIRA
C o n f e r e n c e
D a t e : 28-29 April 2000
V e n u e : Hyatt Regency Bethesda,
Maryland, USA
I n f o r m a t i o n : Kamran Dadkhah,
Department of Economics,
Northeastern University, Boston,
MA 02115, USA 
tel +1 617 3732297
k d a d k h a h @ l y n x . n e u . e d u





D a t e : 4-6 May 2000
I n f o r m a t i o n : Peri Bearman, Harvard
Law School, Pound Hall 501,
Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
p b e a r m a n @ l a w . h a r v a r d . e d u
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . l a w . h a r v a r d . e d u /
P r o g r a m s / I L S P
2000 South Asian
Women’s Conference
Date: 6-7 may 2000
V e n u e : Los Angeles, California
I n f o r m a t i o n : Sangeeta Gupta, PhD,
Director, SAWC, PMB 260, 1198
Pacific Coast Hwy, Ste. D. Seal
Beach, CA 90740-6200,USA
s a g e e t a u c l a @ y a h o o . c o m




Date: 25-28 May 2000
Venue: Hyatt Regency Hotel,
Bethesda, Maryland, USA
I n f o r m a t i o n : SIS Executive Secretary,
Kambiz Eslami, c/o Princeton
University Library 
tel +1 609 2581308 
fax +1 609 2580441
k e s l a m i @ p o p 3 . c i t . p r i n c e t o n . e d u
BRISMES 2000 Centre for
Middle Eastern and Islamic
S t u d i e s
D a t e : 2 and 5 July 2000
V e n u e : University of Cambridge
I n f o r m a t i o n : University of Cambridge,
Faculty of Oriental Studies,
Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, 
CB3 9DA, UK
tel +01223 335103
fax +01223 335103 
o r i e n t a l - m e s - a d m i n @ l i s t s . c a m . a c . u k
D e a d l i n e : abstract or proposal by 31
January 2000
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . d u r . a c . u k / b r i s m e s /
a c t i v i t i e s . h t m l
Respect and Tolerance
between Islam and
Christianity in the Texts of
History and Liturature in
2 0 0 0
D a t e : 15-18 May 2000
V e n u e : Cannakale, Turkey
I n f o r m a t i o n : Terzioglu Kampusu,
Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University
tel + 00 90 286-213 02 05/ 213 01 55
fax + 00 90 286-212 20 33
z e k i c e m i l a r d a @ h o t m a i l . c o m
6t h Biennial EASA
Conference: Crossing
Categorical Boundaries:
Religion as Politics /
Politics as Religion
Date: 26-29 July 2000
V e n u e : Krakow, Poland
I n f o r m a t i o n : Secretariat European
Association of Social
Anthropologists (EASA), Urgell 259,
s.s.3, E-08026 Barcelona, Spain
tel/fax +34 9 33212259
e a s a @ t r i v i u m . g h . u b . e s
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . u b . e s / e a s a / 6 t h . h t m
I n t e r n a t i o n a l




P h i l o s o p h y
D a t e : 1-4 August 2000
V e n u e : Calcutta, India
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Chandana
Chakrabarti, Elon College Campus
Box 2336, Elon College, N.C. 27244,
USA, chakraba@numen.elon.edu




for the History of
Religions (IAHR)
Date: 5-12 August 2000
V e n u e : International Convention
Centre Durban, South Africa
I n f o r m a t i o n : Prof. Pratap Kumar,
Department of Science of Religion,
University of Durban-Westville,
Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000,
South Africa
kumar@pixie.udw.ac.za 
General Secretary of the IAHR 
Prof. Armin Geertz, 
Department of the Study of
Religion, 
University of Aarhus, Main Building,
DK-8000 Aarhus C., Denmark
geertz@teologi.aau.dk 
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . u d w . a c . z a / i a h r
International Congress of
Asian and North African
Studies (ICANAS) on
Oriental and Asian Studies
in the Era of Globalization
Date: 27 August – 1 September 2000
V e n u e : Montreal Convention Center,
201 Viger Avenue West, Montreal,
C a n a d a
I n f o r m a t i o n : ICANAS 2000 Secretariat,
Bureau des Congrès, Université de
Montreal, P.O. Box 6128, 
Station Downtown, 
Montréal (Québec) H3C 3J7,
C a n a d a
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . b c o c . u m o n t r e a l . c a
International Conference
on Middle Eastern Popular
C u l t u r e
Date: 17-21 September 2000
V e n u e : Magdalen College, University
of Oxford, UK
I n f o r m a t i o n : Near Eastern Studies
Programme, The Oriental Institute,
University of Oxford, UK
n e a r e a s t @ o r i n s t . o x . a c . u k
URL: h t t p : / / u s e r s . o x . a c . u k / ~ n e a r e a s t /
m i d d l e . h t m
7t h European Conference
on Central Asian Studies:
Central Asia: 
Past, Present and Future
Date: 25-30 September 2000
Venue: Vienna University, Institute for
Social and Cultural Anthropology 
I n f o r m a t i o n : Asst. Prof. Mag. 
Dr Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, 




tel +43 1 427748506,
g a b r i e l e . r a s u l y @ u n i v i e . a c . a t
Medical Ethics and
Medical Law in Islam
Date: 19-21 March 2001
V e n u e : University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Vardit Rispler-Chaim,
Department of Arabic Language
and Literature, University of Haifa,
I s r a e l
tel +972 4 8249789,
r h l a 1 0 3 @ u v m . h a i f a . a c . i l
XXVIII Deutcher
O r i e n t a l i s t e n t a g
Date: 26-30 March 2001
V e n u e : Bamberg, Germany
I n f o r m a t i o n : Maurus Reinkowski,
Lehrstuhl für Türkische Sprache, 
An der Universität 11, D-96045
Bamberg, Germany 
tel +49 951 8632196 
fax +49 951 8635182
d o t 2 0 0 1 @ s p l i t . u n i - b a m b e r g . d e
Islamic Studies in Europe
S e r i e s
The International Institute for
Islamic Thought (IIIT) and national
academic institutions will be
holding a series of seminars on
Islamic Studies in Europe in various
European cities from February
2000. The seminars will focus on
the state of this discipline and
identify serious lacunae in the
present state of research within its
many fields of specialization.
Tentative date for UK conference is
July 2000. For all other dates and
more information about this series
of seminars, please contact IIIT at
the following address:
p f 0 6 @ d i a l . p i p e x . c o m
Academic Meetings ISIM Agenda
The University of Melbourne of Australia,
an internationally recognized teaching and
research institution, is offering a Master of
Arts in Islamic Studies by distance educa-
tion from March 2000. Delivered mainly
over the Internet, the course offers a com-
prehensive programme in Islamic Studies
that attempts to bridge the gap between
traditional and modern scholarship.
The Master of Arts in Islamic Studies is
rigorous and maintains the highest acade-
mic standards, whilst offering a flexible
approach to learning, enabling graduates
in Islamic Studies or cognate disciplines, ir-
respective of their geographical locations,
to continue their studies at the University
of Melbourne. 
The course focuses strongly on develop-
ing analytical skills, critical thinking and
scholarly writing. It provides the student
with tools, concepts and skills that build
upon previously acquired skills and knowl-
edge. It familiarizes the student with the
extensive body of literature on Islam and
Muslims in both Western academia and
classical Islamic scholarship, enabling the
student to place many areas of Islamic
Studies into their philosophical, intellectu-
al, social, historical and economic contexts.
Candidates for the MA (Islamic Studies)
should have a BA Pass or BA Honours de-
gree in Islamic Studies or in a related disci-
pline and must satisfy the University of
Melbourne English language require-
ments. Instruction is in English.
Course Objectives 
The Master of Arts (Islamic Studies) has as
its objectives that candidates completing
the course should be able to: 
– demonstrate a superior knowledge and
understanding of current issues and
challenges in each of the selected spe-
cialized areas of the course; 
– demonstrate an in-depth knowledge and
understanding of various conceptual
frameworks and theoretical perspectives
presented in the course; 
– demonstrate an understanding and ap-
plication of the latest research findings in
the selected specialized area of the pro-
gramme; 
– express informed opinions about partic-
ular areas chosen by the student; and 
– demonstrate an understanding of the
theory and practice of research needed
to evaluate research literature and carry
out appropriate research activities.
Course Structure 
Students with a BA Honours degree will
finish the course in 12 months (full-time) or
24 months (part-time) by completing six
subjects and a short thesis. Students with a
BA pass degree will finish the course in 18
months (full-time) or 36 months (part-time)
by completing ten subjects and a short the-
sis. At this stage, 12 subjects will be offered: 
– Analysis of Texts in Islamic Sources 
– Islam and Questioning of Modernity 
– Methods of Qur’anic Sciences 
– Researching Islam and Muslim Societies 
– Methodology of Hadith 
– Islamic Banking and Finance 
– Islamic Theology: Schools and Methods 
– Islamic Education: Philosophy and
Methods 
– Muslim Philosophical Traditions 
– Methods of Islamic Law 
– Sufism: Doctrines and Practices 
– Minor Thesis in Islamic Studies
(10 – 12,000 words)
Assessment & Examination 
Assessment will depend on the units
studied, details of which are provided in
the study package. To complete each unit,
students generally have to undertake a re-
search paper of about 2000 words as well
as sit a three-hour written examination at
a centre approved by the University.
Application Deadlines 
To commence studies in Semester 1,
March 2000, the closing date for applica-
tions is 30 November 1999. Some late ap-
plications up to the end of January 2000
may be accepted. To commence studies in
Semester 2, July 2000, the closing date for
applications is 30 April 2000. ♦
New Web-Based Master
of Arts Programme













Department of Islamic and
Middle Eastern Studies,














Seminar to be held in
Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
June 2000
‘Religion and Economy in
Muslim Societies’
Seminar to be held in Jakarta,
I n d o n e s i a .
ISIM Activities in
cooperation with other
i n s t i t u t e s
17 January – 6 March 2000
‘Europe’s crescent’
Series of lectures on Islam
i n Europe organized by Felix
Meritis and the European
Cultural Foundation, in
cooperation with the ISIM on
the following dates at 2 0 . 3 0 :
17 January 2000 
Hafid Bouazza
‘Images of Muslims in 19th
and 20th-century literature’
( i n Dutch) 
24 January 2000
Peter Clark
‘From Fantasy to Faith: Islam
and architecture in the United





colonialism’ (in D u t c h )
7 February 2000
Parvez Manzoor
‘Islam and the notion of multi-
cultural society in Europe’
14 February 2000
Ger Duijzings
‘Islam in the Balkans: between
myth and reality’ (in Dutch)
21 February 2000
Martin van Amerongen
‘Muslims in Mozart’s “Die
Enthführung aus dem Serail”’
( i nD u t c h )
28 February 2000
Steven Vertovec
‘Muslim youth in Western
E u r o p e ’
6 March 2000 
Jørgen Nielsen
‘Islamic orientations in Europe’
5 February 2000
‘Living Islam’
An event on ‘Islam on the
Internet’ and ‘Islam and Music’










t h e CERI, with the cooperation
o f ISIM, on Islamist
movements in the last quarter
of the 20t h c e n t u r y .
(To take place in Paris, France)




I S I M
E d i t o r i a l
by Dick Douwes
2
ISIM Chair at Utrecht University:
Martin van Bruinessen
3




Transformation Processes in Africa
4
Georges Khalil
Notions of Law and Order
4
G E N E R A L  IS S U E S
Rebecca Popenoe
Islam and the Body:
Female Fattening among Arabs in Niger
5
Fadwah El Guindi
Veiled Men, Private Women
in Arabo-Islamic Culture
6
Cindy van den Bremen




I d e n t i t i e s
8
Bruce Lawrence
Neither Civil nor Info Society Offers Muslims
the Hope of Global Equity
9
R E G IO N A L  I S S UE S
Sithi Hawwa
Religious Conversion of Filipino Domestic
Helpers in Hong Kong
1 0
Elizabeth Attané
Identity and Fertility: Muslims in Xianxiang
1 1
Jacqueline Armijo-Hussein
Resurgence of Islamic Education in China
1 2
Farish Noor
Islam vs Secularism? The New Political
Terrain in Malaysia and Indonesia
1 3
Martin Ramstedt
Muslim-Hindu Relations in Indonesia
1 4
Patrick Garrone
B a k s y l y k: a Muslim Declination
o fS h a m a n i s m
1 5
Mujeeb Ahmad
Da’wat-i-Islami: an Aspiring Transnational








The Horbinger of a New Era in Iran
1 8
Eugene Rogan
Ottoman Muslim Missionaries and
t h e Transjordan Frontier
1 9
Sami Al-Khazendar
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s
Perceptions of the Palestinian Issue
2 0 - 2 1
Timothy Furnish
Mahdism in the Sunni Arab World Today
2 2
Remco Ensel
Resurgent Voices: Profanation of
t h e Shurafa in Modern Morocco
2 3
Jan Abbink




Medina Gounass: the End of a Religious
I s o l a t e
2 5
Vladimir Chukov














Is Islam Soluble into Germany?
Sunni Muslims of Turkish Origin
30 
R E S E A R C H
Louis Brenner
The Study of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa
3 1
Vladimir Bobrovnikov
Islamic Studies in Post-Soviet Russia: 
in Search of New Approaches, 
3 2
I N S T I T U T E S
Angelika Neuwirth
The Orient Institute in Beirut and Istanbul
3 3
Elizabeth Picard




The Institute of Ismaili Studies
3 5
John L. Esposito
The Center for Muslim-Christian
Understanding: History and International
A f f a i r s
3 5
C O N F E R E N C E  R E P O R T S
Mohd Hazim Shah
Second International Malaysian Studies
C o n f e r e n c e
3 6
Nadje Al-Ali
New Approaches to Migration:
Transnational Communities and the
Transformation of Home
3 6
P U B L I C A T I O N S
Nico Kaptein
New Research Tool for Malay Studies
3 7
I NF O  P A G E S






V A C A N C I E S
New ISIM
Fellowships 
The ISIM invites applications and research
proposals for various fellowships through-
out 2000. Applications from candidates in
all fields of the social sciences, humanities
and religious studies will be considered. All
candidates should be competent in acade-
mic English. 
The ISIM fellowships include:
– PhD Fellowships: ISIM PhD fellowships are
granted for a period of up to 4 years. The
applicants should hold an MA degree or
similar qualification in their field. Most of
the PhD fellowships are placed within one
of the ISIM Research Programmes. Howev-
er, innovative individual PhD research
proposals are also invited.
– Postdoctoral Fellowships: ISIM postdoctor-
al fellowships are granted for a period of
up to 2 years and are available to young
scholars who have received their PhD de-
gree less than 5 years prior to application. 
– Visiting Fellowships: ISIM visiting fellow-
ships are granted for a period of up to 3
months. Some of these senior research
fellowships will be offered upon invita-
tion, others will be awarded in open com-
petition. 
– Sabbatical Fellowships: the ISIM offers fa-
cilities to academic staff of participating
and other universities to conduct re-
search. In specific cases, the ISIM makes
funds available to finance the temporary
replacement for teaching at the home
u n i v e r s i t y .
For more information on the various fellowships and
to download an application form, see the ISIM
Website:  http://www.isim.nl
or write to: ISIM Fellowship Programmes,
P.O. Box 11089, 2301 EB Leiden, The Netherlands
C o n t e n t s
The International Institute for
t h e Study of Islam in the Modern
World (ISIM) promotes and
conducts interdisciplinary
research on contemporary social
and intellectual trends and
movements in Muslim societies
and communities. The ISIM’s
research approaches are
expressly interdisciplinary and
comparative, covering a large
geographic range which includes
North Africa and the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia,
South and Southeast Asia, and
(Muslim communities in) the
West. Broad in its scope, the ISIM
brings together all areas of
e x p e r t i s e .
